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WINTER, 1960-61

RELIGION IN LIFE

Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

A Christian Quarterly
OF OPINION AND DISCUSSION

VOLUME XXX

1960-61

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RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY of opinion and discussion

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Editorial

IF IN addition to binding up the wounded it is also the business of religion to release the captive, then it is appropriate that the modern churchman should examine the contemporary threats to freedom. Actually the enslaving of men in modern life is more subtle—even more discreet—than when military conquest or economic serfdom were the procedures. There was a time when the shout against power was directed to Wall Street; but now there are equally vigorous shouts against Madison Avenue. The real power struggle is for men's reflex-conditioned minds; we are afraid to conquer their bodies by military power, for fission annihilates the conqueror as well as the conquered.

Within the twenty-nine years of *RELIGION IN LIFE* just completed, we have had a noble procession of ecumenical churchmen serving on our Editorial Board. One of these, Bishop G. Ashton Oldham of the Episcopal Church, has prepared the Commentary for this issue of our journal. He reflects the judgment of the Editorial Board that the struggle for a free world is a Christian concern; that the Christian scholar should be as vigorous in his search for the foundations of freedom in all areas of human endeavor as are those who seek more powerful weapons of destruction; that new methods of the good must overcome evil. It is with pride that we present Bishop Oldham's Commentary.

We have lost the senior member of our Editorial Board, Dr. John Baillie of Edinburgh, Scotland. His death this past summer ended a career of great scholarship. He was a member of the very first Editorial Board called together to launch *RELIGION IN LIFE* twenty-nine years ago. His leadership as recent moderator of The Church of Scotland and as president of the World Council of Churches was characterized always by Christian brotherhood. For John Baillie, Christ was the head of the church and of the world, and with his Scotch determination he never settled for anything less. In essence, what we are saying in this issue about freedom is a way of paying tribute to the things John Baillie stood for throughout his life.

Here begins our thirtieth year.

E.S.B.

Problems of American Freedom

I. Freedom of the Press

DAN LACY

I

IT IS PART of the genius and the strength of Protestantism that it arose and thrives in the free marketplace of contending theologies. This is one of its great and dynamic legacies, shared commonly in its diversity, which must be protected zealously lest, by silence and inaction, Protestants suffer disinheritance and may no longer say "Come, let us reason together." For the free spirit is no longer free when it cannot communicate. A complex of interlinked freedoms is thus a legacy which the Founding Fathers, whether self-proclaimed Deists or Christians, inherited and viewed as an integral part of their holistic conception of democracy; these freedoms are indivisible; when one of them is encroached upon, all others are in jeopardy.

So profound and so consistent was their faith in this indivisibility that the Constitutional guarantee of the freedom of the press was written as a part of the amendment that also guarantees freedom of speech, of assembly, and of religion. All of these freedoms, as both the secular historian Carl V. Becker and the religious historian James Hastings Nichols have affirmed so amply, were inextricably linked in the eighteenth-century mind. Licensing of the press in many European countries had been in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities, and everywhere in Europe censorship was exercised largely, even primarily, in an effort to sustain religious orthodoxy by the suppression of heresy. In an age in which theology occupied men's impassioned attention as political and economic ideas now do, the powers of the state and of organized respectability were freely employed to silence speech that might sully the purity of religious doctrine. Many Americans had come to these shores heretics in the eyes of their home countries; and

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freedom of speech and of the press were to them essential parts of the freedom to witness to their dissident faith.

The Founding Fathers had also emerged from a revolutionary experience in which the success of their cause had owed much to the freedom of the colonial press and pulpit to point out and attack what were construed as the evils of British rule. There they refreshed their knowledge that freedom of speech and of the press were indispensable weapons against the abuse of both political and religious authority. They were men who esteemed the value of what the world knew as heresy, who had built their religious and political lives around it, and felt that the purity of the political and religious beliefs which they had attained could be better assured by their being constantly exposed to a cleansing and ultimately creative criticism than by their being sheltered from attack.

Those heretical views soon became, in their turn, the American orthodoxy; and there has been present in our subsequent history a recurring tension between the pressure to still the tongue or pen that challenged the political, economic, religious or moral status quo, and the countering pressure to preserve the freedoms of belief and communication that were equally fixed in the American tradition. Times of rapid change, when accepted patterns have seemed most threatened by new doctrine, have generally witnessed a heightening of that tension. We are living in such a period today, and it may be worth a brief review of what our traditional freedom of the press has meant and what it means when applied to contemporary problems.

When the authors and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights proclaimed that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of the press . . .", they very likely intended only a very specific limit on the powers of the Congress. They probably meant only that the Congress could not require anyone to secure official permission before setting up a printing press and printing on it whatever he chose, and that the state could not make a law punishing him for what he *might* have published; he could be punished only after conviction by a jury of his peers in a trial in which the libelous or criminal character of what was uttered was one of the issues to be decided by that jury under criteria consonant with those in the common law. Contemporaneous provisions in the various state constitutions emphasized that freedom from prior restraint upon what a man might choose to publish did not protect him from subsequent legal responsibility.

Regardless of what we may now assume to have been the original conceptions of these rights, a decade had not passed before the Revolu-

tionary father, John Adams, now President, welcomed Alien and Sedition Acts under which men were sent summarily to prison for attacks upon his administration. This measure, however, went clearly beyond the Constitutional consensus as to the boundaries of freedom of the press, and when the Acts were promptly repealed, no voice could be heard in remonstrance. Thereafter, attacks upon officers or parties in power, as contrasted with attacks upon the form of government, have enjoyed almost complete immunity from subsequent prosecution as well as prior restraint.

During most of the nineteenth century the meaning of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of the press scarcely came into question, perhaps because our forefathers legislated less than we do, perhaps because the courts of those days were less prone to question the constitutional validity of legislation, but perhaps primarily because during most of that century there was less ideological and moral tension than in most periods of our history. Conservative desires to suppress abolitionist propaganda led to acts to exclude such materials from the mails; during the Civil War there were severe but temporary limitations on personal freedom; and near the end of the century when anarchism seemed to offer an alien threat, there were measures to prevent the importation of anarchist materials, along with those advocating assassination or polygamy. Much more to be debated in later years were state statutes making the sale or distribution of obscene publications illegal and a Federal act forbidding their carriage in the mails, nearly all of which were monuments to the rather obsessed concern of Anthony Comstock with verbal and pictorial references to sex.

The tensions of the First World War provoked the passage of a series of acts, notably the espionage act of 1917, whose subsequent history in the courts led to the first systematic efforts to define the limits of legislative authority to provide punishment (as contrasted with prior restraint) for the issuance of publications. In *Schenck v. the United States* (249 U.S. 47 [1919]) the Court held that the freedom of the press was not absolute, and that the legislature, balancing a conflict of rights, might forbid utterance that presented a "clear and present danger" to the state. In affirming a subsequent series of convictions, the Supreme Court went far beyond the meaning attached to those words by Justice Holmes, the author of the opinion in which they first appeared. The Court, in essence, in such cases as *Abrams v. the United States* (250 U.S. 616 [1919]) seemed to be saying that if the legislature, exercising reasonable judgment, decided that utterances of a given class presented a palpable danger to the peace or security

of the state, any individual utterance found to belong to that class could constitutionally be held illegal, even in the total absence of evidence that in fact the particular utterance presented any danger, even vague and remote. It is difficult to conceive a political utterance, held illegal by a trial court under a Federal or state statute that was not totally unreasonable, which the Supreme Court of the 1920's would have found to enjoy constitutional protection. There can be no doubt that the attitude of the Court in those years, perhaps the nadir of liberty in the United States, reflected not the tensions of the war which engendered the restrictive acts but rather the panic fear of Soviet communism, first looming as a terrifying threat to American institutions. (The Alien and Sedition Acts of John Adams' administration sprang more from a similar fear of the transplantation of ideas from the far-off French Revolution than from the real problems within the United States.)

II

The problem of political censorship remained quiescent during the thirties until the hostility to Nazism and the tensions of the Second World War revived old and produced new legislation, far more temperate, however, than that of the First World War. Again the restrictive acts, especially the Smith Act, and the interpretation by Attorney General Jackson of the Alien Registration Act in such a way as to make possible the exclusion of foreign political propaganda, received the most vigorous enforcement not in dealing with German propaganda and related materials during the war but in dealing with strengthened Russian propaganda after the war. Here, however, the courts, like the Congress, exercised much greater restraint. The Smith Act, in the *Yates* case (304 U.S. 298 [1952]), received a very narrow judicial interpretation; and it is very nearly true to say that no man was imprisoned following World War II for the mere publication of his opinions apart from overt criminal acts. Communist publications, for example, though subject to some harassment, have continued to be openly published, mailed, and sold, throughout the bitterest days of the Cold War—which would have been impossible in a situation of comparable tension following World War I.

Indeed the direct limitations imposed by governmental action on the freedom of political communication today are very slight indeed, and those of the greatest importance—the probably illegal limitations on the import of political materials somewhat haphazardly imposed by the United States Customs Bureau and Post Office Department—do not limit publication within the United States.

Similarly, religious "heresy"—as such—is not now proscribed by any censorship acts, though until that provision was struck down in 1952 by the United States Supreme Court, a New York State statute forbade the licensing of "sacrilegious" films. That decision, involving the Italian film, *The Miracle*, reaffirmed a 1948 decision bringing motion pictures into the area of communications, and thus within the scope of the First Amendment. Direct acts of Federal, state, or local governments suppressing publications were now confined almost entirely to those charged with "obscenity." All or nearly all states and most municipalities have statutes, often providing severe penalties, that forbid the publication or sale of obscene items. Federal statutes prohibit their import, their passage through the mails, and their interstate carriage by common carrier.

Though in passing references in opinions devoted primarily to other matters the Supreme Court had from time to time lumped obscene publications with some other kinds of utterances as being beyond the protection of the Constitution, not until very recent years did the Supreme Court—or the lower courts for that matter—endeavor seriously to consider the constitutional limits of legislation aimed at obscenity. Space will certainly not permit any catalog of cases or detailed recounting of the rather complex history of recent adjudications in this area. Suffice it to summarize by saying that, taking all recent cases together, the courts have held:

1. Obscenity does not enjoy the protection of the freedom of the press clause of the First Amendment. But the courts must define "obscenity" and may review lower decisions to be assured that works charged are in fact obscene.

2. Obscenity can be determined only by the courts under the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A sheriff or police chief or prosecuting attorney may not draw up and circulate lists of books and magazines with a view to having them withdrawn from sale. Not only are such actions violative of due process, but if, in the case of magazines, specific issues are not identified, the action involves prior restraint upon publication in that area.

3. A work is obscene only if, lacking "even the slightest redeeming social importance," its dominant theme, "*considered as a whole*," is an appeal to the prurient interest (i.e., "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion") of the normal person and unless it also goes beyond the bounds permitted by contemporary community standards. Works are not obscene merely because they contain language usually considered vulgar or filthy, or treat of sex, or defend actions generally believed

immoral. Nudity *per se* is not obscene. The sale of a work to an adult may not be forbidden merely on the ground that it would be obscene for a minor.

These decisions certainly in no way interfere with the prosecution of peddlers of "hard-core" pornography. On the other hand, they afford a substantial protection to any work of literary, informative, or polemical intent. They leave unclearly defined the status of deliberately salacious "girly" magazines and similar contrived publications skirting the edge of pornography. They require that all materials be dealt with by due process of law.

The sum of recent legal history is that the press, though by no means completely protected, is nevertheless more effectively safeguarded against direct governmental censorship today than at any time in our history or in any other country in the world. This freedom is uncomfortable to many earnest and sincere citizens, who are frightened by communist propaganda, or whose deep feelings on racial issues are offended by racist agitation or conversely by advocacy of integration, or who are disturbed by written or pictorial references to sex, or troubled by what may appear to them a preoccupation of the mass media with violence. This concern often finds expression through extra-legal committees and pressure groups. The Daughters of the American Revolution may demand the removal of textbooks in which they believe they detect revolutionary or "one-world" sentiments; the American Legion may demand that a school library ban books by authors accused of affiliation with organizations to which the Legion objects; the White Citizens Council may denounce books in which white rabbits play with black rabbits; parents' committees may demand the dismissal of teachers who encourage students to read the works of Whitman or Orwell or Huxley; local decent literature committees may demand that newsstands remove from sale all books to which they object or which are listed as "objectionable for youth" by the Catholic-sponsored National Office for Decent Literature. Reason for concern there undoubtedly may be. Abhorrent beliefs such as racism, anti-Semitism, totalitarianism, and flouting of the law of the land, may be openly advocated. The mass media may be used for the commercial exploitation of sex and violence.

But for abuses that pass the limits of the law there are the police and the courts. For *all* abuses there are the remedies of persuasion and example. And the private group's grasping at the power to dictate the taste or the access to ideas of their fellow citizens—however vulgar the taste or foolish

the ideas—is itself surely an abuse at least as grave and immoral, even when directed against alleged immorality.

III

The issues of freedom of the press today, however, involve far more than public or private censorship. When the Bill of Rights was enacted, it was not an unsound assumption that ideas would flow freely if officers of the government and private vigilantes could not prevent speakers from speaking and printers from printing. In that day of town meetings and newspapers with circulations under 1,000, communication was essentially face-to-face, not mediated by any elaborate institutional structure. Today an idea cannot be effectively communicated except to the degree that it has access to one of the great media of communication. These include not only the broadcast networks and newspapers and national magazines, but the libraries and schools—the last being by all odds the largest system of communication we have. In all of these patterns of communication the range of choice is necessarily limited. A school normally has only a single textbook for a given course, and even the school library must choose its dozens of books relating to any one course, selecting some, rejecting far more. There can be only a few television outlets in any one city, usually one or two or three, and each can broadcast only one show at a time, generally a network program, selected by one company official or committee for millions or tens of millions to view at once. Few cities any longer have more than one competing newspaper, and a handful of mass-circulation magazines, of closely similar points of view, dominate the general-magazine, and especially the news-magazine, field. Even the public library, perhaps the broadest in range of all our media of communication, must in most cases select only a very small proportion of the total number of books issued by a free press.

What this means is that though no one in our country can silence speech or stop a printing press or mimeograph machine, the mere right to speak or print words means very little unless those words enter the channels of mass communication. And some men must have the power to determine what information and what ideas can enter these necessarily limited channels. In a sense this power, though used for different ends, is greater than that of any eighteenth-century censor.

Insofar as schools and public libraries are concerned, this power is in the hands of governmental or administrative bodies, who must select the particular textbooks and supplemental reading books and the particular

library books that are used. Normally these decisions are in the hands of professional librarians and educators, who make their decisions with the purpose of maximizing the information available to students and readers. But the decisions may be taken out of their hands—as in Mississippi, where textbook selection has been placed in the hands of a special commission appointed by the Governor with the apparent object of assuring that ideas, particularly relative to race, that displease the dominant groups of that state shall not enter the schools. Or decisions may be forced by outside committees, as when some years ago all books on UNESCO were ordered removed from the Bartlesville, Oklahoma, Public Library. And as a recent survey in California indicates, librarians—and no doubt teachers as well—themselves quietly do a good deal of precensoring to avoid the possibility of trouble.

In the case of mass media, the power to control content rests in the owners of the newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting stations and networks—subject in the case of broadcasting to certain governmental controls. Since the owners, by and large, make up a relatively homogeneous group of successful businessmen, it is perhaps not surprising that the political and economic viewpoint expressed through these media, particularly newspapers and news magazines, is relatively homogeneous and conservative. More important than the expression of the owners' views, however, is the necessity, in these advertising-supported media, of shaping an editorial content that will set up a mass audience for the advertisers' appeals. This necessity exerts a pressure toward a uniform and oversimplified presentation of majority views, limiting a public opportunity to become familiar with minority and divergent views or with the difficult complexity that characterizes so many of the life-and-death problems we face.

All of these limits on the freedom of communication are reinforced by the fact that the only authoritative source of information on issues of the most crucial importance to our future is likely to be the Federal Government. Questions of atomic radiation, weapons policy, disarmament, and foreign policy are typical examples. Freedom of the press was constitutionally guaranteed primarily to make possible an informed and critical popular judgment of government. Yet as to these and like issues on which the future of our nation and even the race may depend, such a judgment is most difficult, for we are almost wholly dependent on information selectively released by the government and too often uniformly and uncritically disseminated by the mass media.

The consequence of all these limitations is that, although direct official

censorship has become a relatively minor limitation on the freedom of the press, formidable barriers to truly free communication still exist and may indeed be growing. And the character of these barriers is such that freedom of communications is most severely limited on just those subjects and in just those places in which it is most desperately needed. There is no problem about the free debate in the public press of a sewer bond issue, for example; but the recognition of Communist China is another matter. In an all-white Vermont town where integration is not an issue, the public library will doubtless have an ample collection of books on the subject. In a Southern town in which information and mutual understanding are most urgently needed to meet a racial crisis, divergent and mutually enlightening opinions are likely to be found neither in the school nor, often, in the library. The press can tell us all we need to know about agricultural policy or Federal Reserve Board practices, but is it free to discover and tell us what we really must know if we are to decide wisely on the vastly more important questions of hydrogen bomb-testing?

IV

In so brief an article one cannot discuss or even identify all these facets of the problem of free communication in our society. One can only try to point out that freedom of the press is a very much more complex question than mere official censorship, and that an actual freedom in the flow of information depends on a vast and intricate structure of governmental, social, and business institutions and arrangements. Far from being a settled achievement of our civilization, it is a goal very far from attainment. And the encircling perils of today's world make its nearer attainment a matter of the most urgent importance. It must be achieved not merely by the negative avoidance of official censorship, but by positive action to create a governmental, economic, and psychological environment in which free communication can flourish.

This suggests that a Christian concern with freedom of the press must extend beyond the letter of the constitutional guarantees to such objects as:

1. Opposition to extra-legal efforts in the community to force the opinions or tastes of a private group, however well-intentioned, upon the libraries or schools or booksellers of the community.
2. The integrity and responsibility of the press in allowing a fair voice to minority views.
3. Legislation and Federal Communications Commission action affecting broadcasting. These are most complex questions, in which the

path to more effective freedom must be sought through a maze of legal, technological, and economic considerations; but few questions are more important.

4. Support for educators who seek to create and preserve in the schools a free forum for the objective consideration of wide-ranging views, even views we may ourselves reject.

5. Support for school and public libraries. For the child or man who comes alone to form his own views, these libraries can give him his private choice among thousands of sources of ideas and information rather than lumping him with ten million other viewers linked passively before a single voice and a single face upon a screen.

Such a Christian concern extends to one thing more, perhaps the most important of all and the one in which the church's influence can be most powerful. The greatest of all barriers to freedom of speech and press lies in the mind of the listener and reader. It has been said that whom the gods would destroy they first make mad. It is at least equally true that whom they would destroy they first make deaf. Whatever the laws and constitutional guarantees, no free press can achieve its healing and saving service in a community that has closed its mind in fear.

Leaders of the church in individual communities bear perhaps a special responsibility in resisting the usually well-intentioned but always frightened and often hysterical efforts to set up committees outside the law to attack textbooks, purge newsstands, ban books from libraries, or bring pressure on newspapers.

If the continued influence of the church supports a freedom of mind that is willing to invite the free circulation of the range of human thought and creation, confident in the power of truth to prevail, it will have held open the way for a free press to serve its functions.

2. The Christian and the Censorship of Television, Radio and Films

HARRY C. SPENCER

"Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost."—*Thomas Jefferson*

ITEM: The United States Post Office Department reports that the traffic in obscene and pornographic material amounts to \$500,000,000 a year. (*Commonweal*, June 19, 1959, p. 292.)

Item: "In the fertile minds of children are implanted [by television] the seeds of violence, trickery and corruption, and the idea that as long as justice triumphs in the end, the means used to attain it matters little, if at all. Surely to present a preponderance of crime and saccharine superficiality is to distort the truth.' This statement was given to the Commission on behalf of the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, an organization of nearly twelve million parents, teachers and other citizens organized in more than 45,000 P.T.A.'s across the country." (Frederick W. Ford, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, to National Association of Broadcasters, Chicago, Illinois, April 5, 1960.)

Item: "You are working with the most precious resource of our nation: a whole generation of Americans who will some day make their country's policies and dispose of its great power. . . . The responsibility for their early preparation belongs to the older citizen, not the younger one." (President Eisenhower, at the opening session of the White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1960.)

I

The common man has a very sure judgment concerning the value of any statement: he maintains that who says it and who is listening to it are as important as whether it is true or false. This is not the usual judgment of the scientist or the theologian, who would put a higher premium on the absolute of either demonstrable fact or the revelation of

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faith. But the man or woman whose life is not spent in a research laboratory or an ivory tower says, "Billy Graham is a great evangelist because he filled Madison Square Garden, while the local preacher cannot fill the church I attend."

This basis of judgment is commonly applied to television, radio and films. Since, as everyone knows, these marvels of modern mass communication have huge audiences, their messages must be important and to be reckoned with. Now, if a person disagrees with this message, he will be greatly troubled and concerned—not only because the message is a lie, but because over television it can have such a tremendous audience. The problem of sex and violence on television becomes then a compound problem: (1) the message itself may be false; and (2) the mass audience receiving the messages may be fantastically large. (Obviously, if everything TV said was gospel truth, no one would object to the audience, no matter how great. And if no one watched the program, the question whether it was good or bad would be academic.)

Furthermore, the significance of a message is in proportion to its impact on the individual. It would be possible for a person to look at an obscene book without any effect whatsoever, provided the writing was in Chinese and the person did not know Chinese. The situation would be different if the book contained illustrations. A motion picture multiplies the graphic quality of the message. This is its impact.

The problem the P.T.A. described appears, then, to have three elements: the truthfulness of the message, the size of the audience, and the impact of the message on the audience.

Impact of message, the power to gain and rivet attention, is the constant goal of television producers. It could be estimated in advance, if one could measure two factors: (a) what the audience really wants, and (b) the ability of this particular program to meet that need. Since these two factors cannot be forecast accurately, millions of dollars are spent on TV ratings to discover what *has* happened. And *Variety* gives a complete list of gross income for all major theaters across the country—to measure the public reaction to recent films.

It is important to recognize that excessive violence on the theater screens indicates a very deep emotional disturbance and need which is not being met in other ways. That does not justify the violence, but articles in *Esquire* on the Beats¹ reveal the source of some of this disturbance.

¹ See "The Philosophy of the Beat Generation," reprinted from *Esquire*, 1958, in *The Beats*, by Seymour Krim, Fawcett, 1960.

The reader can test this for himself by attending two different films and noticing the audiences that have paid for admission to see "Pollyanna" or "Circus of Horrors." The cost of admission is the same. Why, then, are the spectators so markedly different?

Concerning the obsession with sex, the article, "Women Without Men," by Eleanor Harris in *Look*, July 5, 1960, contains a number of significant clues. There are 21,000,000 unmarried women in the United States and many of these, though still continuing the "frenzied man hunt," recognize that they have no chance of getting married. A bar-girl is quoted as saying that she can spot a certain type who comes in every evening looking for some man to spend the night with. The author also reports that there are approximately 18,000,000 unmarried men in the country. If, added to these, one considers the unhappily married, it is easy to understand that a large percentage of the adult population are sexually frustrated. In a free economy, such frustrations are the obvious target of those who can make money by giving vicarious satisfactions to lives otherwise drab and unexciting. No one should be surprised, therefore, if our mass entertainment reeks with violence and sex.

So a fourth element must be added to the complex—namely, the competitive struggle for money, preferably easy money, by presenting shocking and immoral material. This results in all kinds of bizarre productions. Bosley Crowther, writing from Paris of the 1960 Cannes Film Festival, said:

... the most arresting aspect of the show was the evidence of malevolence and morbidity in many of the films, not to mention occasional revelations of degeneracy and decay. . . . It is this persistent aspect of corruption . . . that has some sober critics wondering and disturbed . . . [concerning] the full batch of films about incest, lechery, rape and other assorted aberrations.²

The *Variety* review of "Circus of Horrors" says it

is a fanciful tale of a renegade plastic surgeon who takes over a one-ring circus . . . [which] soon becomes a front for his sadistical hobbies . . . restoring the facial graces of beautiful women who were scarred in one way or another. Curiously, most of the femmes have criminal backgrounds which the medico uses as a whip to hold them as his concubines.³

In a review of "On N'Enterre Pas Le Dimanche," which "copped the top film critic award of the year," *Variety* reports that the hero's viewing of loving couples points up his need for love. It finally comes via a Swedish

² *New York Times*, May 29, 1960.

³ *Variety*, May 11, 1960.

girl, but she refuses to give in. They become engaged but her employers, a fickle literary and a sluttish wife, are his undoing. He is made jealous by the wife. Then he is seduced by the same wife, with a slaying to build a dubious climax.⁴

(It is interesting to note that *Variety* will speak with utmost frankness about plot lines, production quality, or feminine physical attributes, but the magazine seldom condones evil or obscenity.)

The fifth element we have recognized, then, is the wide divergence of some entertainment productions from the ethical and moral standards of the 75 per cent of the population (upper-middle, lower-middle, and upper-lower class) which "form what might be called the 'core culture.'"⁵

The sixth element is the effect of this divergent standard on the children of the entire population. Louis Pesce, director of the Motion Picture Division of the New York State Department of Education, is in charge of licensing all the films that are shown in that state. He says that though one cannot prove that violent or sexy films *cause* juvenile delinquency, it is also quite obvious that they "don't improve a bad situation. . . . Taken in conjunction with a disturbed home life, a social environment that's in a state of flux, . . . films of violence, brutality, crime and sex definitely do contribute to the anti-social attitude."⁶ The High School Teachers Association of New York City maintains that some books, magazines, pictures and programs are adversely influencing teenage audiences.⁷

A summary of the problem, then, includes six elements: (1) the size of the audience; (2) the impact of the visual medium; (3) the frustrations of many persons which lead them to seek the stimulation of violence and sex; (4) the pandering to these desires by a money-mad entrepreneur; (5) the content of the films which offends moral standards; (6) the possible connection between degenerate films and delinquency.

II

With a problem so large and so complicated, the obvious solution is to turn to the government for censorship of the motion picture and television industries. Censorship is defined as "official restriction of any public expression believed to threaten the governing authority or the social or moral order" (*Columbia Encyclopedia*). It goes back to Greek and

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ McGuire, Carson, "The Cultural Sources of Our Sex Attitudes and Behavior"—a paper presented to the National Council of Churches, November 13, 1958.

⁶ *Variety*, May 11, 1960.

⁷ *Senior Scholastic*, October 21, 1959.

Roman times. The church began censorship in the first century, but became much more vigorous about it after the invention of printing, which was a more effective means of communication. Censorship can be preventive, such as the recent censorship in Boston of the imported London musical, "Lock Up Your Daughters," where scenes were ordered changed prior to presentation to eliminate words like "lay," "bastards," "whore," and "rape."

Preventive censorship is necessary, according to Hearst's *Boston Daily Record*, because "Society has the right to protect itself from filth, whether physical, spoken or visual." The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts and the *Boston Herald* both objected to censorship prior to presentation, the *Herald* maintaining that legal action would have been possible in the courts later, the C.L.U. maintaining that censorship "violated the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression." Richard J. Sinnott, the censor in the case, said, "Obscenity and lewdness are not guaranteed in the Constitution."⁸

This incident illustrates the two kinds of censorship—preventive and punitive. The preventive is particularly repugnant and dangerous, according to Ephraim London, who says that it "bars a film from the screen before the public has a chance to see it."⁹ In a sense, this is like locking up a man to prevent him from murdering his neighbor. Of course, the analogy can be used by the proponents also: "Wouldn't you lock up a madman before he committed a crime?" In any event, such restraint would probably have to be based on laws against obscenity.

Although "Southern postmasters exercised effective censorship of abolitionist literature before the Civil War" (*Columbia Encyclopedia*), America had practically no legislation regarding obscenity until 1870. "Then after a ten-minute debate, pressured by a neurotic named Anthony Comstock, Congress passed America's first laws of obscenity. Until 1915, publishers submitted manuscripts to Comstock's Society—even Henry Mencken did it."¹⁰ Since then these laws have grown and multiplied. A summary of this history can be found in Samuel Spring's *Risks and Rights in Publishing, Television, Radio, Motion Pictures, Advertising, and the Theater*:¹¹

Every state makes the publication of obscene matter a crime. Many of the states impose censorship upon motion pictures.

All Federal laws against obscenity recently were collected and codified into

⁸ See *Variety*, May 11, 1960.

⁹ In *The Saturday Review of Literature*, July 25, 1959.

¹⁰ Quotation from Morris Ernst in *Cosmopolitan*, August, 1959, "When Is a Book Obscene?"

¹¹ Norton and Co., 1956, second edition, pp. 261ff.

one chapter (chapter 71) of the new Statute of Federal Crimes and Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1948.

The four controlling statutes found therein prohibit:

1. Use of the mails for sending, or knowingly receiving obscene matter.
2. The importation into the U. S. from abroad, or the sending from the U. S. abroad, or distributing through the states, of obscene matter by any express company or common carrier . . .
3. The display of any indecent matter . . .
4. The use of obscene language in broadcasting.

This statute includes prohibition of information of contraceptive methods as obscenity. "The prohibition of any information as to, or means of, furthering of contraception is so broad that no interpretation, exception, or evasion is practical." The key words are "obscene, lewd, lascivious, and filthy." "Filthy" was added because a newspaper had used all manner of vulgarity in a tirade without mentioning sexual impurity.

But "obscenity is not a technical term of the law and is not susceptible of exact definition."¹² Judge Learned Hand is quoted as follows: "The work must be taken as a whole, its merits weighed against its defects. . . . Obscenity is a function of many variables." So in ruling on James Joyce's *Ulysses*, Judge Hand said: "The question in each case is whether a publication taken as a whole has a libidinous effect." And Justice John M. Woolsey ruled: "The statute we have to construe was never thought to bar from the mails everything which *might* stimulate sex impulses. If so, much chaste poetry and fiction, as well as many useful medical works would be under the ban."

Time, July 8, 1957, reported on a decision of the United States Supreme Court in which Justice Brennan said that sex and obscenity are not synonymous. "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests." (This would seem to be a devastating exception, which could be used to justify almost any kind of censorship provided the authorities had the power to define "the limited areas of more important interests.") The ruling continued, "We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The court then defined obscenity as present when "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests." (*Time* adds in a footnote that prurient comes from the Latin verb *prurire*, "to itch.") Furthermore, the lower court

¹² *Parmelee vs. U.S.*, 113 Fed. 2nd 729 (1940).

alone is the judge of what is obscene for that area. Justice William Douglas objected that this is "community censorship in one of its worst forms. . . . Free speech is not to be regulated like diseased cattle and impure butter."

But D. H. Lawrence said, "Even I would censor genuine pornography, rigorously. It would not be very difficult. In the first place, genuine pornography is almost always underworld, it doesn't come out in the open. In the second place, you can recognize it by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex, and to the human spirit."¹³ And Margaret Mead has said that pornography stirs daydreams. It is unreal, what Lawrence calls "sex in the head."¹⁴

Would it be proper, then, to define obscenity as a purposive communication from one person to another designed to arouse in the recipient libidinous images which are enjoyed for themselves? Such a definition might help the churchman to clear away the confusion between sex and obscenity. Certainly sex in itself is not evil. Jesus attended a wedding celebration. Yet Jesus reinterpreted the law of Moses and said that a man who has lusted after a woman has committed adultery with her in his heart. Would this mean that all thoughts must also be regimented to what is strictly chaste? What is sin? and what is not sin? If sin were only the overt act, then laws—like the law of Moses—can be codified. Either a man has killed another, or he is innocent. Either a woman has committed adultery or she has not. Yet if Jesus maintains that the imagination of the act of murder or adultery is as bad as the act itself, how sinful was the imagination of Jesus when he was tempted to worship Satan in order to gain power over all the world? What is the relative sinfulness of temptation and the act itself?

III

For many years such a question may have been largely academic. That is so no longer. For now we have huge industries and vast sums of money devoted to the glorification of sex, making it alluring, and creating temptations to "sex in the head" and "murder in the heart." But these daydreams and ingrown expressions of frustration are said to be evil, according to Jesus, and are denounced by the church. If they are wrong, then, according to some moralists, there ought to be a law against them. Stop up the source of the messages by censorship, it is proposed, then the hateful heart will be purified by love and the obscene visions will disappear. But evil is not destroyed so easily. In the days when Jesus preached the Sermon

¹³ Quoted in *Cosmopolitan*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴ Quoted by Frank R. Pierson in "Censorship of TV," *New Republic*, March 23, 1959, p. 23.

on the Mount, there were no printed books, no movies, or television. Yet his hearers knew what he was talking about.

Furthermore, since a communication is *not* the symbol itself but the meaning of the symbol, the communication is essentially a mental, emotional, even a spiritual event. And it is impossible to administer with justice a law which does not require physical facts to prove guilt or innocence. If two autos collide, there is an accident and damage which the police can investigate. But when two minds meet in an obscene message, where is the encounter? How do you measure it? What is the evil? Is it the piece of film? Or is it the motives and the purpose of him who created it? In such a dilemma, the verdict will be rendered on the basis of how the average person reacts to the film or other instrument of communication and what they surmise the purpose of the maker to be. That is not a very sure foundation for legalism. Such a verdict is based upon judgment of intangibles. As Judge Hand said, "Obscenity is a function of many variables."

In such a sea of confusion the censor tries to find a polar star. Therefore, as Frank Pierson wrote,¹⁵ censors do not change with the times. They usually fight to defend outmoded taste. Censorship corrupts those who wield it, for it is basically dishonest. If the censor only gives the people what he likes, he is their dictator and he limits them to his level of taste. If he gives them what he thinks is good for them, but what he himself does not like, he assumes the role of God. Censors, under these circumstances, have gone to strange lengths. In Rhode Island the law bans circulation to persons under eighteen of anything dealing with "illicit sex or sexual immorality"—a ban that "could affect half of Shakespeare, the Divine Comedy, and parts of the Bible."¹⁶

In spite of the inherent difficulties and dangers of censorship, it is evident that many young people, as well as their parents, would support it rigorously. *The Christian Century*¹⁷ quotes a study, "The American Teenager," by H. H. Remmer of Purdue. In surveying 25,000 American young people during a fifteen-year period, the author found that 60 per cent favored censorship and at least a third would prohibit free speech. Here, according to *The Christian Century*, is "fertile soil for totalitarianism." And on page 1403 of the same volume (Nov. 27), this publication questions the denial of the Catholic hierarchy when they said they did not encourage censorship in their Legion of Decency and the Catholic National Office for

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Cosmopolitan*, loc. cit.

¹⁷ July, 1957, p. 836.

Decent Literature. According to these reports censorship—at least the desire for censorship—is very much with us. This is represented by the letter of the Catholic Youth Organization to the Maryland Legislature:¹⁸ “Since my mind is immature and my will often weak, I am not able to make a proper evaluation of the true and the good.” And since parents, too, are fallible, the youth appealed to the government and the church to tell them what to think.

The problem of censorship of films and television is all bound up with the problem of censorship of books, for the essential nature of all communicative processes is the same, differing only in the content of the message and the means of transmittal, which are comparatively incidental. Censorship of whatever media of communication always involves the same elements and contradictions. Nevertheless, some would say that broadcasting is clearly different from book publishing. For, whereas the government *permits* publishers to print books in a free economy, the F.C.C. *licenses* radio and television stations to operate. Therefore, the argument runs, the government has not only the power but the obligation to keep these channels of communication pure.

David Susskind, in an address at the Annual Dinner of the Broadcasting and Film Commission of the National Council of Churches, February 17, 1960, took this position. He said:

I'm confused by the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, whose name is Doerfer (“duffer”). It seems peculiarly right for him, somehow; he isn't sure what his powers are. Now this is not an exacting task for any man of nominal intelligence because he need only read the FCC Act; it specifies for about twenty-five pages what the power of the Commissioner is . . . but he's not sure he has the right to step in to see that programming and broadcasting does the job for the American people. . . . The air waves are owned by the people—leased to these chaps to do a responsible job—in our interest. They are basically, truly, fundamentally public utilities.

On the other hand, the position of the F.C.C. was made quite clear in a personal interview with Mr. D. Joseph Hanlon of its legal staff. Mr. Hanlon said that the Communications Act authorizes the Commission to grant licenses to stations “if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby.” But in section 326 the act provides: “Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by

¹⁸ Quoted by Pierson, *New Republic*, loc. cit.

means of radio communication." This means, Mr. Hanlon said, the licensee has the right to program for his station. Broadcasting is a free enterprise and determines its own programming so long as it stays within the bounds of common decency.

This summary has been enough to show the difficulty of invoking censorship on the motion picture and television. Perhaps it has also underscored Chief Justice Warren's comment¹⁹ that though he sympathized with the moralists in their desire for censorship, he questioned their vision.

IV

If censorship will not work, what about codes for the film and television industries? Both industries do have codes and point proudly to them. The movie code was fairly effective for about twenty-five years in keeping such words as "hell" and "damn" off the screen and in policing bedroom farces. According to the M.P.A., the production code is a "system of self-regulation." It deals mostly in "thou shalt nots," and the effect has been to help prevent the release of bad movies which dealt with such things as dope addiction, blasphemy, or the glorification of vice, but not creatively to help the producer turn out great films.

Then, as Eric Johnston, president of M.P.A., stated in an address on March 12, 1960, came television. Whereas in 1940 the average weekly attendance at movies was 90,000,000 in the United States alone, by 1960 it was less than 45,000,000. Of the 22,000 theaters in 1940, nearly 9,000 had closed. Instead of producing 450 films a year, Hollywood was down to 150. The Andy Hardy type of film had gone to television, and the box in the living room became the family theater. Mr. Johnston says the movies met the challenge of television by improving the product. This is a matter of opinion. At any rate, such films as "The Moon Is Blue" were denied the M.P.A. seal and were hits in spite of the lack. So although it may be granted that the Production Code has had a tendency to restrain some producers, the absence of the seal of approval has in other instances seemed to give the film a greater box-office potential. We may conclude, therefore, that the Code in and of itself is not a sufficient or adequate control over film producers, if their sole motive is to make money by presenting smutty stories.

Though the efforts of the television broadcasters to police themselves with a code has been more successful than many critics will admit, even the best is not good enough for a civic leader like Mrs. J. W. Livingston, who wrote in a personal letter: "We would like to see industry's self-

¹⁹ *The Christian Century*, July, 1957, p. 836.

regulation succeed. This is impossible so long as they do not have a code that *all* broadcasters subscribe to, and so long as the one a few do have is interpreted in a cynical manner, or ignored. As it now is. They must all subscribe, and it must be enforced." Frederick W. Ford, on May 5, 1960, said codes "serve as a guide to broadcasters . . . but codes alone are insufficient to perform the entire function of regulating radio and television programming."

If censorship is dangerous, except in the most flagrant cases, and if the codes are not enforceable with ironclad discipline, and if in the final analysis merely preventing the bad does not create the good, what other solutions are possible? Here are a few that have been suggested.

1. There is the "come-on-boys-let's-all-turn-out-a-high-class-product-for-the-good-old-public" method. Mr. Ford, in an address mentioned above, said: "The broadcaster should take seriously the burden and trust that the Congress has placed on him, that he will . . . serve all the public in his service area." And speaking to the N.A.B. on April 5, 1960, Mr. Ford said, "The task now ahead is . . . to make the broadcast medium all that it is capable of, namely, a vital force for good in the social, cultural, educational and political life of the nation."

Eric Johnston, as a representative of industry instead of the government, cannot speak so bluntly, so he encourages good films by praising the producers. In a report to his Board of Directors in June, 1958, Mr. Johnston stated that our films are "performing an outstanding service as ambassadors of the United States to the people of the world." That ought to make them feel good. Nevertheless, neither the cajoleries of F.C.C. officials nor the praise of the M.P.A. executive has persuaded the industries to turn out a product so consistently excellent as to avoid the criticism of P.T.A. representatives concerned with the morals of the younger generation.

2. A second line of attack is the "write-a-letter-to-the . . ." suggestion. In an address to the Biennial National Convention of the American Association of University Women, June 24, 1959, Dr. Wilbur Schramm reported that the "public indignation" at the unfortunate remark of George Kaufman on television was a total of 300 letters. Yet he was put off the network for several weeks. This is used to prove the sensitivity of producers and sponsors to the reaction of the viewers, if they will let their reaction be known. A variation in the strategy is the plan of Mrs. Livingston, who has organized a periodic boycott of all the sponsors' products advertised on the "violence programs," of which she lists some forty-four network Westerns and private eyes. This movement has been developed only since President

Eisenhower's recent White House Conference on Children and Youth, and there is no evidence yet concerning its effectiveness. Probably a more practical plan is the one of Merrill Panitt, editor of *TV Guide*. He, too, was impressed by the White House Conference and in his May 7 issue reported a new service of his magazine. He invites viewers with squawks or kudos to send their cards and letters to him and he will forward them unopened to "where they will do the most good, have the greatest effect."

Actually, a great deal of self-censorship already exists in films, television, and radio. Lyrics of long-time favorite songs are changed to avoid insulting the Negro. Gilbert Seldes in the *Saturday Review*²⁰ objected to the two seconds of silence in a Playhouse 90 TV program on the Nuremburg Trials. It seems that at the height of the drama, Claude Rains mentioned the words "gas chambers," and since the American Gas Association, a sponsor of the program, has an agreement that gas will not be referred to for suicide, etc., Seldes says that *Time* reported the sponsor insisted on the deletion of the two words. The *New York Times* on June 22, 1960, carried a story with the following headline: "Sponsor Dropped Emmy TV Sketch—Nichols and May Skit about Home Permanent Rejected by the Maker of Lilt." To be constructive, this self-censorship should be guided not by special interests but by the welfare of the general public. It is the privilege of each one in a democracy to express what he believes this to be.

The simplest way to express this opinion is to turn off the TV set or stay away from the movie. Several years ago when Milton Berle was king of the TV entertainers, he got a fabulous salary, but then he was seldom seen. The people grew weary of him and turned him off. If sex and violence are presented to get an audience, when the audience walks out the show will stop. Then let the "artists" who would purvey smut for art's sake starve in the garret, as true artists should, and let the businessman who uses obscenity and violence to make a fast buck go bankrupt. There is no law which says anyone has to have his TV set on for a certain number of hours a day or attend the movies if he doesn't like the film.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Paris, June 26, 1960, this law of supply and demand is working even in the French movie industry.

French films may be getting too sexy—even for the French. . . . A recent convention of theater owners adopted a resolution calling upon producers to cease putting on the market immoral films that provoke public dissatisfaction with motion pictures in general. . . . These movies get a big run in Paris theaters, but are poison at the provincial box office.

²⁰ May 23, 1959, p. 29.

According to Dr. Schramm in the above-mentioned address to the A.A.U.W., the technique of praise will also be effective.

If I were you, I'd try to praise and support what you think is good, rather than attack what you don't like. What you really care about is how much chance your children have to experience excellence in the media. So let the crime dramas and Westerns go. . . . But if this is the only choice your child has, then you have reason to worry. . . . Maximize excellence . . . put your power behind the efforts of the public spirited men in the media to raise the average. . . . If you write, write your own letter.

TV Guide and even the newspaper listings give the viewer a "line" on the program to help him know whether he wants to see it. Magazine reviews, the service of *Parents Magazine*, and the ratings of the Protestant Motion Picture Council (published in *Christian Herald*) are available for the moviegoer. The M.P.A. summarizes the film ratings and opinions of a number of organizations, such as the P.T.A., the American Jewish Committee, and the Protestant Motion Picture Council, in what is known as the "Green Sheet" and distributes some 3,000,000 copies periodically to leaders of church, school and civic groups. The ratings are not as stringent as those of the P.M.P.C. alone, since they are modified by secular groups. According to *Variety*, March 30, 1960, "A Memphis Compromise" was reached between the theater owners and civic leaders of that city by which the exhibitors agreed to put in all their advertising the ratings of this "Green Sheet." The owners initiated the plan, against the general wishes of the film distributors. (It is a common practice among the distributors when they have a "hot" film that could be a flop, to exploit it with saturation bookings and sensational advertising so as to get the profit before "word of mouth" can kill the picture.) But the local exhibitors have direct contact with the public and must meet the pressure of the church groups and parents, and it was their hope that by giving the people advance information of impartial ratings, the censorship of films could be avoided.

Those who are impatient for quick results that will regiment goodness are not convinced that these slower processes will succeed. They ask, Won't the low standards of present-day television and films debauch our children before they have a chance to develop a knowledge of the true and beautiful? Can frail human nature resist the lure of easy, shallow, sensuous, spiritually bankrupt and morally decadent entertainment? The questions are not new. In the 1925-28 edition of the *Readers' Guide*, the following magazine articles are listed in such periodicals as the *Literary Digest*: "Immoral Literature and Pictures," "America First in Lewd Pictures," "Peddling Obscenity to Children," and "Why Do Good Women Read Bad Books?"

V

Obscenity is a terrible disease. But banning a film, even a nauseating horror picture, or setting up a czar to police TV Westerns (like importing a marshal to keep the marshals in the programs from killing too many), is only treating symptoms. The deeper evil lies in (1) modern man's loneliness in a vast universe and sense of helplessness in the currents of impersonal world forces; (2) the long history of prudery, hush-hush ignorance, and shocked modesty which the church has had concerning sex; and (3) the unsatisfactory personal relations which result in persistent frustrations for vast numbers of our population.

Though (1) above is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be pointed out that the Sermon on the Mount which denounces adultery in the heart (or "sex in the head") is all of a piece. It cannot be followed in one particular without following all the teaching: that man can have fellowship with God and his fellow man; that formal obedience to external law (the Commandments) is the expression of obedience to the law within and is of little value if it does not, as William G. Cole put it, "spring from a unified self."²¹

(2) Secondly, as Clark Ellzey stated to the same conference:

There is an increasing demand for a theology of marriage and family life, including sex, in the Christian church. Such a demand represents a need for a value structure around which life may be organized. The church itself was trapped in the conspiracy of silence which hid sex behind a veil of obscurantism and our modern youth are asking us to bring sex into the open and help them discover its relationship to our Christian ethic.

The church cannot meet the flood of obscenity unless it sheds its pose of self-righteous respectability and with keen insight based on all the scientific facts available, helps the sexual deviants find their way again. This concern for and urgent desire to serve persons of all classes and types regardless of their sexual history will bring a new realism to the message the church is proclaiming and indicate to young people who are trying to discover a set of values that the church has a word for them also.

(3) If the frustrations of daily life increase the temptations to glorify violence or become obsessed with sex, then an additional attack must be made on the causes of the frustrations. To do this we should begin with the establishment of a basic principle for judging what is good or bad. Lester A. Kirkendall, in his paper on "Ethics and Interpersonal Relationships" presented at the 1958 conference, maintains that "Whenever thought and

²¹ Address to the National Council of Churches, Division of Christian Education, November 13, 1958.

choice regarding behavior and conduct are possible, those acts are morally good which create trust, and confidence, and a capacity among people to work together cooperatively. Such acts build integrity in relationships, and an enhanced self-respect in the individual." And the obverse is also true. "We have to think differently about sexual expressions. In prostitution, this approach raises the question of who is prostituting his capacity for relatedness the most—the man or the woman? In other words, which is the prostitute?"

The problem of violence, sexual immorality, and obscenity in the movies and on television today cannot be solved as though they existed in isolation. The problem is difficult primarily because it is related to so much of the rest of life. The easy way would seem to be to set up censorship controls—if you could control the censor. But this is contrary to the principles of democracy where "no one institution may control any other and . . . individual members learn appropriate role behaviors which may differ from one setting to another."²² Or, as William L. Chenery says in *Freedom of the Press*,²³ "The question which Charles Evans Hughes foresaw in 1920 is being forced to consideration now in various forms. The question basically is, Do we dare apply American principles and laws to ourselves?"

The *Chicago Daily News* of April 18, 1960, carried a front-page article under the title, "It's About Time That Americans Grow Up On Sex," by Howard Whitman. Excessive violence and obsessive sex in our entertainment media are a sign of the immaturity of us all. It is high time that the church should help our people grow up, for immaturity cannot cope with the problems of the space age. Roland Gammon, in his article in *Variety* entitled "Ethics Is Everybody's Business,"²⁴ writes like a preacher, though he is a public relations adviser. He quotes a statement from Macaulay of a hundred years ago:

Your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth, with this difference: that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own country by your own institutions.

Mr. Gammon adds: "Only changed men can change that course. Only rededicated men . . . can build the City of God instead of the City of Swine."

It's about time Christians got to work.

²² McGuire, Carson, "Cultural Sources of Our Sex Attitudes and Behavior," National Council of Churches, November 13, 1958.

²³ Harcourt Brace and Co., 1955, p. 197.

²⁴ January 6, 1960, p. 81.

3. Religious Freedom in the Atomic Age

ROYAL WILBUR FRANCE

BY DEFINITION, religion is that which binds. Applied religion should bind men of all races and nations together in brotherhood. The Christian religion has as its basic concepts the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. It was Jesus himself who emphasized brotherhood. In the words of John, "If you do not love your brother whom you have seen, how can you love God whom you have not seen?" Increasingly my interest in this social religion has replaced any interest in creeds and dogmas. It is lamentable that the ethical teachings of Jesus and Buddha and other great teachers have been submerged and often lost sight of altogether in the very forms and ceremonials which they deplored.

Fundamental to brotherhood is peace. War, no matter how rationalized, cannot be reconciled with the Sermon on the Mount. I cannot conceive of Jesus dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima or Moscow. Yet, to the extent that we participate in the preparation of deadly instruments of destruction, we share in the guilt of their use.

Fundamental to true religion is caring for something more deeply than one's own life. To care not merely what happens to me and my own children and grandchildren and those of my own blood who come after them, but to care for that great never-ending stream of life of which each of us is an inherent part, is religion. Into my creation has flowed not only the blood of countless ancestors but the thoughts and feelings and beliefs of all those in past ages who have sought the good life. To long to have this bountiful and beautiful earth become the heavenly commonwealth of which the dreamers have always dreamed, is religion.

Faith in such a concept has no meaning except as it is put into action. The wide discrepancy between what men profess to believe in—the Golden Rule and the Bill of Rights—and what they actually do fills me with sadness and concern. But there are in our own time, as there have been in every time of crisis, men and women who are willing to sacrifice personal

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comfort, freedom or life itself in the defense of these principles which are both Christian and basic to our American democratic tradition. Of such are the commonwealth of religion in life.

The important fact about Jesus is the profundity of his insight. In his teachings as reported in the Gospels we are shown a way of life. Indeed, to give up our addiction to fear, distrust and hate may turn out to be the only way to human survival. But of all the blessings promised to those who would follow his way, none is less sought by most Christians than this: "Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake . . . for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you."

I gave up a successful career as a corporation lawyer in New York to become a college professor, because what I was doing had but little relationship to the good life as I understood it. I gave up my teaching career, which I loved, to become a lawyer again because of the rising tide of McCarthyism. To be a civil liberties lawyer did have a relationship to leading the good life. Of the many cases in which I have been involved in defense of the Bill of Rights, two stand out as showing that now, as in the past, to attempt to apply the religion of peace and brotherhood to life may lead to a cross. At least in the cases of Willard Uphaus and Carl Braden they led to prison, here in twentieth-century America.

I first met Dr. Willard Uphaus through the American Peace Crusade, for which I became attorney when it was threatened with listing as a subversive organization by the Attorney General. The American Peace Crusade exemplified an idea which was fundamental to Willard Uphaus' thinking. If peace is to be achieved in our world, there must be a meeting of minds between the communist and capitalist worlds. If communists and non-communists in the United States could meet together and agree on a peace program, this would represent progress. The American Peace Crusade was formed on this basis and came under attack because there were acknowledged communists in it. It never was listed, but that is another story. Dr. Uphaus' connection with this organization was one of the sources of his later troubles.

Willard Uphaus is an unusual man. He not only professes belief in the teachings of Jesus; he actually tries to live them out. I have never known anyone who came closer to my concept of the sort of person Jesus sought when he said, "Follow me!" Despite an appearance of frailness he is a rugged man, not only in conviction but in physical endurance. He is short, and walks with a slight limp. He has gray hair. His friendly blue eyes and smile take you all in, and he has won hundreds to him who came

loyally to his support in his own time of trial. He is modest and unassuming but he can be a fiery and eloquent speaker when burning with a prophet's indignation. He is no one to tangle with, for all that look of gentleness and for all that truly generous spirit, as his inquisitor found.

He was born on a farm near Muncie, Indiana. His father and mother were deeply religious. He early decided to devote himself to Christian work and became active in the Methodist Church and the Young Men's Christian Association. After completing his college education and winning the degree of Doctor of Philosophy for his advanced studies at Yale University, he became a teacher of religion in an orthodox Western college. His liberal theological views and his emphasis on the social aspects of the teachings of the Old Testament prophets and of the Gospels brought him into conflict with the president and the trustees. He came east and took a position as instructor in the field of religion at Yale. He settled in New Haven, where he has since made his home.

His early religious convictions, he has told me, were of the conventional kind. His eyes were opened, as he puts it, through a summer spent with Claude Williams. He went with Claude among the poor Negro and white sharecroppers of the South (this was in the depression years) and there he saw in their awfulness the evils of our social system. He became fired with Claude Williams' zeal—the zeal of all great reformers. To him the answers to the injustices and inequalities and to the animosities of men and nations lay in the teachings of Jesus. He became a Socialist, but not less of a Christian as he conceived of Christianity. From then on he was a crusader for social justice and world peace, for a heaven here on earth.

But Willard Uphaus was more than a dreamer. Reactionaries do not worry about idealists who merely pray or dream. He was a man of action and a fine organizer; and when the militant Christian leaves his church and begins to fight entrenched greed and injustice in the market place of ideas, as he did, he is looking for trouble. Prophets are traditionally in trouble. The defenders of the *status quo* see to that.

He became director of World Fellowship of Faiths, which operates a summer camp near Conway, New Hampshire. The credo of this organization is that persons of all creeds, races and political faiths are welcome. Louis C. Wyman, the Attorney General of New Hampshire, called Dr. Uphaus before him in an investigation which he was conducting under the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Control Act. Wyman objected to his pacifist views as tending to weaken our country and leading to its conquest by the Soviet Union, and claimed that communists had been guests at the

camp. Dr. Uphaus told the Attorney General all about his own views and associations, but invoked the First Amendment in refusing to give the names of guests. He believed that to do so would involve innocent people in the toils of the Attorney General's investigation. In his own words:

My beliefs, associations and activities are based on the teachings of the Old Testament and Jesus as I understand them from years of study and teaching in the field of religion. Each association is examined carefully and based on specific tasks to be done—tasks for international friendship and peace, social justice, the elimination of race prejudice and religious bigotry, civil and religious liberty and the defense of the weak. These associations have been with conservatives, liberals and radicals. The assumption always seems to be that the Christian is being duped and that his religious faith is without effect. What an unwarranted tribute to the Left! What a confession of weakness of our Gospel!

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of New Hampshire by a majority of one, and the Supreme Court of the United States by like majority, ordered him to produce the guest list, he refused to become an informer and is serving a sentence of a year in a miserable jail in New Hampshire. He is not even allowed to go outside for exercise, but his spirit is unbroken.

Many religious leaders and bodies have protested the imprisonment of this good man, among them the Board of Social and Economic Concerns of The Methodist Church, the New Hampshire Conference of The Methodist Church, the Executive Committee of the National Council of Churches, Bishop John Wesley Lord, a bishop of The Methodist Church, and his own pastor who has testified to his deep sincerity as a Christian. It was really his seeking peace, and not subversion, which got him into trouble.

But is deterrent strength, with the threat to use weapons which if used would destroy us all, the only safeguard? Is the Sermon on the Mount foolish? Who can now say whether, after the terrible destruction of World War II, if we had spent our billions in helping to rebuild Russia instead of arming against her, there would ever have been a cold war? Fear and distrust on our side have built fear and distrust on the other, until now our world stands on the brink of annihilation.

The teachings of the religion we profess are clear. Why are they not practiced? Because to practice them requires us to grow up. The religion of Isaiah and Micah and Buddha and Jesus is a mature religion.

Another issue which challenges our religious sincerity is integration. Carl Braden, a quiet-mannered man, and his wife Anne lived in Louisville, Kentucky, where Carl was employed by the *Louisville Courier Journal*. They were deeply religious with strong social consciences. They had been

active in causes on behalf of Negroes. In the winter of 1953-54 they were approached by Andrew Wade II, a Negro electrician, who had been trying in vain to move his family out of the segregated area and into a white suburb. No one would sell him a house, and he asked the Bradens for help. Braden agreed to buy a home in a white neighborhood and sell it to Wade.

The Wades moved in. Just after midnight on June 27, while the Wades were sitting on their front veranda, a dynamite explosion wrecked the house. Fortunately the Wades were not injured. A Grand Jury investigation was started, and it was hoped that the perpetrators of the outrage would be brought to justice. To the surprise of liberal-thinking people, it was not the bombers but the Bradens and five of their friends who were indicted, on the theory that the sale of the house to Wade was part of a communist conspiracy. Braden was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in jail. Bail pending appeal was fixed at \$40,000. Such was justice in the superheated atmosphere of Louisville.

Not only were the Good Samaritans punished but also those who spoke out in their defense. For instance, part of the charges made against the Rev. William Howard Melish in the successful attempt of a reactionary bishop to oust him from the Church of the Holy Trinity in Brooklyn (another case of wide implications to the religious world) was based on a moving sermon he had preached on the Braden case. He had said at the close of a communion service in which Anne Braden, an Episcopalian, had participated:

In the light of a personal tragedy of these social dimensions we can see a good many things etched with clarity. It is not enough for the National Council of Churches to issue a pronouncement as it did yesterday for Race Relations Sunday, calling for bettering of race relations and commending desegregation in public schools, unless the National Council and its constituent bodies are prepared to face what happens to people who try to carry these commended Christian principles into concrete practice! Will the National Council and its constituent bodies say a good word for such militant Christians as the Bradens?

On behalf of the Religious Freedom Committee, I filed an *amicus* brief in the Supreme Court of Kentucky. We stood on the broad religious basis laid down by the National Council of Churches that "it is not within the competence of the State to determine what is and what is not American." The concluding sentence of the brief was: "We earnestly submit that a ringing reaffirmation of our faith in freedom of speech and conscience in this case will reinvigorate us all in these difficult times."

It is hard to say what the outcome would have been in the Kentucky courts. Braden's freedom was eventually won through the United States

Supreme Court ruling, in May, 1956, that the field of subversion was preempted by the Federal government and that the state laws were invalid. On the basis of this ruling the decision against Braden was reversed and the other indictments dropped. The alleged crime was subversion but the real crime was failure to observe the Southern mores. Nowhere in the South is anyone safe, white or colored, who makes a real attempt to practice brotherhood. Braden has since been working to bring about integration in the South. Along with others in that field he was called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and asked questions about his beliefs and associations. He refused to answer. He was convicted in the Federal District Court for contempt and given the maximum sentence of one year. His case is now pending on appeal before the United States Supreme Court.

The First Amendment to the Constitution is the heart of the democratic process. The Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech of the press." When these rights are lost, democratic government is threatened. In the words of Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black: "The First Amendment means to me that the only Constitutional way our government can preserve itself is to leave its people the fullest possible freedom to praise, criticize, or discuss, as they see fit, all governmental policies; and to suggest, if they desire, that even its most fundamental postulates are bad and should be changed." Despite the guarantees of the First Amendment, not only Dr. Uphaus and Braden but thirty-six men and women have been cited for contempt of court in the past few years when they refused to answer questions of investigating committees about their ideas and associations. The latest to fall under attack is the famous scientist and Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Linus Pauling. The American people needs to be alert lest our precious freedoms be lost.

Peace and integration are burning issues on which the sincerity of religious faith is being tested and on which there is need to speak out freely. Will we mature in time to save our civilization? It is ironical that despite all the years of Christian teaching, despite the millions invested in churches, despite the countless prayers for our salvation, our hope lies in fear, not love. It is the scientists who have made the destructive power of our weapons so terrible, not the preachers and teachers of brotherhood, who may have made war impossible. But, childish as we are, it may come despite our fears, unless we decide in time to place mature leaders who believe in the unity of mankind in charge of our destinies.

4. The Planned Parenthood Controversy

DAN M. POTTER

IN AMERICA and throughout the world there is an open controversy as to the advisability of parents determining the number of their children or the spacing of their child-bearing. Particularly pointed is the question of the freedom of parents to plan their families conscientiously, using modern methods of birth control.

This controversy, whether existing on a neighborhood, city, county, state, national, or world level, is essentially a *religious* controversy.

True, there are many related aspects to the central issue. There is considerable medical opinion concerning the effect of too frequent pregnancies upon the health of the mother, the effect of the use of contraceptive devices in intercourse, and the effect of the total physical condition of both parents in giving birth to healthy children. There are social and psychological factors concerning the use of the sex act for purposes other than the purpose of procreation. There are economic considerations which influence parents in deciding the size of their families. There are political aspects to this problem, including the sanction of legislatures involved in the enforcement of practices that conform to certain beliefs concerning the distribution of contraceptive information and the use of contraceptive devices. There is the whole area of population explosion and the related question of world population versus world food supply. There is the area of interpretation by the courts of birth control laws in thirty states and the District of Columbia.

In addition to the above, there are the tangential questions relating to this controversy such as the use of taxpayers' funds by government hospitals or other government agencies to provide planned parenthood information or contraceptive devices. There is the matter of the civil rights of patients to secure information that they desire concerning fertility and contraception, and the civil rights of nurses and physicians to give or to withhold information or services in the area of birth control in light of their professional disciplines as well as their consciences. There is the

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question of the right of a minority to control a majority, and the right of governments of one nation to influence other nations in this field.

But just as in ancient times all roads led to Rome, so in the birth control controversy all arguments seem to lead eventually to the basic *religious convictions* concerning marriage, sex relations, family and procreation. Failure to recognize this fact causes endless confusion and frustration. Therefore, with the limitations of space for this article, I shall make my comments primarily on the religious issue at the heart of this controversy.

In general, religious feuding brings disrespect to all religion. So religious groups do not like to go before the public in defense of their beliefs or, particularly, in criticism of each other. In the spirit of brotherhood and tolerance, it is all the more difficult to express honest differences of religious convictions. Yet, in our pluralistic American culture at times it becomes necessary, and in dealing with planned parenthood it is unavoidable.

For many years the Roman Catholic Church, which is the only major force opposed to the use of contraceptive devices in planned parenthood has made public its understanding of the use of the sex act by married couples. The Chancery's office of the Archdiocese of New York states its position as follows:

"It is one of the fundamental demands of the right moral order that the sincere acceptance of the office and duties of parenthood correspond to the use of the conjugal rights.

"Every attempt on the part of the married couple during the conjugal act or during the development of its natural consequences to deprive it of its inherent power and to hinder the procreation of a new life is *immoral*. No indication or need can change an action that is intrinsically immoral into an action that is moral and lawful. (Pope Pius XI.) This law is not man-made but the expression of the natural and divine law.

"The conjugal act is not and can never be merely an expression of physical and biological laws. It cannot be exercised exclusively for mutual gratification. Its purpose is more ennobling—the fulfillment of the primary end of marriage in the procreation of offspring. The natural law commands that the married state, as ordained by God, fulfill the function of the conservation of the human race.

"Artificial birth control frustrates that purpose . . .

"However well-intentioned proponents of such practices may be, they are contributing to the harmful errors that relations in marriage are

exclusively for mutual satisfaction, and that the moral law sanctions the exercise of the act itself, even though marriage's primary end be destroyed. No human authority, no medical, eugenic or social need can give justification to such errors. It would be extremely unfortunate if our hospitals and medical facilities aimed for the preservation of life should be perverted to seek the prevention of life. Roman Catholics cannot accept such a procedure, nor can any Catholic, in or out of our hospitals, condone or cooperate in assisting others in this unnatural and immoral practice."

The Albany Diocese Weekly, *The Evangelist*, presses the logic of that position further. Favoring artificial methods of birth control, it says, "represents a repudiation of the teachings of all Christian and Jewish belief until recent times. It constitutes, typical of the distorted thinking of so-called intellectuals and present-day liberals, the establishment of moral principles on the basis of individual decisions or the power of a majority vote. It is not subject to man's whims, conveniences or the exigencies of the times. It flows from the Law of God as expressed in nature and promulgated to Moses on Mount Sinai. This natural law, reaffirmed from Scripture, is changeless.

"To deny the objective reality of the natural law is to justify the actions of Faubus and his ilk in attempting to segregate the races, it gives warrant to a Hitler to exterminate a noble race, to a Khrushchev to obliterate all religions, to vicious and irresponsible men to bomb and burn the religious edifices of those who have the courage to stand up for the right. As well approve lying and cheating and stealing as to try to reconcile contraception at any time with moral good.

"The law of nature makes clear that the conjugal act by the will of the Creator is destined primarily for the begetting of children and that those who in exercising it, deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose, for any reason, sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically evil. Abstinence from the exercise of the natural faculty, sometimes periodic, is advised when medical or other grave reasons intervene. To claim that man is incapable of such sacrifice and self-mastery is to demean the dignity of humankind. This is the immutable dictate of the law that antedates Jewry and Christianity. It is the natural law that binds all rational creatures."

There are, of course, members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy who would not state their position as emotionally or as forcefully. Some have indicated that planned parenthood is desirable. But they feel the method employed in limiting the number of births by parents is the primary

object of controversy. Controlling or spacing the number of children in a family by means of sexual abstinence or by means of participating only during "the safe period" known as the "rhythm method" are increasingly advised by Roman Catholic theologians. These methods are more "natural" than the use of contraceptives and therefore appear to be more acceptable.

The Protestant understanding of the purpose of sex relations in marriage is basically different from that stated and implied by our sister Roman Catholic Church. From the Protestant point of view, there is no moral reason why Protestant married couples should hesitate to use medically accepted birth control therapy. In fact, planned parenthood practiced in Christian conscience fulfills rather than violates the will of God.

Protestants feel that biblical revelation does not limit the function of sexuality by married couples to the reproductive process but stresses equally the companionate purpose of marriage. These two ends are not separate in importance, nor is one subordinate to the other. Procreation and promotion of mutual love of the husband and wife are coequal ends. Christ and the Apostle Paul stressed the importance of *henosis*—the union of man and wife in one flesh that takes place in the marriage relationship. In other words, the unitive function of the sex relation is of a sacramental nature and is of utmost importance. In sexual intercourse, *henosis* precedes procreation. And while procreation is not totally excluded, procreation is obviously not the primary end of every act of *coitus*, nor is it its object.

The natural law as understood by Protestants is constantly in the process of discovery. With the expanding knowledge in the whole range of biology, psychology, psychiatry and related sciences, God's purposes are seen with growing clarity. The sexual function in human life, as all animal functions, is touched by freedom and released into more complex relationships. This freedom is the basis of both creativity and sin. Sex can be exploited for selfish ends both by avoiding procreation for unchristian reasons and by producing children irresponsibly. Either instance may be gravely sinful. Parents with sensitive Christian consciences, on the other hand, may use this God-given faculty to bring their lives creatively into the greatest of harmony, and by careful planning to be partners with God in responsibly bringing wanted children into a home of love and security.

Protestant clergy in premarital counseling explain that God has established and sanctified marriage for the propagation, welfare and happiness of mankind. God has, through the Bible and through the marriage vows,

instructed those who enter into this relation to cherish a mutual esteem and to love and to live together as heirs of the grace of life.

First, Protestants contend that parenthood is one of the major purposes of marriage. The propagation of the race is certainly in the will of God. With this privilege come tremendous responsibilities, particularly in the kind of world in which we live.

Second, the welfare and happiness of parents and of each child are extremely important. Prayer, study and judgment must be used in planning the number and spacing of children. It is the duty of responsible parents to use all truth from God revealed through the Bible, church, minister, doctor, researcher, marriage counselor, and the Holy Spirit speaking directly to their conscience in planning and producing their family, in order to fulfill God's highest expectations of them as parents.

Third, the conjugal act itself contributes important spiritual benefits to a happy marriage. Failure to recognize the need of sex relations in married life, separate from the intention for pregnancy, is a serious error in understanding the nature of man created by God to be bound together, wife and husband, in the spiritual union that God has made possible through the conjugal act. Parents who fail to recognize this fact often produce children by accident, bring new life into the world that they themselves do not want, and at times bring economic hardship, serious health complications to the wife, and serious burdens upon government agencies and society.

Fourth, the full expression of the sex relation requires a large measure of freedom and spontaneity. At the same time it is clear that the fear of pregnancy creates the atmosphere in which such freedom and spontaneity are impossible. Through medicine and science, birth control devices or contraceptives have been created in order to protect the sex relation from producing pregnancy and at the same time to provide the other very important spiritual benefits of the conjugal act.

These devices are a great blessing for families who desire to plan for the spacing of their children so that their whole welfare may be protected. Protestant religious leaders, therefore, encourage the use of these devices in order to remove the fear of pregnancy and simultaneously meet the important necessity of harmonious sex life for happy marriage. The Christian use of medically approved contraceptives contributes to the social, economic and spiritual welfare of the home, and to the physical and mental health of parents and children.

Therefore, in the Protestant view of marriage there is no moral reason why contraceptive devices should not be used. In fact, birth control or

planned parenthood practiced in Christian conscience with the use of these devices is a positive fulfilling of the will of God.

Some Protestant theologians emphasize that, having conceded that planned parenthood is generally accepted as desirable, attention must be given to the legitimacy of the means that are employed. Abstinence is an heroic course which is not wrong in itself but may be psychologically dangerous. The "safe" period might seem the ideal expedient but the anxieties caused by its unreliability are grave objections to its use. *Coitus interruptus* is fraught with psychological dangers, and its practice may well imperil marital union. The new medical pills taken by mouth are still in the stage of experimentation and need considerable refinement before they can achieve broad acceptance. There remains the last alternative of contraception: the use of mechanical devices which are not evil in themselves. If interference with the natural act of *coitus* is regarded as wrong in itself, then all four methods must be rejected without distinction. If family planning is recognized as desirable, then all methods are open to some objection, and this is the price to be paid for an extension of freedom. The choice must be made in faith and with a free conscience. It must be a joint decision of husband and wife taking into account the significance of their joint life together and the whole purpose of the matrimonial union.

This concept of parenthood is further clarified in the following statement of the Clergymen's National Advisory Committee of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America:

"God has placed on married couples the positive duty to determine the number and spacing of their children. He has equipped men and women with the sensitive mind and conscience for this task. Thus parents may help assure each new infant his birthright of a warm and loving welcome to this life on earth.

"The responsible choice of parenthood is one of many important areas in which men and women are called upon to make conscientious decisions under God. As a rational being, with a capacity for making such decisions, man is able to apply experience, to assess right and wrong, to interpret God's will, and, therefore, to determine his own actions. To forfeit this ability is to abuse one of God's most precious gifts.

"The decision to bring into being a new human life, as one religious group has expressed it, 'must be made by parents together, in prayerful consideration of their resources, the society in which they live, and the problems they face. Responsible parenthood implies a watchful guard against selfishness and covetousness, and an equally thoughtful awareness of the

world into which our children are to be born.' Surely, this approach to parenthood will yield the finest fulfillment of our longing for children and will enhance the joys of family life.

"If a couple decides that they ought to have a child (or another child) at a particular time, then they have a positive ethical duty to try to have one, including, if necessary, seeking medical aid toward fertility. Any method of avoiding childbirth including the rhythm method or total abstinence would be wrong. But if a couple prayerfully decides that they should not have a child at a given time—because adequate conditions are not present or anticipated to reasonably assure the health and well-being of the child and its family—the couple is under a positive ethical obligation to use the most effective and acceptable medical methods to prevent conception.

"The ethical conviction of Protestants and Jews that family planning fulfills the will of God is rooted in the religious conviction that there are two primary functions of sexual intercourse in marriage, the unitive and the procreational. Neither is secondary, but they are different and distinguishable. The first may be rightfully sought apart from the second. The sexual act sacramentally expresses and nourishes the love and commitment that partners in marriage give to one another. Even when the procreational function is judged inappropriate, the unitive function remains.

"One large Communion holds a different view of the matter and in our pluralistic society has every right to do so. But it also wishes to impose its view on those of other religious beliefs. It has repeatedly blocked repeal of legislation in two states limiting contraceptive information and service; it has opposed the policy of permitting physicians in tax-supported hospitals to provide contraceptive assistance when needed and requested even by persons who are not its communicants; in many cities it has obstructed Planned Parenthood membership in health and welfare councils; and recently it has thrown barriers of religious prejudice in the path of recommendations that Government assistance be given to birth control programs in needy nations which desire such aid.

"The Planned Parenthood Federation and those who hold our view of the ethics of family planning have no desire to impose it on anyone who does not approve. Planned Parenthood believes in providing contraceptive service only to those who want it—be they individuals or nations. Likewise, we firmly believe that those who disagree with our view should not be permitted to impose their objections on anyone who does not share these objections.

"Since contraception is regarded by physicians as an essential part of preventive medicine, we believe that public health programs should offer it routinely to those who want it along with other forms of medical care. We believe that research to develop improved child-spacing methods—including techniques acceptable to those who object to some current methods—should be among the many kinds of scientific investigations given government encouragement and support. And we believe that contraceptive information and assistance should be available through governmental as well as non-governmental channels to nations that request it, in the same way that other kinds of medical and scientific aids are offered.

"Mindful of Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, we claim every right to the implementation of our beliefs concerning contraception. And we suggest that our view and the opposing one on this subject need not continue to collide if three prerequisites are recognized:

"1. All programs of contraceptive information, service and research should exempt from participation anyone with ethical objections.

"2. Conversely, the objections of some must not be permitted to deprive others of contraceptive assistance which is scientifically authoritative, and which may be required of them when in conscience they believe birth control fulfills the will of God.

"3. Physicians, research scientists, clergy, medical workers and others connected with such programs must be guaranteed full freedom to exercise their professional skills and discharge their professional responsibilities.

"Finally, we wish to add one comment in a broader context. God has given us a responsibility toward the earth and ourselves. We are charged to care for, nourish and protect human life. So must we likewise care for the earth and its riches—develop but not exploit, conserve and not plunder. If the proliferation of humanity creates such an imbalance between numbers of people and resources available to support them that man is left wretched and weak, and the earth is gutted of its wealth beyond replenishment, then we shall have nullified our responsibility, denied God's destiny for us, and failed in our high calling under him."

5. Technology and Man

KERMIT EBY

CHRISTMAS DAY, 1959, was spent as ours usually is, in northern Indiana on a farm with our parents, sisters, brother, and their families. This Christmas, because our parents are too old to prepare a meal for so many, we spent the day at my brother Leonard's home. Usually our conversation on such occasions is free from serious discussion. But this time it centered on the question of the future of my sister Helen's five sons, and particularly that of Fred, the eldest, now twenty-three.

Fred is a high-school graduate, a serious and dependable young man. From the time of his graduation until he was called to two years of alternative service (he is a C.O.), Fred worked for his father on the farm. During his service he worked as a pharmacist's helper in a hospital. Now that he was about to be discharged, the decision arose whether he should go to college at twenty-three or try and "start up" as a farmer.

Could he, with limited capital, make a go as a farmer? With five more children to educate, his parents could not subsidize him as my father had done for my brother and Fred's father. Frankly, as we talked, we concluded that it was next to impossible to "start up" in our community. The capital investment on 160 acres is from \$75,000 to \$100,000 for machinery, livestock, and land. And 160 acres is too small a farm to operate profitably these days. 320 acres is more nearly a profitable size.

The last time I helped fill silo at home (1959), I figured that it would cost \$23,000 to replace the equipment we were using; and \$23,000 is a lot of money, even in these inflated times.

Statistics are dry, I know, but they too tell a story. In 1952 there were 5.4 million farmers in the United States. Now there are 4.6 million. The number has dropped 15 per cent in eight years. The established farmers are adding to their acreage, the young in our community are going to Manchester College (Brethren) and are lost to both the farm and the church. In fact, since I left in 1929, thirty-five to forty others have made their way in education in other fields of endeavor. Actually,

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as I look back, I cannot recall a single young couple who built their future on a farm through their own economic efforts.

So we decided that Fred should go to college even though he was twenty-three, and Don should follow him to Purdue (veterinary school), His brother Bob, who likes politics, would go to law school.

Now these Baugo young people do not worry me overmuch. They will make it. They came from good stock and know how to work. What worries me is the loss to our home communities in leadership and dedication which their going produces. Many of the young people who do stay in our community cannot stand going to our home church. There is no stimulus there, they tell me, so they drive to nearby city churches.

There is another part of the farm population which is affected by the impact of the technological revolution on agriculture, however, which troubles me. This time let me begin with a statistic. In 1952 our farm population was 24.3 million; today it is 20.8—a decline of 3.5 million. These millions are mainly from the submarginal farms. Many lack education and the acculturation necessary to adjust to urban life. About three thousand per month are coming to Chicago, adding to the 750,000 Negroes we already have, piling up in ever more explosive ghettos. Their influx threatens to engulf the university where I teach, and in spite of the efforts of our South-East Commission, the problem is not solved either in Hyde Park or in Chicago—or in our other great industrial cities.

Today these unskilled workers, through no fault of their own, make up the nearly 5 per cent, or four million, of the labor force which is unemployed. Four out of every five of this unemployed group are Negroes—again may I add in haste, through no fault of their own. Today it is increasingly difficult to hold a job without proper skills. In fact, even the services, such as maid service, demand a knowledge of labor-saving equipment. When I think of these millions, I wonder if they are to be charged off as a permanent cost against our society, or if we have enough imagination to train them for a place in the labor market.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is the United States Army which provides a training school and haven of security for many from the ranks of the undereducated and unskilled. I know that we seldom think of the Army as an absorber of the surplus of the labor force, but it is, both in its military (3.5 million) and its civilian (4 million) capacity. In other words, if they were not engaged in unproductive enterprise—national defense—we would have to find work for them in productive enterprises such as building roads, schools, etc.

Just another of the unsolved problems of our times is the accommodation to war and preparation for war to stabilize employment. It is a problem which affects the entire American economy. Today we are spending 41 billion for defense, or about 14 per cent of our gross national product. This is not an overwhelming amount, but certainly a highly significant one; an amount which acts as a kind of built-in gyroscope for our economy. For example, when areas become depressed, as South Bend did several years ago, like South Bend they turn to military contracts to give the patient a shot in the arm. And since our economy operates on obsolescence and waste, there is nothing like war or the preparation for war to keep it going. The only up-to-date missile is the one on the drawing board. Exploded rockets may be gone forever, but think of the employment they produced!

There was a time (1946) when American labor leaders saw the madness in it all and suggested through the Reuther Plan that at least 13 billion of the then 39-billion defense budget be spent to bring the benefits of science and technology to the underdeveloped nations.

Now their voice is muted. Perhaps because having once expressed "leftist" ideas and consorted with Socialists, they are now busy being more patriotic than the D.A.R. But more probably because automation (the thermostat principle) is weakening organized labor both numerically and organizationally. Today there are 1.6 million fewer industrial workers than ten years ago. All the industrial unions which were the backbone of the CIO when I worked for it are down numerically—auto, 350,000; steel, 250,000; and so on down the line. Actually, organized labor is down 400,000 in membership since 1958. Percentagewise, in relation to the total labor force, the decline of labor's strength is even more marked: it constitutes 18 million out of a total labor force of 69.4 million today. In 1946 there were 18 million organized workers out of 48 million.

In the light of these facts, let us look at Walter Reuther's dilemma (and I pick him because of his more militant past). The transition from planes to missiles immediately means unemployment for airplane makers and decline in membership; also for machinists. Perhaps 650,000 of Walter's men could produce all the cars and trucks we need; and the auto workers, once 1,300,000 strong, today still boast of 1,150,000. But missiles can drastically cut that number.

There is not a reliable plan that I know anything about which offers orderly transition from gun-carriages to baby-carriages in our age of automation—and to employment for the unskilled. No, not even in the ranks

of organized religion or organized labor. We have accommodated ourselves to war and the preparation for war. It is not superfluous to ask how we could adjust to the peace we all profess to want, if it came.

But not only does our nation today live on military preparation, waste, and debt. So do we as individuals. We are encouraged by all media to buy and charge. The refrigerator of today is obsolescent tomorrow. Really, it should be pink instead of white, and have a door like Philco's which swings either way! Just stating this makes me realize how hopelessly outmoded I am. I have had the same wife and the same refrigerator (GE monitor-top) almost equally long, thirty years. Our refrigerator, produced in 1930, at least had little of the built-in obsolescence which almost everything has today in this age of waste.

Perhaps this is where our age has had its greatest impact on us. In my youth in Pennsylvania German-speaking northern Indiana, we disciplined ourselves before the fact—saved, and then bought. Today we ask not how much it costs, but whether we can meet the payments. Somehow we think that if we cut off the dog's tail an inch at a time it won't hurt so much!

And now to be statistical again. Short-term debt in the United States (we refer to charge accounts, not mortgages) has reached a total of \$54 billion and is increasing daily. Almost fifty-seven of every hundred families are in debt; many desperately so. No wonder financial strain is number one among the causes of divorce and family break-up, and more and more fathers are deserting their families to escape the bills.

Of course, finance companies and moneylenders are prosperous and happy because of these developments. (Witness the opposition to Paul Douglas' bill requiring advertisers to declare true cost.) These companies exploit the overextended. They charge them 14 to 18 per cent interest, often more. In the Middle Ages, usury was the concern of the Church. Today, there is little religious or social concern for the debt-ridden. Even when a young Puerto Rican father commits suicide because of inability to pay his bills, the tragedy is too soon forgotten.

There is another price which we pay for the gadgets we hold so precious. Almost one-third of our labor force is made up of women—23 million of them, 13 million married. To enable a family to live as happily as the ads decree, one wage earner is not enough. When asked by the National Council of Churches interviewer why they worked, 96 per cent said that the "luxury-necessities" on which their happiness depends cannot be had with only one wage earner. (This means the pink refrigerator with the two-way door.)

Ideally, in the most upward-mobile homes, father is a moonlighter busy with a job and a half. I know that I am old-fashioned, but I cannot help thinking that father's and mother's presence might mean as much to the children as an ever-growing number of things. It may be too much to ask, but isn't it possible that satiation is less satisfying than hunger, at least after basic necessities are provided? I must confess, however, that should many people take my implied advice, our consumer economy would probably produce even more unemployment. And unemployment is no picnic, even in the age of unemployment insurance. Nor is employment, sometimes, for increasingly the tempo of the machine or the line determines the tempo of the man. Busily engaged in putting on nut number 999, we are becoming nut number 999.

It is here that I must pause and apologize for the many Labor Day sermons I have preached on the text from The Wisdom of Sirach 38:32: "Without them (craftsmen) no city can be inhabited, and man will not live in one or go about in it." In the same chapter the work of the smith, the potter, and the stonecutter are described. Each is able to see the product of his hands and rejoice in it. How many of the men I knew in the CIO, busy on production lines, shared their joy in creativity? Not many! Those I knew wanted their pay checks as means to ends unrelated to their jobs—a car, the bigger and more powerful the better, education for their children, a trip, or maybe a good drunk. These were my friends' goals. Furthermore, most of them went to work at jobs they hated. There was no blending of product and person in their jobs. Hence the fierce determination on the part of so many American workers to escape their fate. And if they cannot escape it, their children must.

How often, in my CIO days, as we blended their beers and my Cokes, did I hear, "Eby, you're a lucky so-and-so; you went to school. Want to hear what happened to me?"

"Okay, Joe," I'd say, even though I'd heard it a hundred times before, "what happened?"

"I was a smart punk. The old man wanted me to go to school."

"Yes."

"When I was sixteen I quit, got myself a job and a car."

"And then?"

"I got a gal, and now I got four kids and I'm stuck. But my kids will go to school if I have to kill 'em!"

Escape to the middle class! That's the dream. Not pride in creativity;

only men and women living out their sentences, feeling surcease in things, or peace in drink and tranquilizers.

Now let me tell you about my father at seventy-nine, feeding his one-hundred-seventeenth litter of pigs (there are two per year). He is doing at seventy-nine what he would do for fun—although being a practical Dutchman he also prefers to save a little money. He can see the results of his husbandry in pigs and corn and beautiful barns. His are the deepest of psychic satisfactions. And his are no fears of being retired.

Now that I have left the world of my father, I more than once have envied him. There is no more fortunate man than he who gets up in the morning looking forward to a day's work which can be measured in the blending of a man and his crops. As I think in this vein, I am often convinced that there is no greater necessity today for those who declare themselves religious than an examination of our Judeo-Christian work ethic—an ethic which begins with God creating the heavens and the earth and then approving his handiwork, and culminates with Jesus working in the carpenter shop.

As I think this wise, I am frustrated, for I see no turning back. The price of our gadgets is specialization and monotony, and increasingly so. Hence, I suppose we must do what we dislike, accept our checks, and seek other outlets. Instead of thinking about work we must examine leisure and instead of vocation, avocation. In other words, we will work our 36-40 hours and then give expression to our creative natures in "do-it-yourself" and other activities. "Do-it-yourself," incidentally, is a program which began in necessity and ended in becoming play. It is probably one of the first times in the life of a man that his mores were influenced from below.

The practice of an avocation, unfortunately, demands even more education and understanding. There are so few of us who know what to do with time. Boredom is our enemy, and if we doubt it, we need only to analyze the amount of money Americans spend for alcohol, tranquilizers, and tobacco. Frankly, I am not sure where I would begin with my program of a creative use of leisure; I only know the necessity of examining the problem.

Finally, I know the argument that the industrial revolution produced new jobs; that men always get jobs making and servicing the machines that make the machines. I also know the argument that men displaced today by automation will find employment in the services. I know too that persons immediately affected are not so sanguine, which reminds me of an experience that was mine immediately after the end of the Japanese phase of the war.

It so happened that I was running a labor institute at Antioch College. While I was there some six thousand Curtis-Wright employees were dismissed because of cutbacks of government contracts. Knowing that their Research and Education Director was near by, they decided to hold a meeting to decide on next steps. Getting a crowd was no problem. In fact, the meeting had to be limited to officers, stewards, and invited members. By four o'clock almost everyone had gathered for a 7:30 meeting. When my turn came to speak, I brought them Mr. Murray's greetings and thanks for a great contribution in making the world safe for democracy, continued with similar greetings from Mr. Reuther, and was about to add a few words of my own, when a brother with a voice like the Bull of Bashan called out, "Point of order, Brother Eby!" I tried to ignore him, then outshout him, but he persisted.

I had to ask, "What is your point of order?"

"What the hell am I going to do on Monday?"

This is a perfectly relevant question, I might add, for there are very few in the world today who are satisfied with indefinite promises of a better tomorrow. And I agree with them. I agree that ours is an era when for the first time the peoples of the world need not be sentenced to perpetual hunger assuaged by the sweat of their brows. Technology produces other problems, I admit, but if science's ultimate product, the thermo-nuclear bomb, doesn't destroy us, a "brave new world" is possible, even in spite of the problems I have outlined.

Somehow I persist in believing and working on the assumption that men are rational and humane—rational and humane enough to find solutions for their problems.

A faith, I admit.

Sex and People: A Critical Review

The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility

PAUL RAMSEY

RICHARD M. FAGLEY, Executive Secretary of the Commission on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, has written a book¹ that should be read and pondered by every American churchman, and by citizens concerned over this nation's policies toward people in underdeveloped countries who face the necessity of doing something about their mounting populations or else dying in the nonattempt. This is, in fact, two books in one, and both are excellent.

The first is on the demographic problem. This problem arises from the fact that in most of the world the *rate* of population increase far outdistances either the present or any feasible and immediate future rate of economic growth. Even rudimentary figures on the population explosion are truly appalling. A net world increase of eighty people a minute; a humanity now numbering 2,900 million; 6 billion in forty years at the end of the century; a maldistribution of this increase, so that the underdeveloped countries are increasing with great rapidity; each passing year adding a year's life expectancy to everyone living in Ceylon; laggard customs and moral codes the world over "ingeniously devised" to secure the population to fill the earth when it needed filling; one-fourth of the world's food supply even now grown on irrigated land; at the present rate of increase, in 2,500 years one square yard for each to live on (if people learn to live on the surface of the sea), and in 5,000 years enough people to outweigh the planet! Dr. Fagley rightly points out that the West experienced the Industrial Revolution *before* the massive control of disease or any great growth of population; while in the underdeveloped countries it is the other way round, and there are limits to the pace of their future economic growth

¹ Fagley, R. M., *The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. viii-260 pp. \$4.25.

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if the economy of these countries is not to be entirely disrupted. Looking in the direction of the solution of these grave problems, Fagley does not sufficiently stress the fact that the people of the West, also *after* the Industrial Revolution, experienced a *gradual* adoption of conception control freely by families. The question to be raised is whether this will be possible in underdeveloped countries, or whether demography will not destroy *demos* and the independence of families from direction by politically imposed public policies.

The second "book" is about the teachings of the world religions on the subject of the deliberate control of propagation. For the non-Christian religions (except Orthodox Judaism) Fagley concludes that "cultural rather than doctrinal obstacles form the main hurdle." His attention is mainly devoted, of course, to Christian teachings, and to the emerging divergence between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism on birth control. He finds "convincing evidence that responsible parenthood is a Christian doctrine whose time has come, which calls for church and personal support"; and for believing that the ecumenical church is beginning to give clearer guidance to the consciences of men and women, and to the nations.

In this review-article I propose to comment mainly on the second "book," and within this on the subject of Christian ethics. What will be attempted is an old-fashioned "critical review," such as the "learned journals" used often to publish. This means that the *problem* of this volume will be taken up again and viewed from a somewhat different angle. The reader should understand that nothing said below is intended to withdraw my judgment that this volume should be widely read, and that everyone who reads it should, with Fagley's aid, try to think his way through to sound conclusions on the subject of Christian sex ethics and the policy families and nations should adopt today.

I

Against the background of a discussion of the Patristic period and of Eastern Orthodoxy, Fagley's presentation of the development and present shape of Roman Catholic teachings should be especially helpful to Protestants who do not know this literature. The decisive importance of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas in fashioning this church's teaching about the ends of sex and marriage, he properly recognizes. Here it must be said that the author is too dependent on W. G. Cole, and too prone to find "dualism" and only an otherworldly asceticism in these medieval thinkers (as also earlier in Jesus and St. Paul).

Also I cannot believe that the old Roman and the medieval tradition of "consent" as forming a marriage (still basic in our law of marriage) has been correctly grasped by concentrating attention on this as entailing a concept of marriage as only a legal contract and as merely elaborating a set of contractual obligations. Particularly not when the objection seems to be that something was irrevocably exchanged by this mutual consent. Such is still the assumption of our civil law, where (for all the state's assumed power to dissolve the bond) marriage is not a contract; and in law schools the law of domestic relations is *not* taught under the law of contracts.² Far better to see in the consent that makes marriage an expression of *covenant-bond*, which also assumes the capacity of a human being to will today what he shall will tomorrow, and to swear possibly to his own hurt yet change not. Marriage as *covenant* falls between or beyond marriage as *contract* or marriage as *status*; and this was better understood by the medieval church than we today often suppose—in spite of the understandable expression of this idea in legal terms in an age when the church's teaching had something to do with the laws of society and when it was not so easy to rest everything on having the right inner motives (which view, abroad among Protestants and other Americans, has come closer than ever before in Christian history to sanctifying the view that marriage is a contract).

The theological concept of covenant rather than the psychological concept of mutual love is, in fact, stressed by Fagley in his concluding chapter, and this was the framework of the main section of the fine report of the W.C.C. study group on "Responsible Parenthood and the Population Problem," Mansfield College, April, 1959, printed in the Appendix. A further exploration and disciplined elaboration of the meaning of covenant in connection with sex and in marriage is quite indispensable to regaining an understanding of long stretches of the Christian past, and to the churches' having any good effect on the civil law today and in the future. It would also help to overcome the more than incipient dualism in this book, and in the more extreme attempts of other recent writers to ferret out the dualisms of the past.

Nevertheless, Fagley gives an informative interpretation of many Roman Catholic doctrines: the distinction between primary and secondary ends and between the *finis operis* (the objective ends of marriage) and the *finis operantis* (the subjective ends the parties may have primarily or even ex-

² Where in legal cases it is said that "marriage is a civil contract," the stress is on "civil," i.e., not under ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and all the evidence is that in our domestic relations law marriage is like no other contract, despite popular opinion to the contrary.

clusively in view); the passage on mutual love in Pius XI's encyclical on marriage (1930) which almost provided a watershed in the evolution of Catholic teachings; the ferment of writings by Herbert Doms and others that followed, men many of whom are still living but no longer writing as they once did; the responses of the Holy Office that made clear there was no real departure from traditional teachings intended; the fact that Catholic objection to conception control refers to the disordering of the natural act and not to use of artificial means where these are aligned with the ends of nature; the rhythm method; the reasons we have to expect that no infertility pill in the future will be approved; and the debate since 1951 about the meaning of the "serious reasons" that warrant periodic continence in conjugal acts.

It is to be regretted that when dealing with the latter issue, Fagley chooses to reintroduce an expression—the "fertility cult"—used earlier and elsewhere. This can hardly promote understanding or our own better statement of Christian ethical principles. At another point Fagley simply nods. Discussing the different degrees of resistance a wife should make to a husband who proposes to practice *coitus interruptus* and to one who wishes to engage in condomistic intercourse, he says that the "logical basis" for making a distinction is "not quite clear." In Catholic theory, this is clear enough: condomistic intercourse disorders the act from the beginning, while this is not the case with interrupting it. In the latter case the husband may not actually do what he intends, and everyone knows that there are tendencies in nature, as well as womanly ways, which may insure that he does not. Fagley like most Protestants simply assumes, as Catholics do not, that motive or intention is the only thing that matters, and of course in this the two supposed cases are alike. But no one can resist or co-operate directly with another person's wrong *inner intention*.

At the outset the author wonders "whether, in the pell-mell pace of contemporary history, the doctrinal evolution can hope to move fast enough" (p. 174); and, despite the very significant changes of emphasis he traces, in the end he is forced to conclude that "no dramatic new developments . . . are to be anticipated in the evolution of the Roman position" (p. 187). This makes it difficult to understand his comment that "one of the growing edges of Roman Catholic doctrine" is the statement in the encyclical to the effect that the "mutual inward molding of husband and wife" or the "blending" of their lives as a whole "can in a very real sense . . . be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matrimony" (p. 178). On the next page, the author himself cites those subsequent judgments that

struck down the interpretations of Doms, and others, who took that passage seriously; and which reintegrated it to the ancient distinction between primary and secondary ends, by saying that the Pope meant to say only that mutual love can be regarded as the *primary of the secondary* ends, and moreover one that must be always regarded as internally related to the primary end of procreation.

Perhaps, since this encyclical, it is possible for Catholics to believe that the relational ends of marriage, or the nurturing of love and union between the parties, is one among its objective *finis operis*, and not merely a licit subjective *finis operantis* the parties may have in mind. Still we know where this good is to be located—in entire subordination to the primary end of progeny. Moreover, Dietrich von Hildebrand is not treated, the man who has written the most advanced statement of the contemporary Catholic position consistent with past formulations, and better than any of the first flurry of writings in the wake of the encyclical. All that can be said is that, in the Roman Church's response to modern romanticism and individualism, mutual love has gained greater prominence among all the secondary purposes of marriage, outdistancing, e.g., the marital good that provides for our comparatively external need for domestic help, etc. No argument is given for Fagley's opinion that "it seems reasonable to doubt . . . that this reaction, which concentrates on one dimension of marriage, is the last word in Roman thought on the subject" (p. 179). One must rather expect that any additional words will be consistent with this, not that this will yet prove "a basis for new beginnings."

Moreover, Fagley's own interpretation of the passage displays an incipient dualism (surely as atmospheric in our day as in any other) in his distribution of the elements of propagation-education and of companionship into, respectively, "the first purpose of marriage within the order of nature and creation" and "the primary end within the order of grace and redemption." It is extremely hard for us who are non-Catholics to get it through our heads that Catholic teaching stems from and is based upon a nondualistic ontology of sex relation as a human act. Fagley is puzzled by St. Thomas' "repeated description of procreation and education as forming a single primary end." He wants a less cumbersome expression, such as "parenthood," to refer alternatively to begetting and rearing. Thomas' usage was a "grafting operation" (while a footnote seems to undercut this assertion by admitting that this linkage of procreation and education goes back as far as St. Augustine). Or again, marriage is said to have both these responsibilities, while the marital *act* has only the nature of procreation; and again only the

marital act, and not the sex act apart from marriage, has the function.

The fact is that Thomas argues for the lifelong permanence of *marriage* from the ordering of the *sex* act as such to *human* procreation and education; and the whole case for regarding marriage as a part of the natural order depends on not letting these distinctions fall apart into dualisms. If man and woman are soul and body engaged in concupiscence or in fidelity, it is doubtful if Catholic thought, as likely as modern Protestantism, would so locate only the personal and relational ends of marriage (in distinction from the procreative act—or these obscurely merged together as parenthood) as belonging peculiarly to either the history of education or of redemption.

There are therefore some dangers as well as advantages in the adoption of the term, "responsible parenthood," from the beginning of this volume. This, of course, is a better expression than "birth control," which may include abortion among its methods. But we may ask whether the preference for this term throughout Protestantism has come about altogether for good reasons, or whether this may also indicate an avoidance of the task we face of thinking more solidly about the theology of sex relation as such, and whether, in passing by the latter, a naturalistic interpretation of procreation has not silently been insinuated. This may be largely at work in what is said about the "higher" and more personal dimensions of parenthood and the relational ends of marriage.

Fagley observes, it is true, that "parenthood is used in this treatment in a narrow, primordial sense, virtually equivalent to procreation" (p. 5). Then it would seem that the Catholic expression "procreation and education" is rejected only because it is more cumbersome, especially when it has to be often repeated in a book on this subject. Yet Fagley goes on to say that "it is because of this broader meaning that parenthood has acquired . . . that it is used in preference to the traditional term. . . . It is more than a euphemism for family planning or limitation, not to mention 'birth control.' It implies a basically affirmative attitude toward procreation" (p. 5). This certainly indicates a basically affirmative attitude toward *parenthood*. It avoids, as a footnote tells us, "the unduly restricted biological connotation which 'procreation' has acquired in secular circles." At the same time it may show an undue acquiescence in this same restricted biological interpretation of *procreation*, in a measure by this author and certainly in American Protestantism—in contrast to which, it must be said regretfully, Roman Catholicism has to be understood to stand (successfully or not) for an ontological analysis of the procreative act as in its unitary essence a rational, human act.

II

This defect becomes clear in what are again excellent and informative chapters on "Protestantism and Parenthood" and "The Ecumenical Movement and the Way Forward." To enter upon these subjects is, Fagley writes, "a bit like moving from an elaborate formal garden to a wildwood with many trails" (p. 189). Some at least of these trails lead us in the direction of a dualism and a spiritualism of which, too frequently for our own soundness in developing a theology of sex (even if correctly), traditional theology has been accused. The Reformers, largely for nontheological reasons in the author's opinion, "did not question the nexus between 'conjugation' and procreation" (p. 192). The question remains as to what are the theological reasons for questioning this "nexus"; and whether the term "parenthood" does not *simply* question it by departing from it and locating somewhere in the midst of the "family" the nexus that was formerly held together in the older theological understanding of procreation.

The 1958 Lambeth Conference agreed that other methods of birth control than abstinence (complete or periodic) "may be used, provided this is done in the light of . . . Christian principles." This is called, in the words of the Warren Commission which helped to prepare for this conference, a "grudging" permission, even if "a pioneer step toward a Protestant doctrine of responsible parenthood." The 1953 conference on the family at the Ecumenical Institute at Bossey stated that "the two aims should not be lightly separated." This is said to be "an uncertain voice, reflecting the confusion which still characterized Protestant thought so short a time ago" (p. 212). The 1958 Lambeth Conference also stated, in words not fully quoted by Fagley, that the two ends of marriage (reproduction and companionship) "are not subordinate one to the other; they are *not directly related to one another; their relationship . . . is to be found in yet a third area—that of the place of the family in giving responsible security to the children born of the love of husband and wife*" (italics added). Exclusively this "third area" for the nexus between conjugation and procreation is brought into play by the use of the broader term "parenthood," without *first* articulating a theology of the sexual act to replace the Roman position.

This deficiency also prevents Fagley from pointing out clearly enough the forward steps that have been taken by recent Anglican and Protestant theologians precisely in developing a theological understanding of sex relations. The work of Brunner, Barth, and Sherwin Bailey in this regard is introduced by reference to "the strong influence of a more serious wrestling

with the theology of parenthood" (p. 197). The signal and unique work of these men has not been their contribution to a theology of the family or of parenthood, but their very profound thought about the ontological nature of sexuality as such—its twin conceptional and relational meaning, its nurturing of *henosis* and the well-being of one flesh, and covenant as the inner meaning of sex in the created order, as natural sex is the external basis and possibility for covenant.

True, Fagley calls for "clear evidence of a doctrine of responsible parenthood, rooted in conscience and theological convictions, and commonly held by the churches of the Reformation" (p. 210). His conclusions are most often sound: "Procreation is an important but not essential end of marriage"; the duty of parenthood is "contingent upon the total purposes of the marriage"; "the primary purpose of marriage is the perfecting of the 'one flesh' union itself, whether expressed in parenthood, marital companionship, or both" (p. 220). While one may suspect that "companionship" is here beginning to be understood trans-sexually, spiritually and dualistically, still we may agree that these things need to be said with one voice as Protestantism wins through to an adequate theology of marriage. "If procreation is not the primary purpose of marriage, even less is it the essential purpose of the marital act. . . . Even if the begetting of children were the primary purpose of marriage, it would not follow that each conjugal act must leave open the possibility of conception" (pp. 220-221). Here the author begins to go over the issue lightly, an issue that will not remain hidden, nor can be avoided no matter how certain it is that the relational end of marriage is as primary as propagation. I do not necessarily disbelieve these statements, but how are we to *argue* that men and women may put asunder the nexus of conjugation and procreation (even granting these to be coequal in importance), where evidently God has joined these ends together in the created nature of the sex act as an ontological and not only as a biological matter? This question cannot be answered simply by *asserting* that the nexus has been relocated in the midst of the family or parenthood broadly understood, while omitting the fullest possible attention to the theology of sex as such.

III

Most answers to this question advanced today go in the direction of dualism, and the reduction of sex to a biological function above which men and women should be able to rise in their personal freedom and their pursuit of spiritual goals. So Fagley gives, as "the first point" in his "personal notes on the kind of theological analysis that may offer significant

common ground," the proposition that "man is more than nature"; and this is said to mean that because of "the gift of reason and conscience" man "is subject primarily to ethical norms (the moral law) rather than to the norms of physical being (the law of nature)" (p. 219). This is the same dualism he found in the papal encyclical, only there he expressed it as the orders of nature and of grace and redemption. I do not say that these are not distinct, but it may certainly be contended that such a position is well calculated to lead Protestant thought away from the task of developing a theology of sex, while sexuality as such is allowed, in the currency of these times, to circulate as only a matter of "physical being."

It can also be demonstrated that this position is a poor contender, whether positively or negatively, with the Roman view if this is properly understood. Whoever said that the "law of nature" means "the norms of physical being"? Or if this has too often been said by too many Roman Catholics, and if their view is too largely a dualistic reduction of the human significance of bodily and sexual life, and if procreation is too frequently treated as doing the work of the animal species, it is still the case that he will be hoisted on his own petard who attempts to answer all this by giving way to the tendency of modern times to praise dualistically the dimension of personal freedom and the trans-sexual community of marriage. Our task is first to cast out the gleam of dualism from our own eyes. Our first task is a rigorous articulation of a theology of the sex act (for the moral crisis of these times is primarily in sex, and only thereafter and therefore in the family or in responsible parenthood or responsible nonparenthood, or any other trans-sexual dimension of the whole affair). One cannot counter the Roman Catholic ontology of sexual relations and procreative acts by bringing against it a viewpoint which, on examination, will be seen to partake of the very dualism it first discerns too easily from a surface examination to be the substance of, and then condemns in, the Roman doctrines.

There is really not much theological knowledge contained in pronouncements which overleap the problem of the meaning of the conjugal act itself with its apparent nexus of conjugation and propagation simply to say that in conception control "it is not the means, but the motives that are determinant" (General Synod of the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk, 1952), or that "it is the spirit in which the means is used, rather than whether it is 'natural' or 'artificial,' which defines its 'rightness' or 'wrongness'" (Augustana Evangelical Lutheran Church, 1954), or that "the licit character of any method is based on the presupposition that the contraceptive intent is morally valid in concrete circumstances," "motives" rather than "methods"

(Fagley, p. 221). There is even less, in one of the requests to scholars and churchmen preparing for the forthcoming National Council of Churches conference on family life, that they speak about the "creativity" of the family (by a word-play only seeming to bypass and leave behind any discussion of *procreative* acts in the ontology of the human being). We have first to speak about sex in the order of creation-covenant before coming to conduct; and surely it must be admitted that a great general weakness in Protestant statements of Christian ethics is the emphasis on motives to the exclusion of concern for the ethics of the action as such—a weakness not to be repaired by simply stressing the rigidity of the Catholic emphasis on an analysis of means also.

One can sympathize with the "uncertain voice" of the Bossey Conference, and with the "grudging" permission given by Lambeth Conference (someone there must have begun to wonder about the Conference's statement that one good of marriage is the "expression of mutual affection, *without relation to procreation*," etc.—italics added). Again, this conclusion may be quite correct in the performance it allows, but are not unqualified and insufficiently explained words such as these apt to awaken concern lest the land into which the churches are now entering prove to be one in which Yahweh is worshipped only in Jerusalem where persons are persons and the gods of nature who reside on the hilltops have taken over birth, where procreation and birth are no longer regarded as eschatological events in the purposes of the one God, where man has a history but sexuality does not, where procreation serves only to produce future candidates for education or salvation, where man is personal but sex and acts of procreation are not? In short, where it is not known that men and women are pan-sexual throughout their natures because the one God is the giver of every good and perfect gift, and because sex that is by its nature procreative is the created basis of any covenant or companionship or relational good between them and for which they were by Him made? In theology, unlike faith, one should not imitate Abraham and hasten into a land he knows not of, without asking whether it was not actually modern naturalism and idealism, and not a sounder Christian theology, that have removed the ancient landmarks.

If we could choose our periods, good reason could easily be advanced for not attempting in this day and age to rewrite the church's creeds and for not now undertaking to reform the church's teaching about sex and marriage. An age of unfaith is not the time for the formation of confessions (notwithstanding the Congregational Christians and, now in process, the Presbyterians) when we have the statements of ages of faith to guard and

guide us. There is also not much in the present age to commend it as a time in which a sound restatement of Christian teachings about sex and marriage responsibility is likely to be produced.³ Nevertheless, this work must go forward—in single volumes devoted to it—because in what the church has said before on the subject (unlike its statements in the creeds) there is so little to guard and guide us, and so much error.

IV

My first objection to the joining together of these two books—on the population problem and on Christian responsibility in marriage—may now be stated: it is that, because “the sands of time” in this matter of population pressure “are running extremely fast,” and because of “the pell-mell pace of contemporary history,” the evolution of moral teachings within Protestantism may also have already proceeded pell-mell and without sufficient disciplined thought on our parts. If there is any danger that this may be true, will not one possible result of this volume *in our times* be to encourage the belief that, since, as we will simply assume, there *must* be harmonious and responsible solutions of both problems, then the seemingly most obvious and assertedly the quickest answer to the population problem will prove predeterminative and overriding in our religio-ethical reflection upon sexual conduct and marriage; and that what is said upon the latter subject will be afterthought, the rationalization of a decision already reached on other grounds, and more and more lacking in its own essential structure? The latter should not be lacking, even if it should turn out that the morality of conjugation, independently articulated, must override or take the lead in limiting the attempted solution of the population problem, and, what is more, even if we are forced to conclude that the population problem may not be susceptible of solution. Why add one more emphatic chapter to the operation of nontheological factors in the history of Christian theological ethics?

Moreover, where in the Word of God or the tenets of the Christian religion are we given warrant for believing there is a solution of the problem of population, e.g., that there is a way of providing enough food for the human race forever on this planet? And if we are not assured of this in the

³ There is at least some truth to the warning: “It is, to say the least, suspicious that the age in which contraception has won its way is not one which has been conspicuously successful in managing its sexual life. Is it possible that, by claiming the right to manipulate his physical processes in this manner, man may, without knowing or intending it, be stepping over the boundary between the world of Christian marriage and what one may call the world of Aphrodite—the world of sterile eroticism against which the Church reacted so strongly (perhaps too strongly) in its early days? For one of the characteristics of the latter world was (and is) the exercise of unlimited self determination in sexual activity.” *The Family in Contemporary Society* (Anglican essays), London, S.P.C.K., 1958, p. 135.

long run, why in this our time? How do we know that, as Fagley says, "it is not the miracle of birth which causes the present dilemma, but the fact that through want of knowledge and training on the part of parents, this miracle is in the aggregate invited too frequently in relation to the available material conditions which support human life" (p. 3)? Why reject the word "overpopulation" because it implies "a conclusion that Christians cannot accept," namely, that "a certain percentage of human beings are 'surplus' " when the measure is this planet or temporal history (p. vii)? How do we know the problem is not *per se* the increase of the human race, or that "it is not the increase of the human race, the multiplication of candidates for salvation [rather than the 'quality of life on this planet' alone], which in itself causes concern . . ." (p. 33)? There seems lurking here a belief in an unseen hand that intends earthly existence as the destiny of man, coupled of course with radical voluntarism, as foundation for confident-enough action. Here a decent amount of otherworldliness would be in order, remembering that the eschatological event of the birth of a human being reaches beyond his temporal existence. Roman Catholics say we should grow more food, while Fagley says we should also limit births. But Fagley may be depending, equally as much as the Roman Catholics when they write on this issue, on Providence acting only horizontally to provide him with the historical confidence that birth cannot be believed to cause problems which man's action in history cannot cure.

Who knows that that Western export—"international disease control"—has everywhere been a good thing? "Whatever must be said about that," Fagley writes, "can hardly qualify our admiration and gratitude for this achievement" (p. 40). "The one solution which is ruled out by every Christian and humanitarian impulse would be an effort to turn the clock back" (p. 44). While no one would turn the clock back if he could, or could if he would, and while no one should qualify his admiration for the acceleration of death control the world over, nevertheless he may still take thought in the two following ways: (1) If he is a Christian he should remember that disease and famine are among the things vastly on the increase in the Apocalypse. It is not that when these evils are wiped out, then will the end come. Where are we given to believe that these Horsemen, and as well tumult and war, may not come riding on the backs of population pressures before Christ assumes his reign? This is a symbol for the fact that belief in God, and an understanding of birth as an eschatological event in the purposes of God, ought not to be reduced to an assumed exact design in the creation or on the part of a God whose work is imagined to be

completed on this planet and in this history. The significance of birth need not at all *depend on* our believing in the historical solution of all the historical problems births themselves create.

(2) While our admiration for the accomplishments of disease control should not be qualified, nor should there be any lessening of such energetic humanitarian actions, or any lack of actions thereafter to attempt to alleviate the evils among the consequences of that, etc., this "admiration" and our moral approval and the very meaning of "humanitarian" can be submitted to sound *analysis*. It is not that mankind is gaining the mastery over death and disease. Seven out of every seven persons now living is going to die—of "disease." God intends to kill us all in the end, and in the end he is going to succeed. Our proper confidence in the providence of God should have been somewhat restored by the recent report of the discovery of an entirely new disease hitherto altogether unknown to man. Also, that person has not thought much about life and death who imagines there is ever a proper time for a human being to die, when he may and can and should die "naturally." Death, like birth, is also an eschatological event, or else it comes, whether early or late, as man's "last enemy."

In the face of the ultimate boundary of disease and death, irremediable by any human action, it is not that humanitarian action to alleviate the world's problems is known on balance to be more good than harmful in its total ultimate consequences, or good because of these consequences. It is rather that it is proper and *right* action to take in behalf of the needy and helpless ones now living on the earth even if we cannot trammel up all the future consequences, so long as these consequences may possibly be good. The good is what God does, also with the consequences of our deeds; our acts are right or wrong *present* responses to God and to man. The known end results may prohibit an action, but the end results do not define an action as intrinsically right to be done. Right, witnessing and effective action flows from concrete neighbor-regarding *agape*, but this may not be the same as, and it is deeper and prior to, a *future*-regarding *agape* calculating the greater good or lesser evil in the upshot of any right action.

If, then, right conduct in the field of disease control can be determined without attempting to derive this backward from first counting up all the consequences and guaranteeing these to be good, must not the right sexual conduct be similarly determined? I do not say that Fagley does not believe this, but I do fear that setting the problem of sexual morality in the context of the population problem will have precisely this bad result, namely, that more and more people will simply say (without first taking independent

thought about the nature and meaning of sexual being and about the meaning of the gift and the task they have of being sexual for the time being) that sexual performance which contributes to the consequences of helping to alleviate population pressures *must* be good. Then sex will continue to become more and more a technical affair, and, among other things technically to be achieved, a means to the ends of public policy.

V

As there is danger that the grave problems of the world's population may force a too rapid and a finally unsound development in the church's moral teachings, so there is danger that man's life in sex, marriage and the family will be forced into becoming chiefly a matter of public policy. This is a second objection (or caution) that should be raised when these two subjects are treated together in one volume. There are simply too many statements in this book of the following type: "The educational task is also specific: to visualize the family in its relation to *national development*, to gain a new appreciation of the quality of family life as against quantity . . ." (p. 93, italics added); or (in criticism of Roman Catholic discussions of the "grave reasons" for periodic continence): "the economic and social indications tend to disappear. Periodic continence is judged to be licit only for the welfare of the individual family, not for the welfare of a society." (p. 185) What is wrong in this matter of giving birth (as distinct from areas that are truly public) with a husband and wife taking account of general economic and social needs *only* as these are reflected in the conditions of maximum welfare for their children? The statement of the East Asia Christian Conference, Malaya, May 1959, to the effect that "there can be good reasons for limiting the family apart from demographic considerations of controlling population" was certainly the understatement of the decade; and it was also a poor introduction for the sentence that immediately followed: "Considerations of family welfare must be regarded as supreme."

Let it be granted that the words, "Be fruitful and multiply *and fill the earth . . .*" (Gen. 1:28, italics added), express the *objective telos* of marriage and one of God's appointed *finis operis* for human sexuality. Let it also equally be stressed that these words entail, not a random, limitless purpose, but one that is directed toward the common good of man's earthly life, so that he has no business overfilling the earth in unthinking obedience to the first part of this command only. Still, either in filling or in not continuing to fill the earth, men and women in their *subjective* aims and goals in marriage and in their relation to each other and to children, have, in this

private sphere, only the most minimal and indirect relation to one or the other of these goals. Neither the *objective telos* of nature nor the *objective telos* to which in some ways public policy may be devoted can or should much occupy their thoughts in conjugal love, or in caring specifically for their children. On what grounds shall we disapprove for its invasion of the family the French law *prohibiting* the spread of contraceptive information and devices, enacted a number of years ago in a time of declining national population and with the intention of arresting this, or deplore Mussolini's bonuses for babies, without also being bound to disapprove, for the same reason, a public policy that uses the instruments of the state to go beyond "helping" to "encourage" and "pressure" families into adopting family-limitation policies?

Fagley seems on the brink of saying that the *finis operis* of responsible nonparenthood (or the responsible limitation of parenthood) sponsored as a matter of public policy, must become more and more the *finis operantis* central among the subjective motivations and goals of the parties themselves—even while he objects to Roman Catholics who (though they believe propagation to be the chief *finis operis* or objective end of marriage and even though they say that no part of the *finis operantis* or the parties' motivations should be *contrary* to this) nevertheless allow that the objective ends of nature need not be always before them during conjugal love nor even their subjective purpose in getting married. Of course, it is obvious that responsible nonparenthood must of necessity be adopted consciously and deliberately, if at all, as a matter of family policy, while irresponsible parenthood takes place without decision or aim. Still it must be said that, just as for Christian ethics there is the question of the morality of breaking apart the nexus of conjugation and propagation, so for social theory there is serious question to be raised about establishing too close a nexus between family policy and public policy in attempted solution of the population problem. I seriously suggest that, so far as the problem of society generally impinges upon the goals of family policy-making, this should filter through the "revolution of rising expectations" on the part of the peoples of the world and through the family's determination of its responsibility toward its own and within its own sphere in the attainment of greater expectations for the children to be born.

It is significant that the only notable success countries have had in the public direction of family reproductive policies are instances of which Fagley cannot wholly approve. He reports one million legalized abortions a year in Japan, and probably as many unauthorized abortions, so that "the

grim fact is that abortions considerably exceed live births in Japan," abortion along with contraception making that country "an unprecedented example of a rapid reduction in fertility," as the birth rate fell from 34 per thousand to less than 19 in the eight years from 1948 to 1956.⁴ He also mentions the payment of money by one state in India to fathers of two or three children who will consent to be sterilized (and—a fact Fagley does not mention but which I understand has been the case—the payment of *bonuses to social workers* who secure their consent).

I do not question that Fagley is correct that "no strategy" (rapid economic development, monstrous irrigation projects, synthesizing carbohydrates from sawdust, growing tree crops or green algae in tanks of carbon dioxide, stocking rice paddies with fish, getting the rats that destroy more grain in one year than moves in international trade, or massive migration) "can win which fails to include a real program to control and reduce fertility" (p. 13). But since he also states that "one by one the densely populated nations seem slated to fail in their struggle for development, unless they can *quickly* curb the human pressure on their means of sustenance" (p. 80, *italics added*), one might conclude that they seem slated to fail. Period. But here I say only that the free adoption by families of policies limiting progeny cannot *quickly* come about without government pressures that are very questionable indeed. Public policy cannot filter through quickly enough to become an indigenous family matter as the goal of rising expectations for each and all. Therefore, demographic policy-making will likely adopt more than nearly tyrannical means in order to succeed in our time. At stake here are issues of sexual morality and the integrity of marriage and the family and the sexual and other freedoms of the human being that are more important than the quick solution of what may, in any case, be an insoluble problem. And I say that writing these two books together obscures these issues, when the urgent direction of this writing moves mainly from public policy in the direction of family policy.

In the light of recent discussion of our foreign aid policy, it is certainly worth pointing out that "the actual requests of recipient governments are adjusted to the intimations from assisting governments as to the kinds of aid they are prepared to extend" (p. 94). But also it is worth remembering that, not alone because of a compact Roman Catholic minority in this country

⁴ I assume that Fagley was objectively reporting or analyzing, and not necessarily approving all the means Japan has used in beginning to reduce fertility, when he wrote: "... Even if the moral and medical objections to abortion as a means of fertility control are overlooked, Japan's success in reducing her birth rate so much and so quickly cannot be regarded as proof that the underdeveloped countries can do likewise" (p. 85).

but purely as a question of public policy, we have an interest in how recipient governments proceed with any assistance from us to try to solve their population problem—unless we are to say that the freedom of the family everywhere and whether or not *demos* and democracy are swamped by demographic projects are purely domestic issues (admittedly these are delicate issues in the relations between states). A book on the demographic theme, and this nation's responsibilities in this regard, should perhaps have ended (along with stressing our responsibility to *assist* in family control within the severe and likely unsuccessful limits of a people's free adoption of these means) with the simple and startling notation of where we have been most negligent: "... As of 1960 we have built no power reactors for export to those regions, we have none under construction, and we are not planning to build any"—despite our declaratory "atoms for peace" policy!⁸ That would have been a public solution proffered to a public question. Doubtless no such strategy could win unless there takes place some real control and reduction of fertility. But how can this be accomplished—quickly as it must be—without including marriage and the family, to the whole extent of their beings, within the public domain, and abolishing the distinction between the private and the public spheres?

The reader should set for himself the following test question (adapted from one given last year to students of jurisprudence at the New York University Law School):

By 1985 the effects of the "population explosion" began to seem intolerable in the United States. Public services of every kind, including general and professional education, began to break down because of the flood of increased population. Medical progress had greatly extended the life expectancy; and, despite an enormous increase in the number of obstetricians, achieved at the cost of considerable compromise in the quality of their skills, they were badly overworked. Their professional income rose proportionately.

The remaining state laws prohibiting or restricting the sale or advertising of contraceptive devices had all been repealed by 1990. In 1994 a nation-wide education campaign to encourage their use was launched; but by 1997 statistics showed that this had had little effect on the rate of births. At Congressional committee hearings, experts testified that the situation was just what they had expected. Other experts testified that unless drastic steps were taken a very sharp drop in the general standard of living was inevitable.

Accordingly, in 1998 Rep. Aristides K. Pflugelheimer came forward with the Pflugelheimer Plan, based on the experience in certain states in India earlier in this century. This plan, duly enacted into law and signed by the President, provided as follows: An excise tax of \$20 is imposed on every obstetrician for every birth which he assists, unless this is a charity case or one for which his fee is less than \$40. The

⁸ Murray, Thomas E., *Nuclear Policy for War and Peace*. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co., 1960, p. 140.

revenues from this tax are earmarked in a special Sterilization Fund (to be supplemented, if need be, by direct appropriations for this purpose). The following bounties will be paid for voluntary sterilization to the following two types of persons, provided they are within child-engendering or child-bearing age: \$1,000 to every father or mother of two or more living children; and \$3,000 to every person, male or female, single or married, childless or not, who is certified by a panel of medical experts to have any congenital mental or physical disease.

At the end of the first year of the operation of this statute an active obstetrician, John Smith, pays an excise tax of \$7,300 under protest and brings suit to recover the amount paid on the ground that the entire scheme is unconstitutional and that the excises collected from him are so linked with the bounty provisions that they stand or fall together. By the year 2004 this case on appeal reaches the Supreme Court of the United States for decision on its merits.

Chief Justice Brown, who is a Roman Catholic, subscribes to natural law, and in political life, before being appointed to the bench, he strongly supported economic "growthmanship." Associate Justice Blue is a legal positivist, and he is known to be the most concerned of all the court about the population problem. Associate Justice Mauve is a Protestant Christian, also concerned about this grave problem.

If you were Justice Mauve, what would be your decision?

In sum, to put sex (a human thing, that is) before people in any discussion of these subjects may be the only way soundly to advance Christian ethical teachings and practice, and as well the only way to put people before government.

The Trinitarian Controversy Revisited

PAUL M. VAN BUREN

THOUGH IT MIGHT BE WISER for lightweights to stay out of heavyweight competition, I wish to address myself to the controversy between Dr. Richardson and Dr. Welch which enlivened the pages of *RELIGION IN LIFE* a year ago. Surely all must be grateful that these two scholars "went to the mat" on a subject so worthy of discussion, but we must regret that the fight seemed inconclusive. It wasn't as though they had fought and come to a tie. They did not seem to engage each other, or more correctly put, they did not appear to meet over the same issue.

It is not my intention to review the content of their articles, or of the books which lie behind these articles. I assume that the reader has read these already. I wish, rather, to look back over the form of the discussion and ask if there is not a way in which we might begin to move ahead with the problem. What I propose to argue is that there are several problems involved in this discussion, not just one, and that we need to distinguish these if we wish to proceed. The fact that there appear to be two different issues may have something to do with the fact that the participants in this discussion are men in different disciplines. One is primarily a historian, and he poses an historical question. The other is primarily a theologian and he poses a theological question. Certainly one of the most serious aspects of this controversy is the question of whether and in what way historians and theologians may work together in the common theological enterprise.

THE PROBLEMS

There is, first of all, Dr. Richardson's *historical* question: in the actual historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity, what were the moving issues for the men engaged in this development? Was the question of the ontological understanding of God, in his transcendence and in his historical involvement, a major concern, so major as to have a fundamental bearing on the shaping of the classical doctrine of the Trinity? This is the question

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which both men ask, and it is a historical question to be answered as best we can as historians. There is certainly a theological question which we can then ask if the answer to the historical question is answered in the affirmative, namely: does the classical doctrine of the Trinity prove to be a helpful vehicle of expression for an understanding of God as "Absolute-Related" (or however we wish to express the understanding of God as being beyond threat from creation, "nonbeing," or what have you, and yet as having so acted as to involve himself in the threatened situation of man)? If so, what words and concepts should we use to express this understanding of God?

There is, secondly, Dr. Welch's *theological* question: "Is God really made known in Jesus Christ?" Both men would give an affirmative answer, but there is less agreement as to whether the doctrine of the Trinity is the most helpful way of making this affirmation. The issue here seems to be whether or not the affirmation of this claim, that God is really made known in Jesus Christ, is absolutely dependent on a trinitarian expression, or whether there are other ways in which this can be said, as good as, or perhaps even better than, that available to us in the inherited or reconstructed language of the historical doctrine of the Trinity.

We have, then, a historical question, with theological questions which may be raised in connection with it; and we have, second, a theological question. Finally, we must ask how we might move ahead with the theological question which concerns Dr. Welch in such a way that we do not ignore the historical question posed by Dr. Richardson. These will be the subjects of the three parts following.

I

Dr. Richardson has posed the question both in his book and in his article, whether the doctrine of the Trinity, in its historical development, was not shaped in large measure by the fact that the Fathers were wrestling with the ontological problem of God "Absolute and Related." His answer is affirmative. As a theologian, I am willing to listen to the historian here, not so much because Dr. Welch has failed to convince me of historical grounds for objecting, as because—and this may be more to the point in the controversy under review—I see no theological reason why I should want to object. If we are committed theologically to the conviction that God really has made himself known in Jesus Christ, and him crucified, we may have to question certain elements of patristic theology. The idea of the impassibility of God, whether as Father or Son, ascribed to Irenaeus and the whole patristic movement and so much open to question in recent

theology, would be a familiar case in point. We have no theological reason for objecting to such an historical attribution, but only to the idea itself as one to which we would subscribe today.

As already indicated, there is, in connection with Dr. Richardson's historical conclusion, a theological problem. Does the doctrine of the Trinity as historically developed serve as a helpful way to express the paradox of God as "Absolute-Related"? Operating as a theologian, Dr. Richardson has pointed out the serious difficulties arising from the fact that the doctrine in its actual development has led to assigning the two sides of the paradox to the two *personae* of the Trinity; and it is, we are told, no real solution to the problem if we accept the Thomistic correction of the identity of function in the "Persons" *ad extra*, for the net effect is simply to make the whole conception of Trinity inapplicable. Again, I see no historical or theological grounds why we should not be willing to follow Dr. Richardson this far.

But now we come to a further theological problem. Let Dr. Richardson speak for himself here:

Whether we use such terms as "He who is" or "infinite subjectivity" or "absolute will," or any other similar expression, always the concept of the Absolute, the denial of all finitude, threat, change and deviation of purpose, is involved. . . . If we fail to apply absolute categories to God, our faith has no stable and certain object. We begin to believe in a God who has not yet become truly God.¹

What is this "truly God"? Is Pascal's cry in order here? "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars!" Is faith supposed to be "stable and certain" in the sense of having a "stable and certain object"? Is God less "truly God" if he allows himself no absoluteness? Such a conception of God may be logically more satisfying, but, Dr. Welch has asked, what sort of logic is this? Is not such a God also the God of the "God hypothesis" which most men today can do very nicely without? It is not clear, in short, that Dr. Richardson has met Dr. Welch's fair theological question which has arisen out of his own historical presentation. There is more at stake than the patristic idea of Trinity. There is also the question of the patristic idea of Divinity which needs to be considered, not to speak of the peculiar anthropology which, in the Christological side of the problem, had a role to play in this whole development.

The problem is not that Dr. Richardson has gone too far. It is rather that he has not gone far enough. If he has done us a great service in helping

¹ RELIGION IN LIFE, Winter 1959-60, p. 12.

to free us from being bound by the static or ahistorical categories of the doctrine of the Trinity, he has failed us in not helping us away from the ahistorical categories of the patristic concept of "Divinity." To think and speak of God in historical (or as some would have it, dynamic) categories may also mean that we must end with a paradox which should not be evaded; but it would seem that Dr. Richardson's failure at least to suggest such a translation of his paradox into historical terms is one of the reasons for the objections of Dr. Welch. I assume that it is clear that this is not to suggest an "anti-ontological" approach, whatever that would be. What is suggested here is only a different way to think about "being," fashioned more on the model of history than on the model of nature, but in every sense, just as clearly an "ontology," though just as clearly a different one.

II

Dr. Welch opened his article, in attack upon Dr. Richardson's thesis, with this theological question: "Is God really *made known* in Jesus Christ?"² Now the first thing we need to see clearly is that this is *not* the question that Dr. Richardson was dealing with, and it must be added that he did *not* identify "the trinitarian problem" with the paradox of "absoluteness and relatedness," as Dr. Welch asserted. What Dr. Richardson *did* say was that this paradox, in one form or another, played a major role in the historical development of the doctrine, which is quite a different matter. When Dr. Welch goes on to insist that "in fact the New Testament distinction of Father and Son is *not* the distinction of God unrelated and God related," it could be said that this is precisely Dr. Richardson's point! The problem in the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity is that just this latter distinction was read into the former.

This apparent misunderstanding of Dr. Richardson's argument is expressed further on when Dr. Welch says:

The biblical tradition is to be most sharply *contrasted* with the view of God as an abstract Absolute. And this indeed Richardson finally admits: "The attempt to understand the Father and the Son of the Trinity in terms of the Greek Absolute or of God's final transcendence over against his relatedness, could never be satisfactory to a theology oriented toward the Scriptures." Does that not give the whole case away?³

The answer must be, by no means. It does raise the question of the way in which we are to understand "Absoluteness" in God, and suggests that

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

it must not be the way of Greek thought and thus not in the way in which it was expressed in the *historical* development of the doctrine of the Trinity. But just this is the problem of the doctrine of the Trinity to which Dr. Richardson has called our attention.

Both men agree, as we have seen, that the New Testament distinction of Father and Son may not be understood as the distinction of absolute and related. And Dr. Welch admits Dr. Richardson's thesis that the doctrine of the Trinity is not an adequate expression of the paradox in God. Where they part company is not around a single question, but in the fact that on the one hand, Dr. Richardson stands on his thesis of the inadequacy of the doctrine of the Trinity to express the paradox of God, whereas, on the other hand, Dr. Welch wants to talk about another problem. Dr. Welch is concerned with the problem of revelation, as is clear from his opening question, as well as from his assertion that, fundamentally, the trinitarian doctrine expresses the Gospel conviction that "God is newly and *uniquely known* in Jesus Christ, that the gospel of Jesus Christ is genuinely a *disclosure* of who God is."⁴ Was this the basic conviction of the trinitarians in the time of the historical development of this doctrine? The historian Dr. Richardson surely has grounds to wonder. Were the Fathers really saying, with Dr. Welch, that "the trinitarian conception is rooted exclusively in revelation"? In part, no doubt, and that is just the problem, but *exclusively*? If Dr. Welch were right about this, how could they have insisted so upon the impassibility of the Father? And why were they so careful to guard the impassibility of the Son *qua* second "Person" of the Trinity?

If we ask why the fury of Dr. Welch's attack, the answer must be that he senses a threat in Dr. Richardson's position, a threat to what is for him (and properly so, theologically) the central issue: "whether the disclosure of God in Jesus Christ, as testified to in the New Testament, is genuinely unique and determinative for Christian thinking."⁵ In this, I would want to agree, our answer must be a clear affirmative, although it can be said in other ways. The heart of the gospel rests on the indispensability of Jesus Christ, for knowledge as for "salvation." He is indispensable because he stands as Mediator of our knowledge of God as well as of our access to God in faith or prayer, not to speak of our access to each other, as Bonhoeffer would want to add.

It must be said that Dr. Richardson insists, in his *Reply*, that he is

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

not disputing this central issue. But what Dr. Richardson does question is the consequence which Dr. Welch draws from this: "If so, the trinitarian development is a meaningful enterprise."⁶ I must confess that I fail to see the necessary connection. It might be so, or it might not. The doctrinal development might have been such that we could say this, but it might also be the case that with other terms and concepts and patterns of thought, we could find more helpful ways of saying what Dr. Welch rightly says we have to say: that Jesus of Nazareth is the indispensable Mediator between God and man and between man and God. I suggest, as a reasonable hypothesis, that Dr. Welch has made his attack because Dr. Richardson has not been clear about how this might be said on the assumption that we find other than trinitarian terms with which to work.

III

The whole debate, and the questions which have been raised about it, can be summed up with reference to one sentence in Dr. Welch's final *Reply*. Having said that Dr. Richardson has posed the thesis that the problem of absolute-relatedness was the moving force in the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity, Dr. Welch goes on:

It seems to me, on the contrary, that he has here grievously misstated the *meaning* of the trinitarian enterprise, that he has reversed what *have been* and *ought to be* the priorities in trinitarian theology, substituting a kind of metaphysical problem in which he is deeply interested for the judgment that in the events to which the New Testament bears witness God is known in a new and unique way—a way *inseparable* from the affirmation of the "threefoldness" of the divine act and being.⁷ (Italics mine!)

1. Dr. Richardson was speaking about the historical development, not the "meaning" which could later be attached to this doctrine if seen under a new perspective, that of revelation. As a historian, Dr. Richardson has sought to demonstrate that the ontological problem was not exclusive, but certainly a major force in shaping the final doctrinal product, so potent a force as to pose serious problems even for such major attempts to restate the doctrine as that of Professor Karl Barth.

2. "Have been" and "ought to be," are, for better or worse, not the same thing. Dr. Richardson has argued what the priorities actually were. Dr. Welch is concerned about what the priorities "ought to be." I could not agree more fully with each man. There is no conflict in holding both

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

theses! The *historical* problem has been exposed. The fundamental *issue* for us has been posed. Both may and must be said.

3. The issue, then, is simply this: is the conviction that "God is known in a new and unique way" in the events to which the New Testament bears witness really *inseparable* from a trinitarian affirmation? How does Dr. Welch know this? What are the grounds for saying this? Must this not be reserved as a pragmatic judgment, to be made only in the sense that one may not yet have seen any other way of stating this conviction except in trinitarian terms? This would be an odd conclusion for the author of Chapter 3 of *The Reality of the Church*, all the more odd in that in this very article in RELIGION IN LIFE, Dr. Richardson has also come close to finding another way of speaking of these matters. In this place, I can only give the briefest outlines of a way to do just this, to express the uniqueness of God's self-revelation in the history of Jesus of Nazareth, without having to rest on the language or concepts of the doctrine of the Trinity, and it is a way which is at least close to certain words of our two antagonists.

I would begin by speaking of God as the God of the Covenant. As this God is witnessed to in the Old Testament, he is affirmed in his history with his people, and from there, in his history with his creation. The fullness of God, to which Dr. Richardson points when he speaks of paradox, and to which Dr. Welch points when he speaks of "threefoldness," is indicated here by speaking of him as the God of the Covenant, who makes covenant as Lord, who calls into existence his people as the partners in this covenant, and who reaches out to draw man into this relationship. We are Dr. Richardson's debtors for his historical clarification and, theologically, we have no reason to take issue with his assertion that the God of the biblical witness is God in his fullness. We can accept his basic point that what he indicates with his paradox is all in God himself, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, though we might want to wrestle further with his way of putting the paradox. One might refer here to the article by O. Procksch and K. G. Kuhn on the idea of the holy in the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, in which it is held that God's holiness lies in his being other than and acting differently from men precisely in that he draws near to sinful man in mercy (Hos. 11:9). That may be called a paradox, but it is a very special sort of paradox!

The biblical writings speak also of God's son, and as Dr. Richardson points out, this means the man or men who receive "a special vocation." And, he goes on, in the New Testament witness, Jesus is God's son on this model—"his relationship to God was *in essence* the same as that which

he coveted for all his hearers," it was the "*same type* of relation with God which prophets and psalmists had already foreshadowed."⁸ (Italics mine!) Now everything depends on how these words are meant. On the surface, they seem to *generalize* God's call and his relationships. If so, then these assertions would have to be rejected. God's "special vocation" is always specific just because it is God's call to particular men in their own historical situation. God's call is always particular. And his call to his son Jesus Christ, the specific election which Jesus of Nazareth was born to bear, was God's election of Jesus to be the Messiah, the New Israel, the one who would be God's faithful, obedient and loving partner in his covenant. Because he alone bears this election (and this expresses what concerns us in the trinitarian and Christological assertion of his "divine nature"), and because of his historical obedience (and this was his "perfect manhood," that he was willing to be the New Israel, the uniquely faithful man, the man who was for the others), he is the perfect image of God; and to hear him is to hear the one to whom he is obedient, the one who called him to this obedience that he might be the "place" where God is known and acknowledged in the world.

Is Jesus then "just a man"? Yes, he is; only, of course, no man is "just a man." He is, more correctly, this particular man, the man who came into this election and who responded in faithfulness. He is God's Word, for and to us, this man from Nazareth. By his election and obedience, he stands as God's Word to and for us. God's Word, his eternal purpose, plan and good pleasure, have now been rested upon this man, and it is the man himself, not something "in" him, not something "behind" him, but the man himself in his history, with this historical destiny (his election) and this historical freedom (his obedience), who is now God's Word. The Word *became* flesh, really *became*.

To see this is to see that, while Jesus coveted just his relationship to God for other men, namely, the relationship of obedience in the Covenant, it is doubtful whether we can best say this by adding "in essence." Perhaps we could say even that, if we add at once, "but not *in function*." Jesus lived his relationship as the New Israel, the one who is there for all the others. We come to this relationship, drawn by the God who has covenanted himself to Jesus of Nazareth (i.e., the work of the Spirit), as men who have Jesus as our mediator, as the others for whom he is there. His relationship to God may be defined by his function of mediation, whatever its essence (I must confess I have misgivings about the word

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9.

"essence" in this connection); and in this function, he is indispensable. We are indeed chosen in him (Eph. 1:4), but our election is not the same as his. He is called to be Israel for all the others, for the whole world. We are called to be members of Israel, those who have him for their elder brother and great High Priest. One might say that we become adopted sons of the Father of this one true son by the strange process of being taken as brothers by this man. Through him alone do we come to be sons of God.

I suggest that with historical terms, derived from the history of God's dealings with Israel, we have been saying what we may hope the trinitarian formulations were trying to express in ahistorical terms. Where they spoke of the unity of substance of the Father and Son, we might speak of the faithfulness of God. His plan and purpose expressed in the Covenant is not just an aspect of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. This plan of love and rescue and life for men is God's whole will, a purpose to which he has committed himself without reserve, putting his whole heart in it, so to speak. This is the word, which is with God, which is God; for God is love, namely this love for men which finds expression in the Covenant with Israel to be his son and, as such, a light for the Gentiles. God's mission toward man, his reaching out toward mankind, is the expression of who God is. He is this kind of a God, who makes covenant with man, and who is absolutely faithful in this covenant.

And the New Testament kerygma is the proclamation of the event in which this plan and purpose of God's was fulfilled in the man Jesus of Nazareth. He accepted the covenant. He trusted that God was faithful and responded in faithfulness. As a son responding in love and obedience to his father may be called "the spitting image of his father," not only in appearance, but because he acts and talks and reacts just as his father would, so for the man who had never met the father we might say that if you come to know this young man, you will know his father. In a similar fashion, the New Testament community was convinced that Jesus was the image of God, that he who saw this man had seen the Father. Jesus Christ, recognized as God's faithful Israel on the basis of the fact that he was raised from the dead, is therefore seen as the very word of God to men, the man chosen to be the one in whom God had both made himself known, and also worked out the plan and purpose which he had for the whole of mankind.

The detailed working out of this "other way" of preserving the central kerygmatic issue, which is Dr. Welch's concern, without use of the trini-

tarian figure, must be reserved for a more appropriate format than a short article. What is intended here is only to indicate that with the categories of Covenant, election and obedience, the central affirmation of the Gospel can be made. In fact, had we not been reading the New Testament for so many centuries through the eyes of those who bequeathed us the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the Two Natures of Christ, we might have been better able to see that the New Testament itself is just such an attempt, in many of its writings. As it is, here and there across the theological scene, the winds of a Christology of "call and response" can begin to be felt, as we go back and consider anew what was involved in the condemnation of Paul of Samosata and many of his Antiochene heirs, and learn from Bonhoeffer and "secular" historians to take history as a more hopeful category of thinking than those of finitude and infinity, left to us by our supranaturalist fathers in the faith. I am baffled in my attempts to see why Dr. Welch, who appears in some ways to share in feeling this new wind blowing, will not join in expressing thanks to Dr. Richardson for a helping hand along the new road.

Martin Buber and the Voluntary Turning

CLARICE M. BOWMAN

ONE EVENING IN 1905, while Martin Buber was spending some time in Italy working on Hasidism, he saw the great Eleanora Duse in the theatre. The thought of actor and audience, the tension between self and other, led to the theme of "I" and "Thou," into which no doubt many earlier thoughts and influences had played, through his maturing years.

This theme, with the antithetical "I-It," became nuclear in the philosophy and personal experiences of Buber. As his writings, beginning with *I and Thou*, have become available in translation, this central thought with its variant fugues has provided new perspectives for creative insight in divergent disciplines: philosophy, theology, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, religious education. Perhaps any century sees but a few of those rare thinkers who can absorb into themselves the insights of the age and give back a fresh Gestalt, providing new frames for new questions leading to new answers. In an epoch of mechanization and depersonalization, can Buber's centralization of the *personal* resound therapeutically?

The answer depends upon how seriously any of us are willing to give ourselves to the dialogic of I-Thou as over against I-It, not just in theory but existentially.

Everywhere is eager wistfulness for relation. Buber feels that his cat is trying to convey to him such a longing. He senses his horse being aware of his rubbing his coat. To infinitely greater degree, persons long. "The child, lying with half-closed eyes, waiting with tense soul for its mother to speak to it . . . the mystery of its will directed toward experiencing communion in the face of the lonely night, which spreads beyond the window and threatens to invade."¹ Buber feels he is getting close to the mystery of human life in this "wish of every man to be confirmed as what he is, even as what he can become, by men; and the innate capacity in man to confirm his fellowmen in this way."² ". . . secretly and bashfully he watches for a

¹ Buber, M., *Between Man and Man*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1947, p. 88.

² Buber, M., "Distance and Relation," in *Hibbert Journal*, CDXCIII, January, 1951, p. 110. Also found in his "William Alanson White Memorial Lectures, Fourth Series," reprinted from *Psychiatry*, Vol. XX, 2, May, 1957.

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Yes . . . It is from one man to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed."³ Here real relation is perceived in the happening, not to be abstracted and spoken of as an "experience," that "stirs in the receptive soul and grows to perfect blessedness; rather, in that moment something happens to the man. At times it is like a light breath, at times like a wrestling bout, but always—it *happens*."⁴

Here is the existential core, the lived life, the "real life that is meeting," in Buber's phrase. One meets in inner aliveness the most real self of the other, yet knows there are still infinite depths *beyond* the knowing. One allows for the mystery in the other as one allows for the mystery in one's self. Two autonomous centers are magnetized to one another, each deeply respecting the otherness of the other. The one is not absorbed in the other. The one does not in any slightest way attempt to invade the other's personality or to use the other as means. Here is not unity or identity but *mutuality* with each free in the relation, a simultaneous helping of one another to become more fully persons, a simultaneous conferring of belonging. "I-It" means the opposite: approaching the other as a *thing*.

Approached thus introductorily, Buber's thought appears deceptively simple, both to grasp and to live. Two temptations appear at the outset. The first is that we start with the outward behavior, a temptation indigenous to activists. "Here comes a person. I must treat him as a 'Thou.'" Our kit of manipulative "win-influence" techniques now has another addition. Our "how to," "do-it-yourself" complexes bolster in us false confidence that if we create proper roles for ourselves, we can act them. But no one is deceived—neither the other fellow nor ourselves. Short-cuts to relation do not work. Let the group-work writers be warned. One is not *engagé*. One's heart is not involved. Out of the heart are the issues of relation.

We go a step deeper, then. We cannot start with outward behavior; we must start with the heart. "Good," we then say, "I'll say to myself: 'This other is your brother. Maybe he has a headache or a pebble in his shoe.'" But we cannot *make* ourselves relate to him helpfully or authentically; we cannot even control fully the response of our hearts. Either we overdo, trying to empathize (Buber disclaims that word), emptying ourselves of selfhood and melting into the other; or we underdo, emptying the other of selfhood and reading into him what we think he ought to feel. Or else we are just plain insensitive. We and he remain as ships passing in the night.

³ "Distance and Relation," p. 113.

⁴ Buber, M., *I and Thou* (Tr. Ronald Gregor Smith), Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937, p. 109.

Our thesis here is that the authentic I-Thou relation necessitates our existential willingness to undergo a *turning*, the *teshubah*. This cannot be accomplished solely of our own self-will. The "grace" of God operates, wooing us to the response of the turning, yet not invading but calling us to step forth voluntarily as conscious selves. Our "work" thus meets the infinitely greater "work" of God in achieving relation. Similarly, with another person, one responds in fullness of selfhood, hailing the other as a self. Transformation is wrought that will affect the motives of the heart and the outward behavior successively, because first the *perception* is changed. Here, in processes of initial response not fully understood or charted psychologically, one is made new. One sees with new eyes. The great forces of the subconscious self swing along.

Perhaps here is a new facet of light on the Christian phrase, "being born again." Let us examine this change in perception more deeply.

INADEQUATE PERCEPTION

Buber calls the incomplete, artificial, inauthentic perception, "I-It." One is not fully *present* to the other. There is absence of the personal. Instead of real being is appearance. Buber is realistic in his admission that much of life is lived on this It level, and that our multi-inventional civilization has vastly increased the times and powers to experience things and persons as Its.

Our minds have been trained to sort, categorize, count—either persons or things. Sometimes we scarcely consider the difference. We are caught in Aristotelian transitiveness (subject acts on object; God himself is *Actus Purus*, Prime Mover). Only as It can something, or thoughts about someone, enter into knowledge. Buber is frank to say that the communal life of man cannot dispense with I-It. But when man chooses to live all or most of his life at this level, he misses the real knowing. Rather than feeling the Thou "moving like a spirit upon the face of the waters" we de-actualize, propagandize, use, manipulate, abuse, analyze, reduce to statistics, hurt, kill. "This look is a reductive one, because it tries to contract the manifold person, who is nourished by the microcosmic richness of the possible, to some schematically surveyable and recurrent structures."⁶

Buber would speak of this kind of looking, in the It mode, as tending radically to destroy the mystery between man and man, to "level down" the "ever-near mystery, once the source of the stillest enthusiasms." We

⁶ *I and Thou*, p. 48; "White Lectures," p. 109.

thus delude and reduce ourselves. What we think we know, we do not know, really. "You perceive it, take it to yourself as the 'truth,' and it lets itself be taken; but it does not give itself to you."⁶

Recognizing that the analytical is the method of the sciences, he pleads that man always keep in view the boundaries of such a method, but remarks that it is difficult to see where the boundaries are. Our generation, he fears, has lost the way of "true freedom," of free giving between I and Thou.

ONE'S SELF AT THE TURNING

Man can turn from distorted or inadequate modes of perceiving the other and of attempting relation inauthentically, and about-face in an act of freedom with the wholeness of his personality; this is man's role, in no sense to be thought of as usurping God's role. The task of every man is to make this turning, that the "two worlds" which are essentially one may then in him become truly one. This is man's sacred vocation, to hallow all of life, not make it evil. Even the evil urge⁷ can then be taken up into the good. "He who with the entire force of his being 'turns' to God, lifts at this point of the universe the divine immanence out of its debasement, which he has caused."⁸

The heart of man seems to have impulses which whirl in different directions. "There is no true direction except to God."⁹ This turning is more than repentance and acts of penance. In being a "reversal of his whole being," it transforms one's way of perceiving one's self, of perceiving the other, and of perceiving the Eternal. One can now see his task, appointed of God from the beginning of time: "Everything is waiting to be hallowed by you; it is waiting to be disclosed in its meaning and to be realized in it by you. For the sake of this your beginning, God created the world. . . . Meet the world with the fullness of your being and you shall meet Him. . . . If you wish to believe, love!"¹⁰

Such a newness of perception is made possible through the gift of the spirit. This is renewed from within. In this one devotes one's own "best energies," in co-operation with the work of grace, the *emunah*. One answers the divine address. Thus one comes to perceive himself anew in the divine sight . . . not abandoned to forces of chaos. "God Himself

⁶ *I and Thou*, p. 32.

⁷ See particularly Buber, M., *Good and Evil*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953; and *At the Turning: Three Addresses on Judaism*, Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952.

⁸ Buber, M., *The Way of Man*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950, p. 44.

⁹ Buber, M., *Two Types of Faith*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951, p. 63.

¹⁰ *At the Turning*, p. 46.

seeks him out." Here is no *Gott-Mensch* antithesis where man in alienation is invaded or encountered; rather here is implication of divinely ordained "valences" for relation, as man responds from his side to God's call, in whatever form it may come.

Do we stand overcome before the hidden face of God as the tragic hero of the Greeks before faceless fate? No. . . . In such a state we await His voice, whether it come out of the storm or out of a stillness which follows it. Though His coming appearance resemble no earlier one, we shall recognize again our cruel and merciful Lord.¹¹

Each has his own special pathway. There resides in every man the possibility of attaining authentic human existence in the special manner peculiar to him.¹²

PERCEIVING ANEW OUR RELATION WITH THE ETERNAL THOU

Buber is no pantheist. He teaches the absolute transcendence of God, but as combined with his conditioned immanence, in that while the world is an irradiation of God, it is given independence of existence. There is a divine spark in every thing and being, but each such spark is enclosed by an isolating shell from which only man can liberate it and rejoin it with its Origin: "by holding converse with the thing and using it in a holy manner."¹³ God speaks, and his creative act may not be interrupted. "Everything, being and becoming, nature and history, is essentially a divine pronouncement, an infinite context of signs meant to be perceived and understood by perceiving and understanding creatures."¹⁴

God's grace enables man to make the turning. God dwells wherever man will let him in: "He wants to let himself be won by man . . . places himself, so to speak, into man's hands. God wants to come to his world, but he wants to come to it through man."¹⁵ When man begins to turn in the direction of God, he is confronted by his call and destiny; he "experiences himself as heard and understood, accepted and confirmed, by Him to Whom he addresses himself."¹⁶

Man is now in relation with the Eternal Thou who can never become It, the Thou who can be addressed but never expressed—known only in the betweenness of relation, never perceived as subject. Every particular thou

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹² "White Lectures," p. 111.

¹³ *The Way of Man*, p. 44.

¹⁴ *At the Turning*, p. 57.

¹⁵ *The Way of Man*, p. 45.

¹⁶ *At the Turning*, p. 48.

is a "glimpse" of the Eternal Thou. The divine voice speaks to the Single One in a "voice of thin silence."¹⁷ Man may at times know the pain and barrenness of remoteness from God, but he cannot know absence of God, it is only man who is absent. All men have access to God but each has a different access. "He who goes out with his whole being to meet his Thou and carries to it all being that is in the world, finds Him who cannot be sought."¹⁸ God makes sovereign address, man gives autonomous answer. If he remains silent, that too is answer. Each I-Thou is a pathway to the Eternal.

Following Jewish doctrine, sin is the disturbing by man of his fundamental relationship with God. Forgiveness is restoration through the turning. Man sins *as* Adam sinned, not *because* he sinned. God's participation with the sinner is strong enough to help him turn back. The "evil urge" Buber conceives as passion not necessarily bad in itself which is peculiar to humankind, and which left to itself is without direction and leads astray. The "good urge" is pure direction, Godward. Turning thus unifies the self. Buber recognizes fully the demonic depths of life in our times. He could well observe and feel in the marrow of his bones the hurts and hates in Germany and in Palestine, where he has given himself deeply in the stream of Jewish suffering. He yearns over the turning away in our times from holy teaching. He shudders, as did Berdyaev, at collectivities. But at the center of his philosophy, despite all, is personhood achieved in "real meeting," one with one, and one with the Eternal Thou.

CREATION AND REDEMPTION

"Man must indeed accept creation from God's hands, not in order to possess it, but lovingly to take part in the still uncompleted work of Creation."¹⁹ This links redemption with creation, with each moment of a person's life set between creation and redemption. Creation happens all the time, throughout the whole of time. In risking encounter with another in I-Thou relation, or in risking encounter with the Eternal Thou, we participate in bringing creation and redemption together.

The new creation going on within one at the turning imparts a new self-image, which in turn we bring to each new moment of perception: "the customary soul enlarges and transfigures itself into the surprise soul . . . not a return to an earlier, guiltless stage of life, but a swinging round to

¹⁷ Buber, M., *The Eclipse of God*, Harper & Brothers, 1952, p. 119.

¹⁸ *I and Thou*, p. 79.

¹⁹ *At the Turning*, p. 39.

where the wasted hither-and-thither becomes walking in a way, and guilt is atoned for in the newly-arisen genuineness of existence."²⁰

The work of redemption is continued if one perceives the events of every day in hallowed light. "Every act can be a way" of serving God and preparing for the coming Kingdom, provided the intention is pure. Thus all actions can be messianic. "If we had power over the ends of the earth, it would not give us that fulfillment of existence which a quiet devoted relationship to nearby life can give us." This is truly transformed perception, a new perspective on values. The soil, the farm tools, the animals "contain a mysterious spiritual substance which depends on us for helping it towards its pure form . . ." ²¹ "Any natural act, if hallowed, leads to God . . .," ²² "our task is precisely to get in touch . . ." ²³

The call is for what we might call a breaking-up or loosening of former conceptions, a getting rid of "ancient rot and mould" of old conflicts between persons, old forms, conventions, institutions, what Berdyaev would call objectifications, that those now groping toward one another "in anxious delirium" may be given directness, clear way. "You shall help. Each man needs help, each needs *your* help. . . . You shall awaken in the other the need of help, in yourself the capacity to help. Even when you yourself are in need—and you are—you can help others and, in so doing, help yourself." ²⁴

PERCEIVING IN THE TRIADIC RELATION

Each relation of person with person is also in relation to the Eternal Thou, hence the triadic image. How does this enable human conversation to become dialogue? Both turn to the other, make one another "present." Each speaks from the depth of his real self to the depth of the other. This is factuality.²⁵ One is no longer spectator, standing off against the other. "Becoming aware" is perception that one's very self is being addressed by the other.²⁶ The other "says something to me, addresses something to me, speaks something that enters my own life." Instead of looking *at* the other, one makes a "bold swinging," "most intensive stirring of being."

Let it be said again that all this can only take place in a living partnership—that is, when I stand in a common situation with the other and expose myself

²⁰ *Pointing the Way*, Harper & Brothers, 1957, p. 206.

²¹ *The Way of Man*, pp. 41-43.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁴ *Pointing the Way*, p. 109.

²⁵ *Between Man and Man*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947, pp. 4f.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

vitality to his share in the situation as really his share. It is true that my basic attitude can remain unanswered, and the dialogue can die in seed. But if mutuality stirs, then the interhuman blossoms into genuine dialogue.²⁷

This quality of relation is not dependent upon the content of what is talked about. Dialogue can take place without words. Relation itself is a form of speech. Speech, as a matter of fact, can enhance distance. The test is whether "something happens" which, in Buber, is "covenant."

. . . for a conversation no sound is necessary, not even a gesture. Speech can renounce all the media of sense, and it is still speech. . . . An open-hearted person may so turn to another open-hearted person as to speak really to and towards him; and then genuine community will appear; not that of an identical content of ideology or faith but that of the situation, of anguish, and of expectation.²⁸

In genuine meeting I perceive that I am limited in my own finitude and partialness and need of completion. I have vocation to confirm the other in what is unique in him. "Everyone has in him something precious that is in no one else. But this precious something in a man is revealed to him only if he truly perceives his strongest feeling, his central wish, that in him which stirs his inmost being."²⁹ Thus to have another treat us as Thou opens to us a truer perception of our I. The I which has stepped forth is the "bearer of perceptions."³⁰

The authenticity of the I means letting no seeming appear between the self and the other, means saying in integrity what arises. One is called to "make contribution of spirit without reduction and without shifting ground." One is open. Pretense is gone. There is no holding back. This other is the focus of concentration. One is not just half attending. One chooses and is chosen, takes the risk. No hypocrisy is here. Confirming the other does not necessarily mean approval, "but no matter in what I am against the other, by accepting him as my partner in genuine dialogue I have affirmed him as a person."³¹ I meet my Thou. The unity is not only perceived, it is lived. One ventures in full faith toward communion, not mere communication.

Buber speaks of three levels of perceiving while giving warning of the stance one should *not* take:

. . . not to look furtively outside yourselves, not to look furtively into others, and not to aim at yourselves . . . firstly, everyone should preserve and hallow his own

²⁷ "White Lectures," p. 110.

²⁸ *Between Man and Man*, p. 3ff.; Pfuetze, P., *The Social Self*, Twayne Publishers, 1954, p. 167.

²⁹ *The Way of Man*, p. 19.

³⁰ *I and Thou*, p. 23.

³¹ "White Lectures," p. 112.

soul in its own particularity and in its own place, and not envy the particularity and place of others; secondly, everyone should respect the secret in the soul of his fellow-man, and not, with brazen curiosity, intrude upon it and take advantage of it; and thirdly, everyone, in his relationship to the world, should be careful not to set himself as his aim.³²

TRANSFORMATIONS WORKING OUT INTO ALL OF LIFE

Love that binds the I more closely to the Thou enables one also to love others whom God loves.³³ This is the decisive principle, above justice, above institutions. "Love is the responsibility of an I for a Thou."³⁴ Only a part of a being can be hated. The whole of a being can be loved. "People who love each other with holy love bring each other towards the love with which God loves his world."³⁵ Love does not exist in the I, making the other an object and absorbing. Love is *between*, and lives in the experiencing. One may not perceive a fellow creature as lovable. But in the Hebrew, Buber reminds us, the command is to love "to" him—the other is not made an object as in the accusative, but lovingkindness is beamed to him as in the dative. Our duty is to love the stranger in the sphere of separation if we love God in the sphere of wholeness.³⁶ We perceive him as lovable in this context of God-relation. Hence the reactions that flow from that perception are relational. More than that, we are to love the "enemy" likewise—love "to" him.

Consistently, Buber speaks of sex in terms of accepting the naturalness of the body and of the spirit as united. Spirit heightens the perception the one has of the other, and lifts the relation into love and into line with the love of God. "He who loves a woman, and brings her life to present realisation in his, is able to look in the Thou of her eyes into a beam of eternal Thou."³⁷

Work can be an expression of love, if one prepares by accomplishing a unification of spirit, in order to perceive the hallowedness of the task and envision its doing "all of a piece," not as patchwork.³⁸ One perceives a *call* in the task. In any of the arts, there is a *call*—for response, for an entering into the betweenness that is not as complete, certainly, as the relation of two persons but is an orienting, a hallowing.³⁹ Play is a part of

³² *The Way of Man*, p. 39.

³³ *At the Turning*, p. 37.

³⁴ *I and Thou*, p. 15.

³⁵ *Between Man and Man*, p. 137.

³⁶ *Pointing the Way*, p. 211.

³⁷ *I and Thou*, p. 106.

³⁸ *The Way of Man*, p. 25.

³⁹ Buber, M., *To Hallow This Life*, Harper & Brothers, 1958.

human existence, as "the exultation of the possible," the body's enjoyment of itself. He speaks of the dancer, his whole being interpenetrated by his spirit.⁴⁰ Drama is the formation of the *Word* as it moves *between beings*, with a tension between word and answer that can never be fully bridged by speech. Teaching means trying to perceive the pupil as he is in a spirit of love, willingness to experience "from the other side," to make him present and to become truly present to him so that a "subterranean dialogue" can take place that is real education.⁴¹

In psychotherapy, Buber would give one to understand that the important thing is not a preconceived methodology but a full perception of why persons are as they are. Shall one try to stay within what one perceives to be his "role" or shall one dare to do or say what the present situation seems to call for, to "play it by ear"? Buber says to "dare."⁴² The person is to be perceived, not narrowly in a theoretical framework, but in terms of his background, his relations with others in his world. Method then subordinates to the transcending relationship, the "elementary situation between one who calls and one who is called."⁴³ The healing of the wounds of humanity can begin at any place at any moment.

SOCIETY AT THE TURNING

The community, like the individual, is "addressed from above." The people, as a people, confronts God. "Like the individual, it is free as to its answer to the divine call, free to say yes or no to God by its doing and its not-doing. The people is not a sum of individuals addressed by God, it is something existent beyond that, something essential and irreplaceable, meant by God as such, claimed by Him as such, and answerable to Him as such."⁴⁴ There is false community and true community. The false is found in organization. True community comes when persons take their stand in mutual living relation with a Centre and with one another.⁴⁵ Even political situations must be perceived as changeable when we dare to "drive the plowshare of the normative principle into the hard sod of political fact."⁴⁶ Only thus do we pay the price for the right to lift a historical moment into the light of "superhistory."

⁴⁰ *Pointing the Way*, p. 20.

⁴¹ *Between Man and Man*, p. 96ff.

⁴² *White Lectures*, p. 114.

⁴³ *Pointing the Way*, p. 94.

⁴⁴ *At the Turning*, p. 50.

⁴⁵ *I and Thou*, p. 45.

⁴⁶ *At the Turning*, p. 24.

Norman Cousins in an editorial on Buber has emphasized *awareness*, or perception:

Nothing can be done without awareness. With it, anything is possible. . . . Year by year the things that separate men have been hardening; year by year the price of such separation has been growing. . . . Worst of all is that it becomes increasingly difficult to know where to take hold, where to say, "This is where we make our stand; here is where we clear the ground and build."⁴⁷

Buber would probably add that we must be sensitive to the call coming to *us*, perceive our part in this fateful hour. "It is *my* hour, and *my* act." The call is to step into relation, to become "whole beings" responsive to the "mighty revelations which stand at the beginning of great communities and at the turning point of an age . . ." ⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Cousins, N., in *Saturday Review of Literature*, March 23, 1957, p. 20.

⁴⁸ *I and Thou*, p. 117.

The Concept of Selfhood in the New Testament and Modern Ethics

DAVID GRANSKOU

THE PROBLEM of this paper is called forth by some of the modern discussions on selfhood. There is a need to evaluate the modern quest for selfhood in the light of the Christian faith. The difficulty is to determine the right course for this discussion. One contemporary Christian attempt to solve the problem has dovetailed Christianity and modern psychology as much as possible. This approach holds that it is the mature Christian who comes to a full sense of selfhood. Another segment of modern Christianity is preaching the ethic of selflessness or self-denial. The debate has therefore ranged from the position of uniting religion with psychology to that of setting religion against psychology.

The need of today is for a frank discussion of the Bible and psychology. There is of course no biblical psychology as such. The needed investigation is rather into the psychological implications of the biblical frame of reference implied in the Bible, that is, an ontology based on the creative purpose of the living God in covenant with his people.

This type of study is needed, for it will meet head-on what much of the present interest in the union of religion and psychology sidesteps, namely, the starting point of biblical religion. While modern research in psychology has started from the self-consciousness of man, the biblical point of view starts with God and his search for man.

Selfhood has many aspects. In a fuller discussion of the problem all these aspects could be pursued. This article will aim at opening up two aspects of the problem: first, the religious aspect of selfhood; and secondly, the social aspect. The religious aspect of selfhood is the relation of the self to God, and the social aspect is the relation of the self to the religious group.

Let us provisionally define selfhood as the consciousness of one's personality as distinct from others, and as the reality of this awareness in the

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individual's being able to assert his distinction. This is different from such terms as egocentricity, or selfishness, which could imply a concern for the self that might not involve self-awareness or self-assertion. These two factors of awareness and assertion of the ego make up selfhood.

The problem is: Can Christianity and the belief in Jesus Christ and a membership in his church promote or hinder the development of selfhood? This is not an easy question, for it has been answered both ways. Both Christian and non-Christian thinkers have held that Christianity and selfhood do not mix. Generally the non-Christian reasoning suggests that the relation of man to God is through some type of mystical union or Stoic subordination to the will of God. From this standpoint the charge is that mysticism lessens self-awareness, and that a Stoic subordination to God lessens self-assertion.

Two men who have made such contentions are Nietzsche and William James. Both have a following in modern thought. Nietzsche's attack on Christianity is well known. Especially devastating is the criticism contained in his *Genealogy of Morals*: belief in God and a system of moral laws are instruments of enslavement used against the very souls of men to make them beasts. Here in stark form is the romantic quest for life. It cannot be totally brushed aside with the *argumentum ad hominem* that Nietzsche became insane. Sigmund Freud, who was far from demented, seems to have seen a certain truth in Nietzsche. He called the belief in God a father-fixation that is restrictive to human growth. The problem arises in that Christianity stresses a form of relation and uses terminology that would qualify it as a target for Freud's charge. God is called "Father," we are to become as "little children," etc. While these facts are true, it is also true that Christianity makes claims for some sensitivity to the growth of the psychic life; for it stresses "freedom," "forgiveness of sins," and the like. Thus there is room for a clash of opinion.

From another angle, William James has grouped all religions of a personal type into a form of mysticism. For James the ecstasy of mysticism is not in line with the development of healthy men, who can face the problems of life. For him the experience of the mystics involves the loss of selfhood. He quotes Plotinus as typical: "He changes, he ceases to be himself . . . absorbed in God, he makes but one with him." And yet the empiricism of James shows up some interesting contradictions. After stating that personal religion, including Christianity, is not for the healthy soul he observes: "Strange that a species of book so abundant among ourselves should be so little represented elsewhere—the absence of strictly personal

confessions is the chief difficulty to the purely literary student who would like to become acquainted with the inwardness of religions other than Christian."¹

Thus from James' point of view there are two contrary elements that are observed in the Christian faith. Theoretically he sees all God-man relations in personal religion as mysticism, and tending to the loss of selfhood. Practically he cannot deny the empirical fact that Christianity is unique for its literature of introspection. This observation is in line with the modern studies in the history of ideas which show that the development of personality as a philosophical concept was the work of Christianity.

How are we to consider the charges of these men, and how are we to consider the resources of Christianity at this point? Ought the Christian to deny his selfhood, or is there something out of perspective in the analysis of men like James and Nietzsche?

CHRISTIAN MORALISM

One solution to this problem as attempted by James and others is what he calls the "religion of the healthy-minded." This sees the positive aspect of Christianity in the moral and religious values of the faith, not in the personal God-man relationship. Thus the personal elements of Christianity would come out of the ethical and social proclamation of Jesus. It is the life of Jesus, not the worship of Jesus that counts. The way to the development of the self is growth, freed from the morbid inhibitions of the monastery. This is in some respects attractive. In opposition to mysticism it allows for the assertion of the individual in a religious dimension. Man is not asked to merge himself with God, but is cast on his own and has a sense of responsibility. This is healthy, so reasons the pragmatist.

Yet it remains to be seen if James is right in classing all personal religious relations with God as mystical. If his classification of religious experience is too restrictive, then his psychological conclusions should be re-examined. Perhaps then we can take seriously his observation that Christianity furnishes more spiritual autobiography than other religions. This may mean that Christianity is not so much a self-annihilating mysticism as James thought. Another problem not covered by James' argument is the implicit tyranny of the group that comes when the stress is not on truth in religion, but on the "religious values." These values tend to be the values of a particular group, and the result is that the group is deified. Thus there is nothing in the philosophy of James to deal with the problem of

¹ James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Random House, 1902, p. 393.

the totalitarian aspects of social groups. This very thing can be seen in many American communities where stress on the religious values has been followed by a suburban totalitarianism.

CHRISTIAN SELFLESSNESS

Another approach to the problem has been to say that the modern approach to personality and the stress on the self is nothing but the assertion of the Greek pride of life against the Christian stress on humility. This approach might quote Augustine's dictum on love, namely, that the love of God in the highest form implies the hate of self. Calvin himself has spoken of "suspended desire." We are not now interested in raising the historical problem of Calvin and his relation to Stoicism; but we are interested in those who have followed the ethics of selflessness and the insistence that the Christian must be purged of self, must not complain, but must accept the will of God for the direction of the events of life.

This group has generally argued from verses like Matthew 16:24: "Let him deny himself and take up his cross," or Galatians 2:20: "I have been crucified with Christ, it is no longer I who live but Christ who lives in me," or the *doulos Christou* of Paul, or the prayer of Jesus in Gethsemane: "Thy will be done." Some have taken Nygren's great work on love and insisted that any assertion of the will to live is the upward thrust of *eros* in its egocentricity. The interesting feature of this approach is that it has not only denied any validity to modern psychology, but has also to deal with the fact that the New Testament does not have the word "selflessness" or the Stoic *apatheia* in its vocabulary. Likewise the term *autarkeia*, a word in great favor with the Stoics, was insignificant among the virtues listed in the New Testament.

While this fact may not rule out the contention of those who preach the ethic of selflessness as a Christian concept, it does demand that further consideration be given to the biblical understanding of selfhood and selflessness.

CHRISTIAN MYSTICS

Another approach to the problem of selfhood is suggested by the Christian mystics. While those who preach the ethic of selflessness speak of subordination to the will of God, the Christian mystic stresses union with God. The attraction of this position is the evidence of mystical language in the New Testament (as Deissmann would claim) and the need for personal "experience."

One of the classical expressions of this point of view is found in Wilhelm

Herrmann's *The Communion of the Christian With God*: "Without that experience (an inner immediateness) of God all the rest . . . does not deserve the name of religion."² Likewise the stress on sin as egocentricity would mean to the mystic that the chief effort of the Christian must be to escape the ego and to find absorption in the divine. However, if the will and the ego are to be limited in this way, problems outside the sphere of selfhood arise. As Friedrich Heiler has pointed out, the whole prayer life of supplication, of thanksgiving and of praise, are undermined in mysticism when self-will is rejected. In addition, how does the mystic relate to the group? The corporate religious association which is essential for the religious life of the New Testament community is more or less incomprehensible to the logic of mysticism.

MODERN CONSENSUS

In the analysis of the various viewpoints, the consensus seems to be that the assertion of self implies that the God-man relationship cannot be taken seriously. To be truly religious means either to limit self-assertion or to be more concerned with an awareness of God than an awareness of self. To put it briefly, too much of selfhood can destroy the religious relationship of man with God.

There is, however, a break in this consensus. William James was not the only one to object to the so-called Christian stress on subordination to God's will or union with God as the core of Christian expression. The emphasis coming out of existential philosophy, psychology, and the whole social democratic movement in Western Europe also underscored the importance of man and the value of selfhood. Most of these people followed the same general lines as James in stressing the value of ethics and the healthy life without so much concern with personal religion. In so far as there was religious stress, it was on ethical religion. The later part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth witnessed numerous interpretations of this type. In regard to the problem before us they were assuming what the mystic and the preacher of selflessness assumed. They too held that an intense concentration on God and his will could very easily tend to reduce man's self-awareness. Thus while they opposed the older pattern of a mystic life, or an ethic of selflessness, their assumption about the God-man relation was the same. They too conceived of the God-man relationship in mathematical terms. Under such an outlook it was logical to assume that the more attention was paid to God the less would be paid

² Herrmann, W., *The Communion of the Christian With God*, Williams & Norgate, 1913, p. 20.

to man. This was not in all cases held in a strictly logical way but it still played its role and the stress of the liberal outlook in that day was on the social aspect of Christianity.

We are to a great extent heirs to this outlook. If we strive for selfhood and the free expression of man we instinctively suspect anyone who lays heavy emphasis on the God-man relationship. On the other hand, if we admire the Christian mystic or the preacher of selflessness we tend to suspect the social gospel or an emphasis on the importance of selfhood. In the light of this unspoken assumption—the more of self the less of God, or the more of God the less of self—we must ask if this is the understanding of the Bible.

SELFHOOD AND THE BIBLE

What should cause us to wonder is the dual stress of the Bible which speaks of God's sovereignty but also of man's freedom. If the Bible, and the New Testament in particular, lays equal stress on these two elements, then the biblical outlook may be proceeding on a completely different assumption from the one outlined above. What does the Bible say about selfhood as it pertains to the God-man relationship? Does the Bible think in the same mathematical terms as modern man? Does it assume that the more there is of self the less there is of God, and vice versa?

The answer to this problem is not a short one, for the Old and the New Testaments were written in an age which was to a large extent pre-psychological. Therefore there is no explicit discussion on the problem of selfhood in the Bible. The only way to arrive at a conclusion is to see if the God-man relationship as it is described in the Bible is a different sort of relationship than mysticism, the ethic of selflessness, or psychology would allow. It may be helpful first to talk around the point and see what the Bible, especially the New Testament, says about such related concepts as selflessness, freedom, assertion, and communion with God, the Holy Spirit, and the Church.

SELFLESSNESS

It is often contended that the New Testament speaks of selflessness, but this is seen to be a very hasty conclusion when subjected to scrutiny. The usage of words which are translated "self" is oftentimes deceptive. The New Testament was not written in the age of Freud. William Sanday in a small book entitled *Personality in Christ and Ourselves* has cautioned the reader in this way:

In biblical times the idea of the self or person was not yet developed; the idea of "soul" had made great progress, and when a biblical writer wished to speak

of himself, he spoke of his "soul." There is rather a play upon two senses in such passages as "whosoever would save his soul (*psyche*) shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his soul for my sake and the gospel's shall save it" (Mark 8:35).³

Therefore, the use of certain proof passages in the New Testament to uphold the conception of selflessness can be very misleading. The passage that is often spoken of in this respect is Matthew 16:24: "Let him deny himself and take up his cross." This passage does not necessarily mean the psychological denial of individuality or of selfhood in the sense of forgetting one's desires and emotions in an almost Stoic *autarkeia*, or apathy. Nor does killing the old man necessarily have the connotation of psychological selflessness.

In Romans 7:9 is another concept: "I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived and I died." Paul speaks of a death that is very much like a loss of selfhood, but it is not a desirable state. In this context "the old man" with its sinful desires is something entirely different. To kill "the old man" is thus not to become selfless. The parable of the Prodigal Son speaks of self-awareness ("he came to himself") as a desirable trait, and insofar as the elder brother is brushed aside, the parable does not depict subordination to God and denial of joy (which the elder brother seems to have represented) as the most desirable relation of man to God. All of this is presented to caution against any easy claim that the New Testament uniformly praises selflessness. It does not.

HUMILITY AND LOVE

Another contention worth testing is the claim that the New Testament concept of humility and love implies selflessness. Many scholars would agree with Alan Richardson in his article on "Humility" in his *Theological Wordbook of the Bible*, where he holds that Christianity "introduced a new virtue—Christian humility—into the world." The next step is to say that humility is the most Christlike attitude. Rightly understood this may be true, but there is something subtly misleading about this contention. Those sections of the church that have adopted this view have, like Jerome, found it hard to account for the righteous indignation of the Apostle Paul.

I suggest that the New Testament does not praise humility as a virtue or end in itself. In criticizing asceticism Paul condemns humility as an end in itself with the words: "These have an appearance of wisdom in prompting rigor of devotion and self-abasement (*tapeinophrosunē*) and

³ Sanday, W., *Personality in Christ and Ourselves*, Oxford University Press, 1911, pp. 24-25.

severity of the body, but they are of no value in checking the indulgence of the flesh" (Col. 2:23). The Magnificat, the prime example of humility to Richardson, contains in addition the *unhumble* joy expressed by Mary—"for behold, henceforth all generations will call me blessed." Humility in the sense of "holy indifference"⁴ has no place in the New Testament. The "Thy will be done" of Gethsemane is not pure passivity, but what Heiler calls "prophetic prayer."

The prayer of Jesus . . . has been considered by all Christian mystics to be the prototype of mystic resignation. And yet his [Jesus'] surrender to the will of the Father differs psychologically and fundamentally from Stoic or mystic resignation . . . prophetic surrender is active and positive, there is no suppression of the desires . . . it is the outcome of a psychic struggle and is won through the discharge of emotion . . . it presupposes the simple expression of a concrete wish.⁵

As Leivestad put it in *Christ the Conqueror*, the temptation presupposes resistance to the tempter. Doing God's will involves assertion. As Christ challenged the Pharisees he was at once too humble and too proud for the Jewish mentality. There is no solid claim that the New Testament concept of humility and love implies psychological selflessness.

When Nietzsche opposed Christ and Christians as weaklings, he was confusing the popular piety of his day with the piety of the New Testament. In the New Testament context, saying "Thy will be done" does not involve the loss of selfhood at all. The New Testament does not think of man relating himself to God in a vacuum of mystical piety, but always thinks of man relating himself to God in terms of the cosmic struggle with evil. The Christian does not subordinate himself to God's will, but rather acts as one who is carrying out God's will. Self-awareness is heightened because union of the will with the Father involves more personal assertion than a life not related to God, in the sense that the individual allied with God has taken up arms with God against evil. The New Testament also speaks of the implementation of the Christian who is fighting evil, and this also heightens self-awareness. Just how this is accomplished in the life of the Christian will be taken up later.

Because humility is not a virtue or an end in itself, there is little to support the contention that the New Testament concept of humility implies selflessness. The reverse seems to be true. The humble Christian in his fight against evil seems to have a heightened sense of his selfhood.

⁴ See F. Heiler, *Prayer*, Oxford University Press, 1932, p. 221.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 269f.

FREEDOM

It is well to heed the warning of Gabriel Marcel that freedom cannot be discussed by itself. If freedom is to be linked with some type of autarchy as we have in Nietzsche, and to an extent in Freud, then we must take the position that the New Testament is not interested in freedom. While Nietzsche's concept of freedom is most drastic, it is not socially radical, for his freedom is something for the few who can separate themselves from the mass. This is the product of man's will and only the strong man has the right to be free in this sense of being beyond good and evil.

The New Testament has a contrasting view of freedom. It has a different starting point, for it is not man's will but God's will that makes man free. This is also socially radical, for every man is forced into the position of freedom. As Kierkegaard has pointed out, Christian freedom has a dreadful aspect. The freedom which God gives is the necessity of choice. Man is free in the sense that he must choose between Good and Evil. This is not the natural freedom of man, it is the situation of man before a God who is confronting him with the issue of his own life. This is the horrible freedom of the Prodigal Son—the capacity for self-destruction. This capacity is not something he has of himself, but is part of his inheritance. Such freedom produces self-awareness in the individual and it involves the dread of aloneness. Kierkegaard pictures man as placed by God on the witness stand. This theological and transcendent extension of the problem of freedom gives it urgency in the message of the New Testament. In this respect the whole romantic movement was correct in stressing freedom, but they erred in tending to think of it in individualistic terms as a human achievement. Thus their stress on freedom, urgent as it is, is not as radical as that of the New Testament. They could not say, as Kierkegaard did in a little essay entitled *God and Man*, that man's greatest perfection is his need of God.

The fact is that the God-man relationship in the New Testament is not thought of as absorption or subordination. Whether or not one likes the terminology of Tillich in all respects, one cannot deny the major thrust of his words on "reconciliation with God" involving "reconciliation with self."⁶ The Damascus-road experience of Paul is not an example of a mystical experience of being filled with the love of God. While many interpreters have taken this view, the place at which Paul was met by God was not the state of ecstasy, but of sin. That God meets the Christian here,

⁶ Tillich, P., *The New Being*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956, p. 21.

at the point of sin, means that the Christian so confronted will have a greater self-awareness, for this is not just the acceptance of sinfulness in general, as an article of belief. The confrontation by God results in the awareness of specific sins in the individuals who are confronted. Thus Paul learned that he could no longer persecute the church because this was a grave sin. The result was a union with the Risen Christ. This is quite a contrast to the mystic union with God.

As Heiler has pointed out, the mystic finds little reason to ask for forgiveness. This is but another way of saying that the mystic has little use for the concept of individuality or selfhood in this sense. In answer to William James, the New Testament's radical understanding of freedom may be the reason why the Christian religion has more spiritual autobiographies than any other religion.

SERVICE AND CHARISMA

In the discussion of the conception of subordination it was maintained that assertion is part of the Christian's acceptance of God's will. This contention might be objected to as being a far cry from true selfhood. Those oriented in some schools of modern psychology might hold that when the New Testament speaks of service it slips from the high plane of forgiveness to the subpersonal plane of compulsion. Similarly Nygren and some other theologians, insisting that *agape* as described by Paul is spontaneous, feel that the New Testament imperatives to love are contradictory.

It is quite obvious to say that God heightens the self-awareness of man when he confronts him at the point of sin. It is not so clear just what the precise relationship is between service to God and selfhood. When Paul argues that man is free and that God intended this freedom to be used for service, it seems as though Paul is caught in a contradiction. The contradiction is more logical than psychological, however. As Karen Horney has said, "The love of neighbor involves self-love." In this sense modern psychology and Paul's argument in Galatians are very close in basic outlook. The danger in the definition of Karen Horney is that a superficial interpretation of it tends to turn love of neighbor into a sort of rationalized self-interest. Whether it is from a pseudo-Freudian outlook or from the materialism of our times there is a general antipathy toward the need for struggle and even suffering in the life of service.

It is at this point of avoiding suffering and sacrifice that the modern-day preacher of the ethic of selflessness makes his clearest plea. His cultural criticism is that man has become a seeker after the pleasure of life. He links

this pursuit of happiness with modern man's quest for selfhood and concludes that his goal is wrong, and preaches that man is to deny himself. What this position overlooks in stressing the need for selflessness is the connection which the New Testament makes between selfhood and service. As Paul points out in the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, service to the neighbor without the proper motivation is worthless. When Luther held that the unjustified man could not do good works he was saying that the man who had not found his selfhood in being justified before God was not able to serve his fellow man. The New Testament in like manner could not think of service which would be selfless, but could only speak of a service which had selfhood as its basis.

In addition to this Paul speaks about the relation between service and suffering in a unique way. The service of a Christian does involve suffering, but not only suffering. If service involved only suffering, then man would be crushed by his task, and this is not the case. The *charismata*, the gifts of the Spirit, are given at the point of stress to the man in the service of his Lord. Thus in Paul, the term *doulos kuriou* means more than servant in the lowly sense. Paul was a servant of the *Lord*. This did not overlook the ennobling aspect of service. The gifts of teaching, preaching, healing, etc., are given to the man in the redemptive relationship with his fellow man. As Paul has it, "We have this treasure in earthen vessels, to show that the transcendent power belongs to God and not to us. We are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair, persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but not destroyed." The disciples in their first mission in which they carried nothing were given the *exousia*. The consolation of Jesus is that in the terrifying work of spreading the gospel to the world, he will be present. In persecution he will counteract the terror of the accused with the gift of speech, etc. This is a far cry from a plea to give up self in service. It presupposes that the man who serves has selfhood, and it promises that at the point where his service leads him to doubt, suffering and persecution he will be strengthened and enabled to experience his true selfhood.

THE SELF AND THE CORPORATE

The preceding study has shown that the New Testament does not conceive of the God-man relationship in terms of a mystic absorption of the self in God or a Stoic subordination of the self to the will of God. Little has been said about the bearing which the relation of the Christian to the church has upon the problem of selfhood.

Such a question must be asked because it often happens in practice that the church is an antipersonal factor in society. Because of this, there have been many critics of the church and of togetherness in general. Nietzsche's quest for selfhood is perhaps more of a pattern for modern man than many of us would like to admit. He praised the hermit type of existence in his book, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*: "Having attained the age of thirty, Zarathustra left his home and the lake of his home and went into the mountains. Then he rejoiced in his spirit and in his loneliness, and for ten years did not grow weary of it."⁷ Mystics also see little value in the church, and the nineteenth century has many examples of an attitude of disregard for the church and the church fellowship. In the words of Wilhelm Herrmann "we outgrow our dependence on our surroundings."⁸

Such a position as Herrmann's is no longer as easily held, because the central aspect of the preaching of Jesus is now recognized to be the declaration that the Kingdom of God was at hand. Jesus is no longer portrayed as the ethical teacher who had no intention of establishing a group of believers. The New Testament does not say that one is a Christian first and only then a member of a church. If selfhood is thought of in terms of an individualistic assertion that separates one from the corporate religious body or minimizes its importance, then the New Testament stops short of a concern for selfhood in the sociological dimension.

However, while the New Testament does stress the corporate life of the believers, it does not do so in such a way as to limit its high valuation of selfhood. In the New Testament conception of corporate religious life there are two factors which at the same time stress selfhood.

The first of these factors is the insistence that within the congregation there is variety. This variety is thought of as essential. Paul's whole discussion in First Corinthians stresses that each member of the body of Christ has a function, and that for this reason uniformity would be a denial of the body of Christ. (See I Cor. 12:12-19.)

The second factor is Paul's conception of the body of Christ, which enhances selfhood in a paradoxical way in which God honors the members by "giving the greater honor to the inferior part" (I Cor. 12:24). This characteristic is possible only with the presence of the risen Christ in his body, the church. In the body of Christ each Christian is given a task, but it is not simply that he is chosen for his natural qualifications. That would not enhance selfhood. What does enhance selfhood is that in addition to

⁷ Nietzsche, F., *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, The Macmillan Company, 1906, p. 1.

⁸ See *The Communion of a Christian With God*, p. 118.

natural qualifications each is divinely equipped for his special task. The result is that the church, because of the divine activity of the Spirit, paradoxically heightens the selfhood of those who relate themselves to this group.

CONCLUSION

This presentation does not exhaust the consideration of selfhood, but on the basis of the foregoing discussion some suggestions can be made. There are two basic ways to look at selfhood: mathematically or organically.

The mathematical way of looking at the relation of the self to the group and to God would be to say that the less there is of the group or of God, the more there is of the self, and the more there is of self, the less there is of the religious group and of God. As has been pointed out, this seems to be the attitude of many non-Christian observers of Christianity, and also of Christian mystics and preachers of the ethic of selflessness. The latter two groups seek to honor God by suppressing the self in one way or the other. This is not a totally different view from that of the pragmatist, who says that a healthy religion does not concern itself with the God-man relationship so much as with religious values.

Against this consensus we have placed the viewpoint of the New Testament. The New Testament recognizes the native wisdom of the above statements, yet it points to a radically personal God, to a church as the body of Christ, and to the world as the place of God's activity. This study has been directed to showing that the New Testament does not think of selfhood in the mathematical way of modern ethics, of Christian self-denial, or of Christian mysticism, but that it has an organic view instead. By speaking of an organic view I mean to use the analogy of the plant. As the root of the plant gets bigger, so does the branch. The concentration of a Christian on God does not mean that he plays down his selfhood. In the view of the New Testament the reverse is true. As the Christian attaches himself to his God, to his church, and relates himself to this world, he finds in this engagement his own selfhood. This is true because the New Testament does not view selfhood as a human achievement but as a product of God's dealing with men. Because God is personal he forces man into a dialogue, and calls man to his true selfhood in freedom, in service, and in his church.

The hope of this study is that selfhood will not be thought of in the purely mathematical way that is so natural for us all, but that the New Testament view, with its organic way of looking at the problem, will be given its chance to impress upon us the depth of its insights in this most important aspect of man's existence.

Prophetic and Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Synoptic Gospels

DONALD T. ROWLINGSON

IT IS STILL UNDECIDED whether the eschatology of Jesus was predominantly prophetic or apocalyptic, and the question bids fair to remain unanswered if we have to depend for a verdict upon a majority vote of the scholars. This is because the sources make it an extremely ambiguous question, even when the data are carefully catalogued and scrutinized, thus leaving much room for the influence of theological presuppositions and the vagaries of historical imagination. The present essay attempts a reasonable solution, even though it brings no magical formula by means of which to solve every enigma.

It is assumed that the apocalypticism of Judaism during the time of Jesus was derived from the classical prophecy of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. and that it had much in common with it. The major presuppositions of both were that God was sovereign as Creator and Redeemer, and that he would as such ultimately resolve all paradoxes in human affairs, not permitting his purpose ultimately to be frustrated; that the ushering in of the New Age was his decision and work, not man's; that the basis of the future hope lay not in man's estimate of the political probabilities of the day, but in God's faithfulness to the Covenant. To this we may add the fact that both issued from times of tension in national affairs and that both employed figurative language and symbols, although there were some deviations between them in regard to both. Especially with regard to symbols, apocalypticism developed characteristics which distinguished it from prophecy, even though Ezekiel, marking the transition, was in some respects more apocalypticist than prophet.

It is the ways in which apocalypticism deviated from or qualified classical prophecy which concern us most directly. The thesis of this treatment is that, if Jesus was an apocalypticist, we should expect his utterances strongly and unambiguously to reflect these characteristic deviations. It does not need to be argued that Jesus was more prophetic in his bearing and manner

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of teaching than he was rabbinical or scribal. The main question is whether he was more apocalypticist than prophet. In an effort to reach some conclusion we shall list certain characteristic traits of apocalypticism and observe what the Gospels report with regard to them. This places Mark's Little Apocalypse (13:5-37 and parallels) at the center of attention, but it involves much more. Having classified the material and having evaluated it somewhat, we shall be in a position to ask what it means for our understanding of the mind of Jesus.

Since much of the spade work in this area of investigation has been done many times over, no attempt is made here to redo it in detail. With this in mind, a series of generalizations will be made with regard to certain well-known features of the Gospel records. Some of these confirm and some question the application of the term "apocalypticist" to Jesus.

Even though it was inspired by historical events, apocalypticism tended to turn its eyes away from the plane of history toward the transcendent sphere where the cosmic struggle between God and Satan and their respective hosts was in process. Echoes of this are found in Jesus' words with reference to angels, Satan, and dealings with demonized people. Mark especially makes a great point of the latter, linking up the exorcism of demons with the triumph of the Spirit in Jesus' life at the Baptism, in the Temptation, and in controversy with the scribes; the significance of the last item is seen in Jesus' pronouncement that "whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin" (3:29).¹ That there are connotations of the cosmic conflict, of interest to apocalypticists, in these items can hardly be denied. The Son of Man tradition in all the Gospels belongs in this category as well, especially the sayings of an eschatological nature of which Mark 13:26 is most typical: "And then they will see the Son of man coming in clouds with great power and glory" to gather "his elect."

In this same vein are indications of a program of events which will herald the End of the Age. Mark 13:5-37 is cast in this mold, its climax being the verse previously quoted. A very few stray sayings may perhaps tend in that direction as well, such as that about interpreting the sky and the present time (Lk. 12:54-56 par.) and those about Jesus coming to bring fire on the earth or to cause divisions (cf. Lk. 12:49-53).

Of great importance is that characteristic of apocalypticism which we may describe as predestinarian, that is, as believing that God was operating

¹ Quotations are from the Revised Standard Version.

upon a rigid and fixed schedule of events leading up to the End. This allows for no deviation beyond the minor adjustment (by him) of the schedule, as when a plane is delayed by the central tower due to a low ceiling. Such a deviation is indicated in Mark 13:20 where the days are shortened for the sake of the elect without the whole schedule being put in jeopardy. There are many utterances of Jesus which fit into this framework, of which a few typical ones may be cited. The references to the coming of the Son of Man presuppose this outlook, as in Mark 13:26, and the Passion Predictions do too (cf. Mk. 8:31; 9:31; 10:33f). The so-called Crisis Parables are similar in intent (cf. Mk. 13:33-37; Lk. 12:39-48; Lk. 12:35-38; 21:34-36; etc.). This note appears in Jesus' words about himself in relation to John the Baptist (cf. Lk. 7:24-35 par.); the coming of Elijah (Mk. 9:12f); as well as in the editorial revisions of Matthew with reference to the "coming" of the End of the Age (cf. Mt. 24:3, 27, 30, 37, 39, 42, 51). Of special interest is the saying which Albert Schweitzer took as the key to Jesus' eschatological outlook: "I say to you [the disciples on missionary tour], you will not have gone through all the towns of Israel, before the Son of Man comes" (Mt. 10:23).

This leads to the question of how the nature of the final judgment is conceived. Apocalypticism tended toward a sublimated nationalism, viewing the event as a vindication of the Holy Community which had been established following the Exile. This was its answer to the problem of evil in the form of the question as to why God permitted his Chosen People to suffer as they did. The prophets had said that God would punish Israel as well as her foes, but many apocalyptists disagreed with that outlook. Judgment was almost equivalent to vindication of the Holy Community, regardless of ethical considerations of a universalistic nature. Implied in this, paradoxically enough, was a tendency toward individualism in judgment. It is only at this point that any similarity can be found between Jesus and the apocalyptists. Although he sometimes indicates judgment upon a group (as in Mk. 11:17; 12:1-9; 13:36f par.; Lk. 13:25-30 par.; 14:15-24 par.; 4:25-30; Mt. 21:43), the final judgment is almost always for him a matter of the individual standing on his own in the presence of God. The Final Judgment in Matthew 25:31-46 is typical and is especially significant because of its transcendental framework.

Other characteristics of apocalypticism appear, but in such isolated instances as to make them practically insignificant. The use of symbols, in this case with reference to an historical event, is seen in Mark 13:14,

"the desolating sacrilege" of Daniel 9:27. Supernatural communications are evident in the "voice" at Mark 1:11 and 9:7.

This is about all that can be said on the positive side of the shield. What of the other side? Following the same sequence as previously, we evaluate first the evidences of a cosmic conflict similar to that presupposed by apocalypticism. It needs to be noted that, with a few exceptions, this material is among the most problematical in the Gospels. This is notoriously true of the Son of Man sayings, and for two reasons. One is the unprecedented manner in which vicarious suffering, as part of the Messiah's work, is expressed in them, and the other is the psychological difficulty of believing that Jesus actually considered himself to be the pre-existent heavenly Man presupposed thereby. Mark 13 is more problematical than helpful. Although its framework is obviously apocalyptic, its separate items (excepting primarily verses 24-27 and a few others) can just as easily be made to cohere with a less apocalyptic cast, as Luke's revision of Mark 13:14-20 suggests. Furthermore, the whole idea of Jesus forecasting such signs runs into the immovable object of "no sign shall be given" (Mk. 8:12), at least none other than "the sign of Jonah" (Lk. 11:29-32) which is quite different in nature. Sayings about reading the signs of the times as one discerns tomorrow's weather are meaningless without the object to which they apply being specified.

The case for Jesus' exorcism of demons is stronger, but it is obvious that much of the cosmic interpretation of this is due to Mark rather than to Jesus as such. Granting that Jesus did exorcise demons and that he sensed that in that form God's power was being manifested through him (cf. Lk. 11:20), the important point is the way in which this coheres with other statements of Jesus which indicate that he believed that he was the sign to his generation. In that sense the reign of God was being manifested in his teaching and work (cf. Lk. 17:20f) rather than in phenomena which can be observed after the manner of Mark's thirteenth chapter (cf. Lk. 7:24-35 par.; Lk. 6:47-49 par.; Lk. 11:29-32 par.; Mt. 10:21f par.; etc.). If we ask, "the sign of what?" at least it had to do with God's Reign which was expected to come to culmination in a final judgment, but there is nothing exclusively apocalyptic in that.

This applies as well to most of the sayings cited to demonstrate the predestinarian nature of apocalyptic thought in Jesus' words. On the whole Jesus, like most of his contemporaries, believed that in time, and probably soon, God would end human history as it was known and would establish a new kind of life in which sin and death were eliminated. The Passion

predictions of Jesus are predestinarian in nature, but if they are not almost entirely hindsight on the part of Jesus' followers after the event, they simply stress his vindication in the resurrection, surely not peculiarly apocalyptic in nature. The strongest argument against apocalyptic determinism is that in his preaching of repentance, Jesus generally assumed not only the ability to repent, but that one's future destiny was being determined thereby. This is so pervasive an assumption of Jesus that it is laboring the obvious to cite illustrations. In other words, the judgment was not the day upon which the Chosen People would be vindicated as against their enemies; it was instead a great moral trial in which the individual would stand alone before God, regardless of his national or racial heritage, facing the kind of criterion presupposed in the great judgment scene in Matthew 25:31-46. By his attitude toward Samaritans, the "sinners," the publicans, by the whole tone and level of his outlook he violently repudiated the parochialism and the favored-nation bias of many of the apocalyptists (and some non-apocalyptists).

Almost completely absent from the Gospels are any indications that Jesus employed the methodology of apocalypticism, including visions and voices as means of divine-human communication, the fulfillment of esoteric prophecies, and the weird symbolism so characteristic of apocalyptic seers. Instead of the latter Jesus used parables, a completely different medium of communication with connotations of God's revelation of himself in "natural" ways. This was at odds with the presuppositions of apocalyptic theology. As against the apocalyptic tendency to make God more remote, Jesus emphasized his approachableness and his knowledge of our needs before we ask (Mt. 6:8; etc.).

The conclusion is not that Jesus was a prophet in the classical sense of that term. Although he shared with the prophets their receptivity to God's voice in conscience, their primary role as forth-tellers, and their keen moral sensitivity, he appears to have dealt far more with individuals before God than with the nations as such. He did predict doom at least upon the leaders of the nation, to be sure, as in the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen (Mk. 12:1-9). It is hard to believe, however, that the references (in Luke 21:20-24 and elsewhere) to Jerusalem under siege are anything more than editing after the event, and even if we consider them authentic, they fail to justify the view that Jesus undertook the role of an Amos or an Isaiah to his people so far as interpreting world politics as revealing God's purposes is concerned. That is, he was and he was not a prophet, taking the classical prophets as the criterion.

What we may believe that Jesus did was to be distinctly *himself*, learning from prophecy and apocalypticism both, as also from scribism, but discarding that which had no meaning for his conception of God's purposes and of his mission and task. While he held eschatological conceptions in line with the prevailing outlook of his contemporaries, as against a twentieth-century evolutionism, he considered himself in some way or other the sign to his generation of God's Reign and its final triumph in the not distant future. He did not make prophetic forecasts of a political nature nor did he speculate after the manner of apocalyptists with reference to the future program of transcendent events. Positively expressed, he left these matters to God who alone knew how his moral purposes were to be worked out. Jesus was content to trust him with such matters, just so long as he was convinced that God was using him as he saw fit. He did not even have to understand why. It was enough to have the certainty that God called him to be the sign of the divine intention for his generation and to die vicariously in the process of fulfilling that role.

This is a far cry from "the heroic in Jesus" as pictured in the mind of Albert Schweitzer. It is certainly not the same thing as portrayed in the unforgettable prose of *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*:

Soon after [John the Baptist] comes Jesus, and in the knowledge that He is the coming Son of Man lays hold of the wheel of the world to set it moving on that last revolution which is to bring all ordinary history to a close. It refuses to turn, and He throws himself upon it. Then it does turn; and crushes Him. Instead of bringing in the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them. The wheel rolls onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great Man, who was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of mankind and to bend history to His purpose, is hanging upon it still. That is His victory and His reign.²

We may grant that Jesus "was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of mankind," but his strength did not lie in adherence to the forms of apocalyptic thought; rather it lay at its center, in its spiritual and moral content, and in that which it had in common with classical prophecy. Jesus was undoubtedly mistaken about many things which belonged to the intellectual and cultural frame of reference which was his inheritance, including cosmological ideas, the nature of mental illness, and eschatological perspectives. That is one thing, but it is something else again to say that he did not distinguish between that which was peripheral and that which was central from a spiritual and moral point of view. In the least ambiguous materials in the Gospels, relative to his thought of God and ethical living,

² Pp. 368f, London: A. & C. Black, 1945.

we witness him making fine distinctions and casting his vote for that which had "survival value." Why should we expect it to be otherwise with regard to his eschatological outlook? The burden of proof is with those who exalt the tendencies toward apocalyptic fanaticism in the records to the degradation of that which is profoundly spiritual and moral.

There are, to be sure, heroic proportions in the figure portrayed by Albert Schweitzer. Instead of retiring to the wilderness to prepare for the coming Holy War, as did the Qumran Essenes, or instead of participating in the jingoistic program which eventually led to the fall of Jerusalem at the hands of the Romans, Jesus chose the path of vicarious self-sacrifice. And he did this alone when he realized that his disciples were not prepared to join him in this redemptive action. Thus, he performed the necessary action for them as well as for others. This is greatness. But there still remain shadows of apocalyptic fanaticism which qualify the spiritual and moral tone of the portrait. To have resisted the temptation to follow apocalyptic delusions in favor of the depths of prophetic foresight would have manifested a higher type of greatness, and we may confidently believe that this is exactly what Jesus did. At least the records lend themselves to that conclusion far more than they do to the theory that he went practically all the way with apocalypticism.

This is the kind of greatness characteristic of a Gandhi, as set forth by E. Stanley Jones:

His spirit and magnificent intention carried him past mental detours and brought him almost unerringly to his goal. His spirit was so great that it could absorb mental limitations and make something great even out of them. Many of us are correct in our little correctnesses and are small in the process. But the Mahatma was incorrect in many things and yet correct in the sum total—and big in the very inconsistencies. . . . He thought clearly because his intentions were simple and clear. He was not intellectually brilliant, but he was so fundamentally straight that his moral intentions carried him almost by intuition to the right conclusions.³

If the heroic proportions of Jesus are of this dimension, then they are truly capable of challenging our Christianity and our world view. Even when we strip from the historical figure the extremes of apocalyptic fanaticism, he will, of course, still come to us in very important ways "as one unknown." However, if he comes to us as completely enigmatic as a first-century Jewish apocalypticist does, how can the encounter be at all realistic or dynamic? Fortunately that is not any longer the only, or even a reasonable, alternative.

³ *Mahatma Gandhi, An Interpretation*, The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1948, pp. 7f.

God and Gog

CHARLES DE SANTO

EZEKIEL 38-39¹ are familiar chapters to biblical scholars, especially to those interested in apocalyptic eschatology. They might well be called the ancestor of all subsequent apocalyptic eschatology. In these chapters is expressed the profound hope of the "prophet" that God would some day intervene in history and usher in his kingdom. The Book of Ezekiel presents a *double eschaton*, i.e., two acts of judgment by which God was to usher in the kingdom. The first judgment was upon the Jews at the hands of the Babylonians for their infidelity to God. This is recorded in the chapters immediately preceding the *Ezekiel Apocalypse* of 38-39. The second judgment of God was directed, not against Israel, but against her foes, Gog of the land of Magog and the hordes of the north.

In chapter 37 the Jews are pictured as a united people dwelling peacefully in the land of Palestine. They seem to be living in the Messianic or Golden Age. Logically one would expect the priestly apocalyptic vision of Ezekiel 40-48 to follow—that vision of the organization of the "New Israel" about the temple. But instead, the Ezekiel Apocalypse follows with its story of the great battle of the Israelites and God against Gog of the land of Magog and his allies.

Briefly the story in the Ezekiel Apocalypse is this. The peaceful occupation of the Jews in Palestine is interrupted by Gog and his allies from the north who come down against Israel. At the crucial moment in the battle, God intervenes on behalf of Israel and defeats the forces of Gog. The exiles of Israel and Judah are again regathered from the four corners of the earth, and they are blessed with all the material and spiritual prosperity which is traditionally associated with the coming of the Messianic Age. God's Spirit is poured out upon Israel and all *know* the Lord, i.e., *know* the Lord in the sense that they *obey* him (cf. Jer. 31:31-34).

¹ The Ezekiel Apocalypse, chapters 38-39, was probably inserted into the Book of Ezekiel by a later apocalyptic editor who worked some time in the post-exilic period. A. Cooke, *Ezekiel* (The International Critical Commentary), Edinburgh, 1936, p. 408.

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The identification of Gog has been a thorny problem which is still unresolved.² Was Gog a real or a mythical foe?³ The apocalypticist may have had some historical foe in mind, but Gog probably symbolized for him both all the Gentile nations and the demonic forces which opposed and oppressed Israel. Gog is *not* to be completely identified with Satan, but to be understood as an *instrument* used by Satan in his attempt to destroy the people of God.⁴

The eschatological hope that God would some day intervene on Israel's behalf and defeat the forces of evil, both human and supernatural, was a popular hope in Judaism. In reality it is the *basic* eschatological hope of Israel. Evil must be defeated before God's kingdom could become a reality. The idea of a final or decisive conflict of the Gog type occurs frequently in both canonical and noncanonical literature. In the Old Testament notable examples are found in the Isaiah Apocalypse of 24-27, and in Daniel 2 and 7. In the New Testament, only in the Book of Revelation does this idea occur, and there it is associated with the *parousia* or Second Coming of Jesus. In the noncanonical literature this idea is found in the Pseudepigrapha in the *Sibylline Oracles* III. 319-322, 512-530, 669-697; the *Testament of Levi* 18:12ff; IV Ezra 13:11ff; and in I Enoch 56:5-8; 90:13-19. Also, the recently discovered scroll found near the Dead Sea entitled, *The War of the Sons of Light with the Sons of Darkness*, presents an apocalyptic vision of the final conflict between Israel (the Covenanters of the Dead Sea Community) and Gog and his assembly (column xii, line 9).⁵ This hope, viz., that God would decisively intervene in history and defeat the forces of evil, remained an unfulfilled prophecy for quite a long time.

The Battle of God and Gog, or more accurately God against Gog, became the symbol of the great apocalyptic eschatological battle which was to usher in the kingdom of God. For example, we find that Psalm 2

² For the various suggestions for the meaning and origin of the name Gog, see H. H. Rowley, *The Relevance of Apocalyptic*, London, 1947, pp. 33ff.

³ S. B. Frost suggests that the apocalypticist had in mind the old Dragon Myth—"as Yahweh slew Tiamat of old, so shall He conquer her [Gog]." He takes Gog to be the mythical king of a mythical land, Magog, who represents real nations. By choosing a mythical foe, the author is able to emphasize the universal scope of the evil that opposes God and his people. Gog is anti-God. (*Old Testament Apocalyptic*, London, 1952, p. 89f.) Cf. Brevard S. Childs, "The Enemy from the North and the Chaos Tradition," *Journal of Literature*, vol. LXXVIII, September, 1959, pp. 187-198. Childs suggests that the apocalyptic school "mythologized" the historical tradition of an enemy from the north.

It seems to me, however, that it is possible to say that Gog is symbolic of all of Israel's foes, both physical and spiritual, and that the conflict reveals a struggle which is more than "flesh and blood," without postulating the Creation Myth as the background of the author's vision.

⁴ In Ezekiel it is God who moves to bring the wicked forces of Gog against Israel, whereas in Revelation 20 it is Satan who deceives the nations of the earth to attack the "saints" in Jerusalem.

⁵ For an excellent English translation of many of the Qumran or Dead Sea Scrolls, see Theodor H. Gaster, *The Dead Sea Scriptures*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1956.

was interpreted by the rabbis in the Talmud as a reference to the Battle of Gog and Magog.⁶

Why do the nations conspire,
and the peoples plot in vain?
The kings of the earth set themselves,
and the rulers take counsel together,
against the Lord and his anointed . . . (Ps. 2:1-2, RSV)

In *Abodah Zarah* 8-9 (Babylonian Talmud), the following comment is made on verse 1:

. . . But when the battle of Gog-Magog will come about they will be asked, "For what purpose have you come?" and they will reply: "*Against God and His Messiah*" as it is said, "*Why are the nations in an uproar, and why do the peoples mutter in vain, etc.*"

Also in *Berakoth* 36 a similar comment is made on verse 1: "But in regard to the War of Gog and Magog it is written: '*Why are the nations in an uproar? And why do the people mutter in vain. . .*'" Thus we see that Psalm 2 was interpreted messianically. It refers to that Great Day of Judgment when evil would be defeated and the kingdom of God would become a reality. Ezekiel and the author of Psalm 2 (as interpreted by the Rabbis) looked forward to this day of cataclysmic, catastrophic intervention by God.

In Acts 4:23ff we find an interesting interpretation of Psalm 2. Peter and John had been preaching boldly that Jesus was the Christ (Messiah). Not only this, but they were working miracles of healing in "Jesus' name." They were winning many to faith in Jesus the Christ. Their success caused great alarm in "official" Jewish circles, with the result that Peter and John were called in before the Sanhedrin. The Sanhedrin warned them and threatened them with punishment if they did not desist from witnessing that Jesus was the Christ, and then they released the disciples. When Peter and John were set free they immediately returned to their friends and reported to them what had happened. The disciples went to prayer, beseeching God's protection and power upon them as they continued to witness to their risen Lord. In the prayer they quote from Psalm 2:1-2, and they give to it the following interpretation:

"—for truly in this city there were gathered together against thy holy servant Jesus, whom thou didst anoint, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever thy hand and thy plan had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:27-28).

⁶ In later Jewish literature and in the Book of Revelation the text of Ezekiel was misunderstood as reading, "Gog and the land of Magog," instead of, "Gog of the land of Magog."

What is the significance of this quotation from Psalm 2 by the disciples? To me it seems to be just this: *the disciples believed that in the cross, resurrection and ascension of Jesus the Christ, the Battle of Gog of the land of Magog, i.e., the great decisive conflict of history, had taken place.* Christ had vanquished sin, Satan and death! It is common knowledge among biblical scholars that the personification of evil in the person of Satan or the Devil becomes increasingly prominent as we approach the time of Christ. Also, the Messiah as God's instrument of redemption becomes more popular in Jewish Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphic literature as we draw near to the time of Christ. The Messiah is an important figure in the Dead Sea Scrolls, also. Undoubtedly the disciples were familiar with the many eschatological passages and their interpretations which were current in their day, Psalm 2 being among them. They had seen Jesus conquer Satan by submission to the will of God in his temptations, and they had seen Jesus cast out demons by the power of God in his exorcisms. They had experienced Christ's victory over Satan in the cross, resurrection and ascension. They remembered his numerous references to the conquest of Satan as he walked among them.

For example, note the statement of Jesus at the close of the Beelzebub controversy: "But no one can enter a strong man's house and plunder his goods, unless he first binds the strong man; then indeed he may plunder his house" (Mark 3:27). In Luke's version of the Beelzebub controversy we find this statement of Jesus: "But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you" (Luke 11:20). In Luke, after the seventy return from their triumphant experience of casting out demons in Jesus' name, Christ says: "I saw Satan fall like lightning from heaven" (Luke 10:18). In Luke, after the Jews come to arrest Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane, Jesus says: "When I was with you day after day in the temple, you did not lay hands on me. But this is your hour, and the power of darkness" (Luke 22:53). Finally, the Fourth Evangelist has a most important word from Christ which he spoke after the Greeks came seeking him: "Now is the judgment of this world, now shall the ruler of this world be cast out" (John 12:31).

These passages could be supplemented with passages from the Epistles, such as I Corinthians 2:8; Colossians 1:13; 2:13-15; Hebrews 2:14-15; and I John 3:5, 8; etc., where the mission of Jesus was interpreted as a conflict with Satan—which mission he accomplished. For the disciples the Battle of Gog was now a matter for the record! The forces of evil had pitched themselves against Jesus when they nailed him to the cross. They thought

that this was going to be their hour of victory, but "God was in Christ" and the cross became the means whereby the forces of evil were defeated. Christ won the battle as demonstrated by his glorious resurrection and ascension. All the world was reconciled to God (II Cor. 5:19). The kingdom of God was ushered in—a kingdom *not only* for Jews, but for Gentiles also (Matt. 28:19-20; John 10:16; 12:32; Acts 10; Eph. 3:1-7; etc.). For this reason Paul could proclaim to the Romans that *in* Christ judgment had already taken place: "There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are *in* Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8:1). Because the Battle of Gog had been won by God in Christ, John could also say: "He who believes in him is *not* condemned; he who does not believe is condemned already, because he has not believed in the name of the only Son of God" (John 3:18).

The final conflict, i.e., in terms of the decisive battle with Satan and the forces of evil, had been fought and won by Christ in his life, death, resurrection, and ascension. The focal point of history for the early Christians was not the *parousia*, but the first advent of Christ. The revolution of redemption took place in the first advent when God in Christ conquered Satan. The *parousia* was always an integral part of the Christian message, but it was not the chief preoccupation of the early Church.

Although the kingdom of God was *inaugurated* by Christ's victory over Satan in his first advent, of course the kingdom has not been *completely realized*. Coexisting in the world with the kingdom of God are the kingdoms of *this* world which are composed of those who oppose and reject God and his kingdom (Eph. 6:12; Gal. 1:4; II Cor. 4:4). Although the "children of light" have been delivered from the dominion of darkness, they are still surrounded by the children of darkness (I Thess. 5:5; Col. 1:13-14; Acts 26:18; Eph. 6:12). Those who compose the Redeemed Community are called upon to serve and, if need be, to suffer for Christ. They are called not only to believe on Christ, but also to suffer for his sake—for it is only through much tribulation that men enter the Kingdom (Phil. 1:29; Acts 14:22; Mark 8:34ff). Suffering is an integral part of the kingdom of God in *this* world, but when the Kingdom is fully realized in the "life to come" suffering seems to be absent (cf. Rev. 7:15-17; 21:4).

In Christ, however, the Christian already has victory over Satan and all his sufferings for Christ are counted a privilege (I Cor. 10:13; II Cor. 2:14; Eph. 6:10ff; I Peter 1:6-7; 4:16; II Tim. 2:12; 3:12; I Thess. 4:3, etc.). The New Testament writers looked forward to the Second Advent, not as that event which would inaugurate the kingdom, for this they had

already experienced; but they looked forward to the *parousia* with anticipation because at that time there would be only *one world*—Christ will have destroyed all “rule and every authority and power” and the kingdom shall be turned over to God (I Cor. 15:24; II Thess. 1:7ff; cf. Rev. 11:15 where John is told that “the kingdoms of this world *are become* the kingdoms of God”). At the *parousia* every knee shall bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ *is* Lord (Phil. 2:10).

There was no doubt in the minds of the New Testament writers concerning the outcome of things. Christ *had already* dealt the “death blow” to Satan—“the *darkness is passing* and the true *light is already shining* (I John 2:8b). Soon the Son will shine in his fullness and the kingdom which was partially realized as a result of the victory wrought by Christ during his first advent, will be completely realized at his *parousia*, or Second Advent.

But the disciples could preach with boldness and conviction because they themselves had experienced the full significance of the first advent of Jesus the Christ. They had experienced the forgiveness of sins in Christ. They had been transformed by the energizing power of the Holy Spirit. They had been commissioned by the risen Christ to go forth in the power of the Spirit to share the Good News with all men. This they did.

We, in our generation, need to proclaim afresh the truth that in Jesus Christ the battle has been won! God has conquered Gog! “Therefore, if any one is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has passed away, behold, the new has come” (II Cor. 5:17).

Religion and the Arts

Doctor Zhivago: A Russian Apocalypse

MARY and PAUL ROWLAND

BORIS PASTERNAK'S *Doctor Zhivago*, like all great works of art, has many facets. It is a book of poetry, fiction, history, philosophy and, above all, of religion. Central to the novel are certain religious concepts upon which the whole structure is built. The purpose of this essay is to explore one aspect of that basic design—namely, the similarities between *Doctor Zhivago* and the Book of Revelation.

I

Pasternak announces clearly in the last scene of Chapter 3 that readers of *Doctor Zhivago* have to do with a poetic and allegorical work. Yuri Andreievich Zhivago, a medical student at the time, is returning from the funeral of his foster-mother, Anna Ivanovna Gromeko. In the socio-political context, Anna Ivanovna suggests the old order in Russia, especially the nobility and the court, and her death as the result of the falling of a huge antique wardrobe is a parable of the destruction of the Tsarist regime by the working classes, represented here by Markel, the porter. Yuri Andreievich plans to write a poem in her memory, dealing with her life and death and "other random things that life had sent his way." As to the form of his poem, he decides: "All great, genuine art resembles and continues the Revelation of St. John" (p. 90).¹ This assertion is a plain forewarning to the reader that Yuri Zhivago's "poem" will be a Russian apocalypse. (Dr. Zhivago's "poem" is of course Pasternak's novel, just as "The Poems of Yuri Zhivago" at the end of the book are Pasternak's own lyrics.)

¹ Quotations from *Doctor Zhivago* by Boris Pasternak are from the American edition published by Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1958.

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We now know that *Doctor Zhivago* will "resemble and continue the Revelation of St. John." To resemble is not to duplicate; there will be no wooden imitation of the biblical Apocalypse. Moreover, since the Russian story deals with more recent times, people, and events, it will continue, rather than repeat, the Book of Revelation. The resemblances between the two works, however, are many, striking, and unmistakable. Both books come out of a time when a strong totalitarian State demands the absolute allegiance of its citizens and is determined to stamp out any competing loyalty. The Russian novel reveals conditions in that country during forty years (1905-45) of upheaval—wars, revolutions, deification of the State, suppression of freedom, denial of individual rights, and religious persecution—which remind us of conditions in the Roman Empire during the first century of our era. The chief purpose of both revelations—St. John's and Pasternak's—is to give courage to persecuted, confused, despairing people by reminding them that their struggle is part of a great Cause: the continuing warfare between the forces of God and Satan, of Good and Evil, of Life and Death. Likewise, both writers try to show the crucial, far-reaching effect of each individual's choice. Again, both men pronounce judgment on the domination of an all-powerful State over the lives of its subjects. The temper of the two judges, to be sure, is different. John, filled with bitterness at the sufferings of the persecuted, finds sweet in his mouth the terrible prophecies contained in the angel's book of doom, whereas Pasternak renders his judgment sorrowfully but calmly and objectively. The verdicts, however, are in essence the same. It is not threats and the cudgel of a despotic State that raise Man above the beast, but an inward music whose sweetest tones are sounded by Christ. Any government or social order not built on his principles dooms its citizens to misery and itself to destruction.

Early in this century Russia arrived at a crossroads. Before her lay two paths. On one stood Christ, pointing the way forward into modern history—the road to true humanity and Life. On the other stood Marx, pointing backward into ancient history—the road to savagery and Death. Nikolai Nikolaievich, Yuri's uncle, guardian, and spokesman puts the alternatives clearly. In memorable passages he contrasts the way of Christ with that of Imperial Rome, with its "boastful dead eternity of bronze monuments and marble columns" together with its "blood and beastliness and cruelty and pockmarked Caligulas who had no idea of how inferior the system of slavery is" (p. 10). (This with a sidelong glance at Stalin, whose face bore the marks of smallpox.)

And then, into this tasteless heap of gold and marble, He came, light and clothed in an aura, emphatically human, deliberately provincial, Galilean, and at that moment gods and nations ceased to be and man came into being—man the carpenter, man the plowman, man the shepherd with his flock of sheep at sunset, man who does not sound in the least proud, man thankfully celebrated in all the cradle songs of mothers and in all the picture galleries the world over. (p. 43)

The tragedy of modern Russia lies in the fact that at the crossroads of 1917 the Bolsheviks forced her to choose the wrong turning—the road backward with Marx instead of the way forward with Christ. The Soviet leaders thus allied themselves with the dark forces of Death and turned the clock back to the time of ancient Rome. Just this is one of the main organizing principles of Pasternak's novel. *Doctor Zhivago* is intended to show Russia metamorphosed into Imperial Rome, complete with blood, beastliness, cruelty, slavery, the cult of State worship, and the persecution of Christians. The full meaning of the book can hardly be grasped without a clear understanding of this controlling pattern.

II

First, however, we must point out one important difference between Revelation and *Zhivago*. It has to do with the choice of allegorical symbols in the two works. The author of Revelation chose figures of various beasts, plagues, and supernatural beings to carry his message. By contrast, Uncle Nikolai Nikolaievich, speaking for Dr. Zhivago (and Pasternak), explains why such allegorical figures are no longer appropriate. Modern man is not interested in ancient cosmogonies, with their dragons, dinosaurs, demigods, and disembodied spirits. That sort of thing, he feels, is an anachronism in a scientific age. It also is not in harmony with Jesus' own method of teaching. Since the advent of Christ, man the individual, going about his daily tasks, has become the focus of interest (p. 43). "For me," declares Uncle Nikolai, "the most important thing [in the Gospels] is that Christ speaks in parables taken from life, that He explains the truth in terms of everyday reality. The idea that underlies this is that communion between mortals is immortal, and that the whole of life is symbolic because it is meaningful" (p. 42). These words from Yurii Zhivago's teacher of religion and creative writing should lead us to suspect that he is foreshadowing the form of his pupil's work. The actors in this Russian apocalypse will be actual men and women. Their lives will keep within the scope of human experience, yet they will also be allegorical figures.

How, then, is the reader to know what the characters in the novel

stand for in the allegory? The answer is, by the meanings of their names. In this respect, *Doctor Zhivago* resembles *Pilgrim's Progress*. Bunyan did not have to describe in full the figures of his allegory; their names make their characters clear. Christian, Evangelist, Ignorance, Greatheart, Pliable, Mr. Worldly Wiseman, Mr. Liveloose, and all the rest tell us plainly what their roles will be. The only difference between the two works in this regard is that whereas Bunyan announces his characters with a single bald surname, Pasternak supplies each of his people with three names: baptismal, patronymic, and surname, and packs each of the three with subtle connotations which evoke ever-widening circles of meaning. To change the figure, Bunyan sounds a single line of melody, whereas Pasternak gives us the full orchestration. Each person is named for one or more prototypes, and the legends connected with these namesakes are the keys to their roles.

Here the custom in Eastern Orthodox lands of christening children for saints of the Church is put to brilliant symbolic use. Pasternak dips into church history for baptismal names that will carry significance to all readers within the Christian tradition. Next, following the practice of early Russian epics, he gives each character a patronymic which reveals his historical or mythological prototype. And finally, by choosing descriptive surnames, he is able to cast his people in multiple allegorical roles. The various overtones evoked by the names will, of course, be much more apparent to Russian readers, especially those of Orthodox background, than to readers in the West.

One or two examples here will serve to illustrate Pasternak's method. Take, for instance, Nikolai Nikolaievich Vedeniapin, of whom we have already spoken. He is the brother of Yurii Zhivago's mother, who died when Yurii was only ten. Shortly afterwards, Yurii's father committed suicide by jumping off a moving train. Thereupon Uncle Nikolai undertook to act as guardian of his orphaned nephew and guided the boy in religion and in the art of writing. His role here is described by his surname—Vedeniapin, derived from the noun *vedenie*, "guidance." Next, Nikolai Nikolaievich shares the patronymic of Lev Nikolaievich Tolstoy, an old friend of the Pasternak family and a hero to young Boris. Tolstoy is obviously Uncle Nikolai's prototype. The uncle, a former priest "unfrosted at his own request," is said to have gone beyond Tolstoyism; he becomes the world-famous author of a new interpretation of Christianity and, as his nephew's teacher of religion, voices Yurii's own mature concept of the Christian faith. Finally, Uncle Nikolai is named for St. Nicholas, Bishop

of Myra, who suffered imprisonment and torture during the Diocletian persecutions. Nicholas is famed for his compassionate love for the poor, and a well-known legend tells of his secretly taking gifts by night to those in need. "Good St. Nicholas" is thus the original Santa Claus. He was one of Tsarist Russia's national saints and the protector of children and scholars, among others. We can see then that Nikolai Nikolaievich Vedeniapin, imbued with the spirit of his patron saint and with that of Lev Nikolaievich Tolstoy, is peculiarly fitted to guide Yurii and to teach him religion and creative writing.

Or again, take the name of the hero—Yurii Andreievich Zhivago. By this time everyone knows that *zhivago* is the Church Slavonic possessive form of the adjective *zhivoy* (alive, living). Hence if Dr. Zhivago were an American, his name would be "Dr. Life."² Yurii Zhivago's patronymic, Andreievich, reveals his prototype as the apostle Andrew, the first, together with his brother Peter, to be called to discipleship by the Lord. Tradition has it that St. Andrew preached the gospel along the shores of the Black Sea. He followed the Dnieper up to where Kiev now stands and, planting a cross on a hilltop overlooking the site, he prophesied that a great city with many churches would arise there, from which Christianity would spread throughout the country. St. Andrew then returned to Byzantium, where he ordained priests and deacons and appointed a bishop to establish the church hierarchy in Russia.³ For his missionary labors, St. Andrew is known as "the Apostle to the Russians" and is considered the chief patron saint of the nation. He is said to have been martyred by crucifixion on an X-shaped cross, called ever since "St. Andrew's cross."

But Dr. Zhivago's name bears a double stamp of martyrdom. "Yurii," the popular form of "George" in Russia, points to his other namesake, St. George, who was slain in A.D. 303 by order of the emperor Diocletian. A well-born Christian of Cappadocia and an officer in the Roman army, he is said to have protested to the Emperor in person against the imminent persecution of the Christians, at the same time confessing his own faith and resigning his command. For this courageous act he was tortured and killed.

St. George, however, stands for something more than martyrdom. In the early Church marvelous tales were circulated of his being tortured and dismembered several times but each time being miraculously restored to life.

² Pasternak did not invent the name Zhivago; it is an actual surname in Russia. One of the "Moscow millionaires" bore the name, and in the 1840's he frequently entertained the renowned archaeologist, Heinrich Schliemann.

³ *Faith of Our Fathers*, The Olympic Press, 1958, pp. 20-21.

These legends (curiously intertwined with the classic myth of Perseus killing a sea-monster and rescuing Andromeda) evolved into the famous story of St. George slaying the dragon (paganism), to rescue the maiden (Christianity).⁴ With frequent variations, this drama has been enacted in the folk celebrations of St. George's Day (April 23) all over Europe.

Nikolai Nikolaievich Vedeniapin and Yurii Andreievich Zhivago are but two examples of many persons in the novel named for saints whose lives illuminate the characters' roles. This device of characterizing by nomenclature is not only accepted allegorical practice but is also intrinsic to Pasternak's concept of immortality—namely, the "you in others" which survives and becomes part of the future. The idea is intimated in the very first sentence of *Doctor Zhivago*, where a funeral procession passes by singing "Memory Eternal!"⁵ The people in the novel have thus been conceived as embodiments of the spirit which animated their prototypes and namesakes in centuries past. Furthermore, as the drama unfolds and we begin to call the roll of the martyrs evoked by figures in the story—St. George, St. Andrew, St. Stephen, St. Paul, St. Nicholas, St. Anthony, St. Euphrasios, St. Larisa, St. Averkios, St. Lawrence, and others—we are reminded that in the cosmic struggle between God and Satan in the Book of Revelation, "the noble army of martyrs" makes up the heavenly forces of the conquering Christ.

III

Turning now to more specific resemblances between *Zhivago* and Revelation, let us consider the use of an unchaste woman to symbolize a nation guilty of religious apostasy and idolatry. In John's apocalyptic vision (Chapter 17), an angel showed him a woman arrayed in purple and scarlet on whose forehead was written "Babylon the great, mother of harlots and of earth's abominations." By the "great harlot" John means the goddess Roma, personification of Rome, whom he brands as mistress of the god-emperors. (The cult of Roma, together with that of the emperors, living and dead, was vigorously promoted by Rome to inculcate loyalty to the State.) Upon Roma and upon the kings of the nations she had enticed, John pronounces terrible doom. To him the greatest of all her abominations was that she was "drunk with the blood of the saints and the blood of the martyrs of Jesus"—that is, the confessors and martyrs

⁴ See Yurii Zhivago's poem "Fairy Tale" (pp. 537-540) and his description of how he wrote it (pp. 440-441).

⁵ *Vechnaya pamyat'* (Eternal memory) is a refrain sung by the choir in the Russian Orthodox service for the burial of the dead. The English-language editions unfortunately translate it "Rest Eternal," which completely obscures the author's implication.

who steadfastly refused, under threats and torture, to deny their faith and to worship *Dea Roma* and the emperors.⁶

In *Zhivago* the unchaste woman is the heroine, Larisa, who incarnates the spirit of Mother Russia in the allegory. "Lara" is seduced while still a young girl by Komarovsky (a symbol of Evil), is later married to Pavel Antipov, becomes the mistress of Yurii Zhivago, and finally, in terror, turns again to Komarovsky and flees with him to the Far Eastern Republic. Despite her checkered history, the hopeless love between Yurii Zhivago and Lara remains pure and poignant. Yurii's attitude toward Lara is in startling contrast, we observe, to John's pitiless condemnation of the "harlot" Roma. Although Lara (i.e., Russia) has embraced evil and followed after false gods, she is not, in Yurii's eyes, a really depraved woman deserving perdition. Instead, he sees her as Christ viewed the Magdalene—an erring woman whose heart is pure and loving even though her life has been touched by evil. In place of the anathemas blazing with the threat of hell-fire in John's pages, Yurii proposes "to write Lara's memory into an image of aching tenderness and sorrow" (p. 452). Immutable moral law decrees that Lara-Russia must pay for her sins by suffering many of the calamities John foretold for Roma-Rome. But whereas John was the involuntary subject of a detested Empire, Zhivago is the patriotic son of a beloved motherland. Instead of eagerly anticipating his country's destruction as penalty for her apostasy, Zhivago yearns for her rehabilitation and return to the faith and, like the martyrs of old, is willing to lay down his life that she may repent and live again as a Christian nation.

But despite this complete contrast in the attitudes of Yurii toward Lara and of John toward Roma, the fact remains that the authors of both *Zhivago* and Revelation follow the example of the Hebrew prophets in representing an apostate and idolatrous nation as a sinful woman.

Another striking correspondence between the two works is the presence in *Zhivago* of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse and their horses. Analysis of the first two will perhaps suffice to reveal Pasternak's method, though all four are ingeniously developed. We have already met Komarovsky as the arrogant, unscrupulous lawyer and seducer of Lara. His full name—Victor Ippolitovich Komarovsky—describes him perfectly. Komarovsky—"son of a mosquito"—a predatory, insatiable bloodsucker; Ippolitovich—"son of a horseman"; Victor—"Conqueror." Clearly he is intended to represent Conquest, the first Horseman of the Apocalypse, who "went out conquering and to conquer" (6:2). The frequent

⁶ See Martin Rist, Exegesis of Revelation, in *The Interpreter's Bible*, Vol. XII, pp. 488-497.

walks of the lawyer with his boon companion, Satanidi ("offspring of Satan"), further identify Victor Ippolitovich Komarovskiy as one of the evil "angels" of the "great dragon, . . . that ancient serpent who is called the Devil and Satan" (12:9).

The second Horseman—Civil War—is portrayed by an extraordinary apparition, the "talking deaf-mute," who appears to accompany Yurii on a mysterious "special express" when he returns to Moscow from the disintegrating southern front in the summer of 1917. (It is important to keep in mind that all through *Doctor Zhivago* the "visions" of St. John in the Apocalypse are paralleled by Yurii's frequent dreams, fantasies, hallucinations, and even nightmares—clear evidence that the novel is not a realistic record of actual events in the outer world. Rather, it is an account of the inner world of the characters—primarily that of the hero—as they live through the catastrophic upheavals of World War I and its aftermath, the Bolshevik revolution. In this connection we recall that *Pilgrim's Progress* is, from start to finish, Bunyan's "dream," and that the *Divine Comedy* is Dante's "vision" of an imaginary visit to Inferno, Purgatory, and Paradise.)

The literary fantasy which contains the second Horseman is found in the last three sections of Chapter 5, "Farewell to the Old." Pasternak has clearly forewarned the reader that the "talking deaf-mute" is no flesh-and-blood person. "Amazing stories" are circulating about him (p. 134); visitors from a distance take no stock in his existence, but it is stoutly maintained by "the small craftsmen, soldiers' wives, and the former servants" of Meliuzhevo (p. 136). He appears only when Yurii, exhausted from lack of sleep and from the rigors of an arduous journey, is sitting on his bag in the jam-packed corridor of a slow-moving, rickety old train carrying him to Moscow. When Yurii changes trains (evidently in his dream), he enters a practically empty "special express" and shares a comfortable compartment with an odd creature who proves to be the phantom "talking deaf-mute." Yurii marvels at the stranger's extreme garrulousness ("He poured out incredible and disconnected facts about himself") and by his restlessness and jerky, mechanical movements ("He kept jumping up as if he were on springs") (p. 162).

Finally his companion introduces himself by handing Yurii his card. It bears the improbable name, Maxim Aristarkhovich Klintsov-Pogorevshikh—in itself a brilliant satire on the voluble Bolshevik agitators mouthing their Party clichés without really understanding them. "Maxim" identifies him as a Maximalist (i.e., a Bolshevik) and likewise a worshiper of maxims. His patronymic points to the Greek astronomer Aristarchus,

first to advance the revolutionary theory that the earth revolves around the sun. "Klintsov" is from either *klin* ("wedge") or *klinok* ("blade") and carries connotations of both, while "Pogorevshikh" refers to the *pogorevshie*, refugees from burnt-out villages who are forced to wander begging in order to survive. The full flavor of this grimly satiric appellation may perhaps be conveyed by the loose rendering: "Bolshevik-puppet, Turning-the-world-upside-down, Driving-a-wedge-between-brothers-with-the-sword and Forcing-miserable-refugees-to-flee-from-burnt-out-villages."

Klintsov-Pogorevshikh, then, depicts Civil War, the second Horseman of the Apocalypse; the phantom "special express" carrying the Revolution from the disintegrating southern front to Moscow is the blood-red Horse; his double-barreled shotgun is the "great sword" with which he has indeed been "permitted to take peace from the earth so that men should slay one another"; the bagful of dead ducks stands for the corpses of the many who are already beginning to fall in the Civil War. (Later in the novel we shall be reminded of Pogorevshikh and his fast express when another Bolshevik hunter—the fanatical revolutionist Pavel Pavlovich Antipov, renamed Strelnikov, "the Shooter"—speeds back and forth on the trans-Siberian railway in his armored train, engine hooting and red tail lights winking as he rushes by, or machine guns spewing slaughter right and left as he stops to "discipline" some hapless peasant village.)

Both works contrast the apocalyptic woes brought on earth by the Four Horsemen with pictures of Heaven. In *Zhivago*, to be sure, we do not find a dazzling throne-room in the clouds with worshipping and ministering angels, though there are adumbrations of it. In Yuriatin, the Kingdom of Heaven is here on earth—in the human heart. Dr. Zhivago finds counterparts of the cherubim, seraphim, the angel of the book, and the jeweled walls of the Holy City in the Tuntseva sisters. The family name is derived from *tunets* (tuna), suggesting the early use of the fish as symbol for Christ. In the midst of a land writhing in nightmare, three of these brave women survive, quietly serving God and man. Serafima, like her namesakes the seraphim, serves with praise, although scoffers say she is a bit touched in the head—always talking about religion. Avdotia (Eudokia, "Well-thought-of") is one of the town librarians and serves with knowledge. As she gives out what to Yurii is a premonitory book about the Pugachev rebellion, she suggests the angel who gave into John's hand the little book of doom. The third sister, Glafira (from *gla-phyre*, "shining-rock"), serves with all kinds of useful work, however humble. Her name evokes the gleaming porphyry appearing as various jewels in the heavenly walls,

and also as a component of plainer, more utilitarian kinds of stone. A fourth sister—the only one who married—is now dead but is constantly remembered as “a cherub, a white angel” (pp. 261-9). (It is significant that the cherub, sign of the presence of Deity, is the only one absent from the scene.)

The fourth Tuntseva sister leads naturally to another striking parallel with Revelation. Her son is the Red partisan commander, Liberius Averkievich Mikulitsyn. Liberius (ironically named for liberty) is a composite symbol of the evil, death-dealing powers into whose hands Russia has fallen. Like Satan, a devil sprung from the company of angels, Liberius springs from the saintly Tuntsev family, his mother being Agrippina Tuntseva, the “cherub.” Liberius, an idolized only son, was a precocious, wild boy. At fifteen he ran off to war, and the shock of his behavior caused his mother’s death four years later. The significant details—a mother named Agrippina, a wild, precocious young son who caused his mother’s death when he was nineteen—reveal Liberius as the reincarnation of Nero—the Nero *redivivus* of tradition. We recall that Nero is symbolized in Revelation by one of the heads of a vile, seven-headed beast. Liberius is similarly branded. In a vivid scene in the partisan camp, the witch Kubarikha unmasks the Red commander as the most bloodthirsty of all mythical beasts—the werewolf.

Liberius brings us to the subject of the persecution and martyrdom of Christians in both Revelation and *Zhivago*. It may be well to remind ourselves that we have witnessed in our own day a close parallel to the persecutions of Christians in the Roman Empire, from that of Nero (64-68) to those under Diocletian (303-313). In the first period of direct persecution in post-Revolutionary Russia, untold thousands of Christians were martyred for their faith. According to official Soviet statistics, 30 bishops and 1,414 priests were “liquidated” in 1918-19. Unofficial but reliable figures for the same period give the number of those executed as 2,691 bishops and priests, 1,962 monks, and 3,447 nuns, clerks, and other church servants—a total of 8,100 victims in the Orthodox Church alone.⁷

To impart his revelation, the Russian author adopts three devices of the biblical Apocalypse. First, the burial of Yurii’s mother in the opening scenes is a parable of the coming persecution. The Russian Church is symbolized by Mother Maria Nikolaievna, just as in Revelation (12:1-6) the Church in Heaven is symbolized by the glorious celestial mother of the infant Messiah. Satan, the dragon who pursues her, is represented in

⁷ Klepinin, N., chapter “Religion,” in *Russia/U.S.S.R., A Complete Handbook*, edited by P. Malevsky-Malevich. William Farquhar Payson, 1933, pp. 632-633.

Zhivago by the threatening blizzard which howls above her new-made grave. (An early Bolshevik slogan reads: "Revolution is a storm, sweeping aside everything that stands in its path.") But Maria Nikolaievna (the Church) is immortal. "Who is being buried?" strangers ask. "Zhivago" (the living), they are told.

The second parable is introduced during the Zhivagos' train journey to the Urals (pp. 238-39). The incident is plainly labeled a "vision" by the sentence, "Everything could be seen clearly . . . but seemed unreal, as though made up." It is a virtual replica of Revelation 12:13-16, which contains John's vision of the dragon (now symbolizing Rome) pursuing the woman who had borne the male child (now the Church on earth). With the wings of an eagle she escapes into the wilderness, but the dragon follows, trying to drown her by pouring a river out of his mouth. Pasternak uses the same imagery: a river in flood; a woman and a boy fleeing from a pursuer, hiding in a wild mountain thicket; a waterfall that resembles "a dragon or winged serpent"; a large bird soaring on heavy wings.

The third parable occurs in Chapter 15, section 7; the time is August, 1929, midway through the second period of violent, open persecution. In a painful conversation with two old friends, Dr. Zhivago hears the story of the priest, Bonifatii Orletsov, his arrest and "subsequent fate." Orletsov's six-year-old daughter Christina, eager to blot out from her family name the disgrace of the epithets hurled at her beloved father ("Obscurantist priest!" "Disenfranchised!"), has become an ardent champion of Communist ideals. The implications so distress Yurii that he is spurred on to write his final work—the book revealing the evil which has overtaken Russia. In the Book of Revelation, John mentions only one martyr by name—Antipas of Pergamum—as if representing the whole company of those executed in the Domitian persecution. Similarly in *Zhivago*, Bonifatii Orletsov⁸ represents the uncounted thousands of believers already liquidated by 1929, or subsequently to be massacred in the Soviet campaign to exterminate all vestiges of religion. Little Christina typifies the children alienated from Christianity by subtle pressure methods.

IV

The Epilogue to *Doctor Zhivago* (Chapter 16) and the epilogue to Revelation (22:6 to the end) stress the same points: the call to suffering

⁸ *Bonifatii*, named for St. Boniface, eighth-century missionary to the Germans, where he was martyred by a heathen tribe in 784. *Orletsov*, from *orlets* ("the Eagle"), a small oval rug picturing an eagle soaring above a walled city, on which only a bishop may stand during Divine Service.

and martyrdom for the faith, and the coming of the New Age. "Blessed are those who wash their robes, that they may have the right to the tree of life and that they may enter the city" (22:14). John was promising his fellow Christians that if they chose death rather than renounce their faith, they would gain eternal life in the City of God. Those he addressed had their martyrdoms ahead of them. In the Epilogue to *Zhivago*, the Russian Christians already had endured a quarter-century of persecution under the Soviets. Moreover, the whole nation was then (1943) experiencing the blood-bath of World War II. The characters who appear in the Epilogue have all "washed their robes," either literally in their blood or otherwise in great suffering. Misha Gordon, Zhivago's old friend, washes his clothes in a river to symbolize his own agony. Christina Orletsova, whose heart overflowed with love, has sacrificed her life for others. Tania, orphan daughter of Yurii and Lara, is now a laundry girl in the army. In her hard labor, borne with cheerfulness and courage, and in her terrible sufferings as an abandoned child, we see her "washing the robes" of many others besides herself.

In Revelation, John promised those faithful Christians who endured martyrdom that they would eat of the Tree of Life in the new garden of Eden—that is, enjoy eternal Life. In *Doctor Zhivago*, the counterpart of the Tree of Life is the rowan tree, which appears here and there throughout the novel and always symbolically. The rowan with its red berries was believed, in Celtic, Teutonic, Finnish, and Slavic mythology, to have power to satisfy hunger, prolong life, heal sickness, and protect from evil spirits.

The final promise to those facing martyrdom was that they would "enter the city." Like the biblical Revelation, the Russian revelation ends with the description of a city. But whereas the Heavenly City seen by John, emerging after great tribulation and turmoil, was a paradise of peace and joy, Zhivago's city (in Chapter 15, "Conclusion") is Moscow, physically and spiritually desolate after the horrors of civil war. Yurii is pressured to write poems in praise of the New Moscow, but he simply cannot. The Revolution has ended in disaster. The paradise promised by the Marxists turns out to be the hellish city described in the Conclusion. Slavery and fear cover the land like a pall. There is no sign of "the river of the water of life"; instead, Christian blood flows through Moscow and all Russia, as it did in ancient Rome. The glorious concept of Moscow as the "Third Rome" (inheriting that honor from Constantinople, the "Second Rome," after the fall of that city to the Turks in 1453), has been warped by imperialistic ambitions—first of the Tsars and now of the Soviets. As

Nicolas Berdyaev sums up the tragic result, "in Russian communism in which the Russian messianic idea has passed into a non-religious and anti-religious form, there has taken place the same distortion by the will to power, of the Russian quest for the kingdom of right."⁹

And yet, like the Book of Revelation, *Doctor Zhivago* does not end on a note of despair. Present-day Moscow may be a far cry from the Holy City come down to earth, but the Kingdom of God is nevertheless surely coming. It is coming quietly, gradually, inevitably, in individual hearts—just where Jesus said it would. Pasternak often reminded friends critical of the regime: "Now something else is growing. It is growing inconspicuously and silently like grass. It is growing like a fruit; it is growing imperceptibly in the children. The real significance of this epoch is that in it a new freedom is beginning."¹⁰

The beginning of freedom—this is the vision of the Holy City, still seen mostly with the eyes of faith, by Dr. Zhivago's two old friends "five or ten years later" as they read his book and look down on Moscow. Gordon and Dudorov had shared with all true Russians the great eschatological hope for the transformation of this world. They had lent themselves for a time to the Revolution, mistakenly thinking that it would bring the New Jerusalem down to Russian soil. But now, as they read Yuri's book in the light of their experience, they are illumined by his thought. The Kingdom of Heaven does not spring into existence overnight, nor is it a place of static perfection like the city of John's vision. Rather, it grows slowly, mysteriously, as life does in the vegetable kingdom. Before any semblance of it can appear on earth, it must first exist latently, as seed, in the spirit of Man. The Kingdom will come not through hatred and violence, but through love and self-sacrifice; not in slavery, but in freedom; not by the edicts of Caesar, but by the ideals of Christ.

⁹ Berdyaev, Nicolas, *The Russian Idea*, The Macmillan Company, 1948, p. 196.

¹⁰ Quoted in Gerd Ruge, *Pasternak, A Pictorial Biography*. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959, p. 92.

Commentary

The Principal Threat to Freedom

TO THE EDITOR OF RELIGION IN LIFE:

"We must be free or die, who spake the tongue that Shakespeare spake, the faith and morals old which Milton held." These words of Wordsworth come to mind as I read this group of articles on various "Problems of American Freedom" which appears in the present issue of RELIGION IN LIFE. All these matters are of great importance to us. But since lack of freedom anywhere threatens freedom everywhere, I would ask our readers to raise their sights and broaden their horizon, to consider not only American freedom but freedom *per se*. The great problem is not simply to win it but to keep it, not merely to achieve but to maintain it.

In a recent address Dr. James B. Conant, former President of Harvard University, said: "It is my thesis that in this year 1959 freedom is as severely threatened as at any time in our history and threatened in ways that make it difficult to understand the nature and magnitude of the menace." This menace or threat is partly internal and partly external. The internal danger is evident in all the ideas clustering about the relations between the white and colored peoples, now crystallized under the name of "integration"; the entire labor problem with its bitterness and sometimes misrepresentation on both sides; and the whole issue of the freedom of the media of communication.

Although these are all important problems touching American freedom, the present external threat is the greater. It is the one overriding and basic problem, more than any other which threatens our freedom—namely, Communism. Unless that is in some way satisfactorily dealt with, all our discussion of the others is but sound and fury accomplishing nothing.

This was borne in upon me by an address by Dr. Charles Malik, former President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, with the somber title, "Is it too late to win against Communism?" He cites the fact that Communism now controls one third of mankind and has largely softened up the remaining two thirds, where it appears to have a steady and alarming growth. He also remarks that in forty years "the free world has not succeeded in pushing back the tide of Communism one inch." And this gives the impression that we are facing an irresistible force which will

eventually inherit and transform the whole world; this is their avowed program and one which they are pressing with fanatical devotion.

Per contra, the Western world has only a negative program for stopping Communism. Indeed we have no definite or positive program of our own, but indulge instead in complacency, self-satisfaction, lack of determination and incisiveness, and in some quarters an uncritical readiness to settle for peaceful coexistence. I do not know of one Western leader who really believes that democracy is basically stronger than Communism, and that some day the children of Russia, Hungary, and China will repudiate it and enjoy the blessings of freedom for all mankind. Without such dynamic faith we are no match for a demonic and fanatical foe.

In closing I cannot do better than quote from Malik's concluding paragraph: "Will the future redeem the past. That depends on four things: on depth, on wisdom, on daring, and on leadership. I believe that, without high leadership, daring to act in wisdom and depth, the future will not learn from the past. These are things for which we should yearn and work. But in our own effort we may not achieve them. It is only as God wills that depth, wisdom, daring and leadership be granted the free world in this crucial hour of history that the future will redeem the past."

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Book Reviews and Notices

The Structure of Nations and Empires. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. x-306 pp. \$5.00.

To be alive to current political realities and problems has always been one of Reinhold Niebuhr's many notable distinctions, and characterizes also his recent study, *The Structure of Nations and Empires*, which is subtitled, "A Study of the Recurring Patterns and Problems of the Political Order in Relation to the Unique Problems of the Nuclear Age." This is essentially a theoretical treatise on the fundamentals of politics, but at the same time closely related to current basic issues of domestic and especially international politics. In fact, some chapters in the second part of the book contain an outright analysis of the latter.

Dr. Niebuhr stresses in his discussion of the Cold War the unprecedented, unique nature, due to the development of nuclear weapons, of some problems of contemporary international relations. He is, however, far from sharing the widespread belief that "the novelties and striking historical emergents of a nuclear age" have invalidated the lessons of the past. He insists, on the contrary, "that present political realities can be fully understood only in the light of historical comparisons, which may discover what is new and what is old in a contemporary configuration of community or structure of political power." It is particularly important, he thinks, to gain some historical perspective on Communism. By realizing that Communism is "a new manifestation of an old imperial configuration" rather than a complete novelty, we shall, Niebuhr hopes, be better prepared for exercising our power and responsibility in world affairs.

The attempt to explain present political realities and problems in terms of the past presupposes that there are constant factors in history which permit relevant analogies between modern and past times. Niebuhr shows that there is indeed some consistency, some perennial pattern and permanent force in man's search for community, in spite of the endless variety of its forms and its ideological contents.

The most significant invariable in political history, according to Niebuhr, is the necessity of order. "The similarity," he says, "proving that order must always remain the first value of any community (because chaos is tantamount to nonexistence), establishes a constant which transcends the most radical change in history." In fact, it makes such change less radical than it appears to be. True, modern democratic communities pretend to pursue justice rather than order while the traditional communities of premodern times emphasized order as the end of political life. But closer consideration, Niebuhr maintains, reveals that the risk of anarchy is accepted in the contemporary democratic community only to the extent that the cohesive forces securing its basic unity are sufficiently strong. Moreover, the consent of the governed from which the prestige of the democratic government derives is by no means so rational as the idea of liberal democracy implies. Obedience to the laws is largely a habit rather than a conscious deliberate act. Nor is the threat of use of force completely lacking in popular government, though, compared to prestige, it plays as a source of authority only a minor role. Democratic ideology is as anxious to obscure the part of force in government as it is to hide the operation in public life of motives of self-interest. Democratic government and traditional government, in spite of many

significant differences between them, are thus similar to one another in the importance they attach to order, in the methods of exercising power, and in the attempt to veil the stark facts of political life and their moral ambiguity by ideological pretensions. Niebuhr stresses time and again the moral ambiguity of every political order, due to "the necessity of the morally ambiguous instruments of social integration," such as government, property, and social hierarchy.

Dr. Niebuhr in the course of his discussion comes often very close to stating explicitly a relativistic view on the forms of government. His keen realization of the overriding importance of order in its most elementary sense, his sociological insight into the functional dependence of political-legal contrivances upon such "horizontal" forces of social cohesion as race, language, culture and customs, and, based on this insight, his rejection of current political voluntarism—all these point in the same direction. Indeed, he ridicules the optimistic expectation that "free elections" are apt to solve the problems which the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa are facing. To revive and restate the time-honored but nowadays ill-reputed relativistic doctrine on the forms of government would be a great merit. But one wonders whether Niebuhr's attitude is entirely consistent in this respect. He insists that there are among the various systems of government, quite apart from perverted constitutions, gradations of moral ambiguity, its actual degree in each case depending upon the closeness of the system to the ideal of justice and the distance that separates its realities from its ideological claims. Democracy is "the most unambiguous relation of dominion to community." (Emphasizing as he does the ambiguity of all forms of dominion, of all human striving and of all institutions, Niebuhr, it seems, could conceivably speak of democracy only as the *least ambiguous* relation of dominion to community.) On the other end of the scale is the imperial community. The moral ambiguity of the empire "may be regarded as an accentuated form of the moral ambiguity of the whole political order."

This does not mean that Niebuhr considers the autonomous nation the only valid structure of community and authority. True, he thinks the day of empire is over. But he also reminds us that imperial power structures have existed from the dawn of history, first in the form of the classical empires of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, and then of the national empires of the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. He centers his attention on the classical type of empire and imperialism, since he sees in it rather than in the modern type the very pattern that is now re-emerging in the form of communist imperialism. By far the greatest and most brilliant part of the pertinent discussion is devoted to the medieval imperial configurations of Eastern and especially of Western Christendom. Niebuhr clearly realizes the truly unique features, religions, political and constitutional, of the Western Empire, but he also stresses the similarities between this and other imperial examples, including the Marxist variety. The most striking similarity is, of course, the political assertion in all cases of universal rule and ultimate authority, while the chief difference is the religious foundation of the medieval empires and the secular pseudo-scientific basis of Communist imperialism. Niebuhr is particularly anxious to point out the similarity of methods used in all cases for obscuring interest and power.

Niebuhr rightly complains that democratic liberal ideology shows little understanding for "the configurations of power and authority which develop in history between the nation and the universal community." To facilitate this comprehension is one of the purposes of his discussion of empires. He also touches upon such other forms of community or dominion above the level of the nation and below the level of

the "community of mankind" as the systems of alliances and the supranational associations that have been formed in Western Europe. One feels all the same that Niebuhr himself has somehow underrated the growing complexity of the contemporary international structure.

The present book is another application of Niebuhr's moral philosophy, so often expounded by him in earlier writings. This philosophy has recently been subjected by Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., to a massive attack. But even so severe a critic as Fr. Murray recognizes that Niebuhr's moral theory might be a proper and useful technique of historical analysis. It has proved so again in this study.

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The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. By GORDON HARLAND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. xvii-298 pp. \$6.00.

Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics. Ed. by HARRY R. DAVIS and ROBERT C. GOOD. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. xviii-364 pp. \$6.50.

Reinhold Niebuhr has written so much important material that he has begun to overlap himself; new books from his own pen now compete with collections of his earlier writing and with books about him. Here are two good examples of the latter. These are valuable additions to the growing body of writing about Niebuhr because they combine full recognition that Dr. Niebuhr's central interest has been politics and social order with the full recognition of the centrally Christian and theological sources of his insight on those matters. Also, they are well done.

The book by Mr. Harland is a clear, orderly summary and exposition (and in a measure defense) of Dr. Niebuhr's thought. About half of it is devoted to his fundamental theological, ethical, and political theory and the other half to his broad positions on specific social and political questions. The connection between the two is well made. The book begins at the center, with Dr. Niebuhr's understanding of Christian love, and proceeds in succinct and well-organized fashion right through his thought, emphasizing the social-political as it is right to do. Chapter Two, on the resources in Niebuhr's thought for Christian social participation, is especially helpful.

In the course of his excellent exposition, Mr. Harland brings in critics of Dr. Niebuhr from all periods, ordinarily to answer them in defense of Niebuhr's position. This adds to the value of the book as a sympathetic presentation and clarification of Dr. Niebuhr's views, even though in some cases one might feel the critics did not require much of an answer.

Mr. Harland is concerned throughout the book to answer common misconceptions of Niebuhr, especially those held in religious circles: that he overemphasizes sin, neglects the church, gives no constructive guide, is passive, etc. He answers them excellently. He is thoroughly identified with Dr. Niebuhr's position, and therefore does not give a critical appraisal of it from a detached and independent perspective. However, as an expositor who grasps the center of Niebuhr's thought, and defends it well, he is first-rate.

The other book, put together by two political thinkers who owe a debt to Niebuhr, is of an extraordinary kind. One might say that it is not *by* Niebuhr or *about* Niebuhr but *from* Niebuhr. What Mr. Good and Mr. Davis have done is to create for Dr. Niebuhr, using his own words, the systematic presentation that his own impatient

hurrying on to new battles would not allow him to set down. Drawing upon a vast quantity of material, both in books and in innumerable articles, Mr. Good and Mr. Davis have pieced together a systematic and comprehensive presentation of his political philosophy and his position on political issues. It is an impressive piece of work, and should be extraordinarily useful.

It is a testimony to Dr. Niebuhr's importance and profound influence that he should call forth two such excellent derivative works.

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Christianity and Communism Today. By JOHN C. BENNETT. New York: Association Press, 1960. 188 pp. \$3.50.

This book represents a most welcome revision and up-dating of the highly useful and exceptionally lucid *Christianity and Communism*, which appeared in 1948 as a Haddam House book. In both the original and the revised editions Dean Bennett interprets Communism essentially as a faith and as an ideology, and in both editions he sees the same central issues at stake between Christianity and Communism.

The value of this new edition lies primarily in the analysis which it contains of the major changes that have taken place in Communism itself since 1948 and the evaluation of the changes which Dean Bennett makes. Chief among these changes are the lessening concern for ideological purity among European Communists, the shift of the center of Communist activities from Europe to Asia, the emergence of Yugoslavia as an experiment in national Communism, and the development of Russian society since the death of Stalin. These developments are discussed briefly in the Introduction, and their implications are treated in subsequent chapters dealing with "The Significance of Developments in Russia Since Stalin" (Chapter 3), "Communism as a Problem in International Relations" (Chapter 7), and "Some Moral and Religious Objections to Co-Existence" (Chapter 8).

Dean Bennett believes that the two most important developments that have taken place in Russia in recent years are the success which Communism has achieved in the fields of science, technology and production, and the relaxation of the worst aspects of the tyranny which prevailed under Stalin. These changes, together with the broadening of the political base of the Russian dictatorship, the passing of the revolutionary generation with its fanatical commitment to the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the growing demand of the Russian people for the improvement of their living standards, lead Dean Bennett to conclude that "we should take a much more positive attitude toward Russia as a Communist nation" than he believed to be the case in 1948. Such an appreciation of the constructive modifications of Communism in Russia should not, however, obscure the terrible threat of tyranny which Communism continues to hold for any nation which chooses it; nor does it mean that we should be any less opposed to the imposition of Communism by Russia or China upon other peoples.

In the light of the great national interest in a reappraisal of America's strategy in seeking to contain Communism, Dean Bennett's reminder that military power plays only a secondary role in the struggle between democracy and Communism, his insistence that the durability of Communism in Russia and China should be recognized and accepted as a fact of international life, and his warning that in the competition

between the "open" societies and the Communist societies the former may lag so far behind the latter in matters of public welfare that the uncommitted nations will be persuaded thereby that Communism would be the best economic system for them, are quite timely and constructive. In view of the developments which have taken place in Russian Communism and which are likely to take place in Chinese Communism within a generation or so, it is unrealistic and self-defeating to look upon Communism as an absolute evil which we should seek to overthrow. This is true partly because the democratic nations and the Christian churches themselves share in the responsibility for the rise and spread of atheistic Communism. It is true also because such a policy of defiant coexistence fails to help the victims of Communist tyranny now. Instead of coexistence, positive efforts to build relationships of understanding and trust are needed both on the part of our government and the churches, and a policy aimed at the eradication of the injustice and deprivation upon which Communism feeds is the strongest guarantee against the spread of Communism as a faith and as an economic and political ideology.

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International Conflict in the Twentieth Century. By HERBERT BUTTERFIELD.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 123 pp. \$3.00.

This is the book that I have hoped for as an antidote to the dominant tendencies of feeling and thought in this country about Communism and the cold war. Professor Butterfield helps us who are controlled by the fears, hostilities and responsibilities of the present moment to take a fresh look at ourselves and at our adversaries. This is not a book about policy but about the assumptions and expectations that precede policy. Appended to the title are the words, "A Christian View." As in his other best known books Professor Butterfield brings the insights of a lay theologian as well as those of an historian to bear on events; his emphasis is upon the interrelations of humility and love under the judgment and mercy of God. He makes human self-righteousness the major cause of historical disaster, but he has more hope than do many theologians that Christian humility and love may change the course of history.

The author recognizes the threat of international Communism to the Christian values that are partly embodied in the Western institutions which protect the freedom and welfare of concrete human beings. He is as far removed from the emphasis of Communism on the system, on the state and on the future utopia at the expense of persons as are any of its critics. Moreover, he recognizes that there is no chance for a *détente* unless aggression is checked, unless the temptation to aggression that is always present when there is a power vacuum is removed. He does believe that a *détente* is possible in the cold war, as it proved to be possible between Catholicism and Protestantism in seventeenth-century Europe. He makes much of the fact that the idea of mutual tolerance was as morally repellant to many on both sides in that conflict as it is today to many Communists and anti-Communists. He sees the following among the conditions for a *détente*: the capacity of each side—beginning with ourselves—to understand the other side's fear; awareness that the other side is not a "monolithic slab of evil" but is a mixed human reality; acceptance by the *status quo* nations of the necessity of revolution in most of the world, and toleration by them of the choice of Communism as an instrument of revolution.

Professor Butterfield would claim that there is on our side greater intolerance of the experiments of other nations than we admit. He opposes the imposition of Communism by one nation on another as much as anyone, but he differs from almost all those who form opinion in this country by saying that sooner or later we shall have to admit that in parts of the world which never had democracy Communism has rendered a real service.

The final condition for a *détente* is the deeply felt preference, on both sides, of mutual toleration to nuclear war. Professor Butterfield advances cautiously the conviction that no cause whatever would justify the use of hydrogen bombs even in retaliation. The first response to this idea may be that the abandonment unilaterally of hydrogen bombs would be inconsistent with the author's strong warning against a power vacuum. Would it not, relatively speaking, create such a vacuum in the whole non-Communist world? Professor Butterfield does not deal directly with this question, but I think that he would have two answers which I derive from his discussion of other matters. The first would be that in Russia the stage has been reached in which risks of damage far short of full nuclear retaliation would be a sufficient deterrent; she now has great gains to conserve that any general war would threaten. The other answer is that we in the non-Communist world have no adequate realization of the extent to which the military posture of Russia is the result of fear.

There may be miscalculations in Professor Butterfield's discussion. Who knows, for example, what may be the effect of the difference between Russia and China in regard to nuclear war and coexistence? But even this may bring nearer a *détente* between Russia and the United States, however much other threats may remain. I believe that Professor Butterfield sees most clearly the very aspects of the situation which Americans who form opinion or make policy are most tempted to neglect.

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The Atonement and the Sacraments. By ROBERT S. PAUL. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 396 pp. \$6.50.

This is a book on the atonement rather than on the sacraments. Less than a quarter of it deals directly with the relation of the atonement to baptism and the Lord's Supper. The relation is implicit, however, in the theocentric dynamism which is the keynote of the whole book. The starting point is the central affirmation of the gospel: "God was in Christ, reconciling . . ." "And this saving act by which the Church lives is both made objectively real and is subjectively appropriated with gratitude by us in the water of baptism and the bread and wine of the Eucharist" (p. 32).

Another book on the atonement? What can it possibly say that has not already been said countless times? And what new light on the sacraments can a member of a liturgical church such as the Lutheran expect from a Congregationalist? It was with such a question in mind that I began the reading of this book. My preconceptions appeared to be confirmed by the introductory chapter with its detailed analysis of the English word "at-one-ment" on the basis of dictionary definitions and early English literature. The stage seemed to be set for an extended moralistic harangue on man's need to square himself with God and fellow man. What followed, however, was unexpectedly stimulating and rewarding. Once the play begins, the author carries the reader with him on a thrilling exploration of the depths of the Christian faith. Seldom has any book held me so spellbound.

This book has the basic ingredients of a truly great book; a great theme, competent workmanship, and a timely and vital concern in which the reader participates.

The theme is nothing less than the meaning and relevance of the Christian message. The atonement is rightly seen not as a doctrine among other doctrines but as the gospel itself in epitome. The primary question to be answered is this: what does the gospel mean to the church? The church cannot communicate the gospel nor make it relevant to the world unless she herself has a clear and firm grasp of its content. This involves more than a knowledge of the interpretations given in the past. Each generation must reassess the work of Christ in terms of its own thought and life. Two specific interests help to give vitality to the author's presentation. One is the recognition of the role played by the social and cultural environment in conditioning theological formulations. The other is the effort to relate basic theology to the evangelizing mission of the church. Here is no mere conceptual analysis or theorizing for its own sake. Here a thinking churchman with the perspective of a historian and the heart of a pastor seeks to make God in Christ real to his contemporaries.

As a scholarly work in theology the book derives its chief value from its thorough and careful presentation of history of doctrine. The first main section, "The Legacy from the Ancient World," traces thought on the atonement from Clement of Rome to Jonathan Edwards. Each thinker is seen not primarily as a representative of a type of theory but as a unique personality and in the light of his peculiar historical situation. Thus Irenaeus, Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and John Owen all come remarkably alive. In comprehensiveness and balance Dr. Paul's treatment of the traditional theories excels that of Aulén. But his principal contribution to historical scholarship is contained in the second section, "Disputes about the Inheritance." Beginning with the break with Calvinism in McLeod Campbell and Horace Bushnell, the author examines critically the "vicarious penitence" of R. C. Moberly, the Abelardian liberalism of Rashdall and Franks, the reassertion of the objective atonement by Dale and Denney, the linking of the atonement with incarnation in the thought of Westcott, Caird and Wilson, and the brilliant synthesis proposed by Forsyth. While Dr. Paul may be criticized for paying scant attention to the continental European theology of this period, he gives British and American thought recognition long overdue. The survey is brought up to date with summaries of Aulén, Hicks, Vincent Taylor, Emil Brunner, and Donald Baillie.

A review of the images used in the Bible and in the history of the church to describe the atonement reaches its climax in the sacraments. In baptism and the Eucharist the saving work of Christ is communicated not by words alone or by imagery drawn from battlefields and courts of law, but by divinely appointed acts occurring in the center of the church's worship. They are more than dramatic symbols and memorials. They are deeds of the living Christ, the revelation of his living presence. Both enact the whole gospel and both center in the redeeming death of Christ.

The book is timely in a twofold sense. First, it meets the need of the parish minister for the strengthening of the theological sinews of his preaching and teaching. Its value for ministers of all denominations is enhanced by the systematic understanding and fairness with which the various interpretations are treated. Instead of championing any one approach to the exclusion of others, the author seeks to assimilate whatever is of value in gaining insight into the mystery of redemption. He refers to himself

as a liberal but he does full justice to the conservative and orthodox positions. His own point of view may perhaps be described as a broad English version of *Heilsgeschichte*.

The second aspect of timeliness is the author's ecumenical concern. He speaks directly to the central issues in current theological conversation between the churches. The book was "conceived in a parish ministry and came to birth in an ecumenical ministry" (p. 7). The author, now professor of church history at Hartford Theological Seminary, was trained at Oxford, served as parish minister in England, and then became associate director of the Ecumenical Institute at Bossey. The fruitfulness of the present effort in ecumenical theology to enlarge areas of agreement by deeper penetration at the point of centrality is evident throughout but especially in the discussion of the sacraments.

A book with such a wealth of content invites disagreement at more than one specific point of interpretation. My only serious criticism of the work as a whole is that it sees the ultimate meaning of the saving work of Christ in an ethical rather than in an eschatological perspective. Thus is lost the opportunity to sound the profoundest depths of the resurrection of the crucified Lord, of the Christian's new life in him, and of the sacraments as the foretaste of the life to come. But the author is a historian, not a biblical or systematic theologian. He has performed his task so well that our generation is not likely to produce a more thorough, balanced or readable book on the great theme which he explores.

T. A. KANTONEN

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Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition: A Social Case Study of the American Baptist Convention. By PAUL M. HARRISON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. xix-248 pp. \$5.00.

This book must be hailed as one of the most significant recent contributions to the sociology of religion. Combining sound scholarship with a lucid style, Professor Harrison of Princeton University focuses on a vital issue—namely, the organizational structure of religious groups which belong to the free church tradition. Like Pope's *Millhands and Preachers* and Underwood's *Protestant and Catholic*, his work is a revised doctoral dissertation at Yale and stands in the grand tradition of Yale dissertations which have added significantly to the literature in the field.

The author's problem-context, which informs his entire case study of the organizational life of the American Baptist Convention, is the discrepancy between the Baptist doctrine of the church and its operating polity. Traditional Baptist doctrine emphasizes freedom of the individual in all matters of faith and practice and autonomy of the local church. Thus church councils and denominational officials possess no *legal* authority. Yet in modern practice the Baptists have elaborated highly complex and bureaucratic structures. These organizations exercise considerable power over the affairs of local churches.

Within the problem-context of the contradiction between doctrine and practice, Harrison employs the concepts of authority and power in a consistently sociological manner. "Power" refers to the ability to carry out one's own will despite the inertia or resistance of others—the ability to influence or control the action of others, despite the lack of institutional sanction for this control. "Authority" is formalized or institu-

tionally recognized power—the expected and legitimate possession of power, which is voluntarily accepted by the membership. The author presents a clear profile of the ways in which denominational leaders exert power but fail to possess explicit authority. Those who wield power will seek authority and find ways of legitimizing their power. Given the many responsibilities thrust upon denominational executives and given their lack of legitimate authority, these officials seek more power, which in turn facilitates their quest for authority.

In working through this conceptual framework of authority and power for various levels of leadership, Harrison draws wisely and widely upon the literature on organizational analysis and particularly on studies of bureaucracy. But his probing account is not a simple application of the analytical tools suggested by scholars like Weber, Michels, Merton, Parsons, Selznick, and Mannheim. In many instances the author extends the research findings of previous students and adds new categories of analysis.

Any criticism the reviewer might offer of such an excellent study must appear like quibbling over small points and questions of emphases. Such a question of emphasis is the relative lack of attention given to the positive contributions (as over against the discrepancies and dysfunctions) of changing organizational forms for the better realization of purposes in the modern world of complexity and large-scale organizations. Behind this minor criticism of emphasis lurks the charge that functional analysis always runs the risk of ideological conservatism. It is not clear that the author entirely avoids this taint. But these are methodological issues which fail to detract from the book's merit and quality.

Lest those who are members of non-free-church-type denominations should assume a smug attitude, let me hasten to add that there is enough in the analysis and findings of this book to provide a shoe which would pinch when worn on any denominational foot. Indeed, this book should be required reading for "pastoral directors" in local parishes and church administrators in all branches of ecclesiastical service.

ROBERT LEE

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The Social Sources of Church Unity. By ROBERT LEE. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 238 pp. \$4.50.

Dr. Robert Lee makes his point that broadly conceived social unity is conducive to church unity. This empirical generalization corresponds to one held by many sociologists of religion, including J. Milton Yinger, that the value patterns of religious institutions tend to be like the value patterns of society. From this generalization we are not to infer that religious institutions simply reflect society. They are in a position to have initiating influence as well, although the churches often tend to follow the social drift and in this respect are dependent variables. They can achieve a degree of autonomy and become independent variables.

Church unity is a many-factored thing, according to Lee. This is what we would expect in an institution which touches the lives of people from the cradle to the grave and which is lockstitched into their individual destinies as well as into their various social groupings. In emphasizing the social sources of church unity, such considerations should not be considered in pejorative terms. Indeed, Lee's book presents the converse image of church life to that presented thirty years ago in

H. Richard Niebuhr's well-known *Social Sources of Denominationalism*. These two books may now profitably be read as one whole, although there remains to be studied the way in which particular denominations have been led to participate in co-operative Christianity by the social forces of American civilization. Moreover, the book invites some scholar to attempt an analogous study on the social sources of the unity attempted in the World Council of Churches.

Many clergymen are impressed by the distinctiveness of the churches which they serve as compared with other denominations. For years laymen have been more greatly impressed by the similarities among the denominations. Lee makes an excellent analysis of how the various forms of Protestantism are alike. He points to the various denominational mergers that have taken place. He describes how everywhere local and state councils of churches have come into existence and how the common problems, programs, and procedures of these churches have developed. He describes community-centered churches under various denominational labels. He lifts up the comity process for attention and emphasizes the general willingness of denominations and local churches to co-operate on many matters. Out of these and other factors there emerges what is called common-core Protestantism. His study here is reinforced by some of the preparatory analyses which were made of theological conceptions and church practices in preparation for the Faith and Order Conference in Oberlin in 1957.

When Lee turns to analyzing factors which are involved in these social sources he is impressed by the functional value of efficiency, self-determination, and the trends toward organizational centralization. Hardly less impressive are the components making up the common core of American cultural goals. He properly speaks of the homogenization of American values and relates these to the phenomena of mobility and the population expansion in suburbia. Moreover, he points out how under certain circumstances common allegiances come to the foreground while many of the social disparities (for example, national language groups) recede into the background. Such disparities were important sources of denominational division in an earlier period. Then, too, there are such factors as the symbolic status function of ecumenicity and the general challenge of the social order to the churches to stand together. In the present writer's opinion, Lee could do much more with this latter point. Although many of the clergy and laity simply drift with the co-operative trends of American social unity, some denominational leaders have continually been motivated by the earlier conviction that the world is too strong for a divided church.

Dr. Lee's book opens up a number of issues that invite further exploration. For example, more needs to be done on the complacency involved in the co-operative level of ecumenicity. This may be in fact a barrier to adequate church unity. It is quite clear from the preparatory studies for the Oberlin Conference that American denominations will not manifest their full unity in Christ by a process of social drift. If anything, this book properly analyzed supports the thesis that the United States needs more deliberate evangelical and courageous efforts for church unity built on an adequate religious and theological basis.

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Evolution and Culture. Edited by MARSHALL P. SAHLINS and ELMAN R. SERVICE.
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960. xii-131 pp. \$3.75.

Evolution and Culture presents, newly correlated, six already variously recognized concepts. The authors, all younger scholars associated with the University of

Michigan and all former or present students of Leslie A. White, identify these concepts in four terms: *general evolution*, *specific evolution*, *adaptation*, *stability*; and in two laws: the *law of cultural dominance* and the *law of evolutionary potential*.

That studies of specific evolution and studies of general evolution are neither mutually exclusive nor incompatible is the preoccupying point, more chivvied among anthropologists than by most general readers, which absorbs the four authors in their corporately composed Introduction; and reiterations and redefinitions toward reinforcement of this premise are presented in the first essay by Marshall P. Sahlins. Whoever is familiar with the intellectual snobisms and school-of-thought pecking orders not only endemic in universities but since before the heyday of the Chinese School of Names and prior to the Ionian sages, tolerates, with sympathetic amusement, these rather laborious first fifty pages—in which the authors, conspicuously alert to the resistances in every scholars' association to new ventures within familiar ideas, demonstrate their acquaintance with all competing schools of thought favoring and disfavoring one or another rigidly defined view of evolution. Readers impatient to discover what further insights these are to be, which must be so warily defended, may prefer to take up this text about midpoint, where, beyond Sahlins' careful *apologia*, the approach specific to the new thesis becomes explicit.

This specific exposition begins with Thomas G. Harding's appraisal of *adaptability* versus *stability* as aspects of the evolutionary process. Having presented sample sets of phenomena, biological and cultural, which show a favorable adaptation to a point called *stability*, Harding then points out that stability of itself is not, merely as stability, either favorable or unfavorable. A specific evolutionary process to stabilized form in insects or birds, as he observes, neither cancels nor devalues a general evolutionary process, within which less stabilized structures, becoming neither insects or birds, may continue to develop more comprehensive adaptations. Though both specific and general evolution are observable processes, the fact that both these phases of evolution exist does not mean that general evolution is a simple straight-line sequence of all specific evolutions.

David Kaplan, in his immediately following essay on *cultural dominance*, summarizes technological and ideological innovations which both extend human mastery of energy resources and tend to subordinate or exterminate more limited and more rigid culture structures. Adducing sample evidence that the innovations and expansions may occur first in either technology or ideology, he advances to his major point: that, whatever the varying percentages of acceptance or resistance characterizing the specific cultural alterations within specific groups, the general tendency of human evolution is still toward reduction of limited and marginal cultures. All other specific cultures, in sum, tend on contact to assimilate toward whatever culture achieves widest and firmest control of accessible energy resources; this is Kaplan's *law of cultural dominance*.

Elman P. Service now presents the synthesizing insight toward which the preceding essays have been preparation. With apt illustrations Service indicates that, like biological evolution, cultural evolution is a continuing process which, nevertheless, is not a straight-line sequence of all specific evolutions. Drawing his examples from neolithic, classical, medieval, and contemporary cultural events, Service now reinforces his culminating point: that cultural advance or cultural maturing is, within his terms, not continuous but discontinuous. Within his terms, this view indicates that, at the point of equilibrium or near-stability, or *dominance*, for one culture (as in classical Greece or in T'ang China) the next leap in cultural development is less likely to

occur within the currently stabilized and dominant group but, as *evolutionary potential*, will probably realize itself in some contiguous but comparatively "backward" or less rigidly cultivated group. This "culturally younger" group does borrow freely from the culture of the stabilized group; but, as Service emphasizes, this need to borrow also means that the "younger" group is not yet inhibited or relaxed through already invested particular technologies or already habituated thought patterns. As of the phrase which Service explicitly deploys, the last shall be first.

In support of their newly aligned concepts of the evolutionary process none of these essayists extend their examples beyond technological and political phenomena. The usefulness of their synthesis in appraising other energy-using and energy-accelerating areas—as, for example, in the arts and in religions—is manifestly discoverable.

All four writers carefully emphasize that many specific studies by cultural anthropologists, archeologists, and historians can, reviewed within their newly correlated identifications of the evolutionary process, yield both supporting evidence and possibilities for further discovery. And as Service aptly stresses, much misdirected speculation can henceforth be redirected or canceled with regard to such observed facts as that, in Middle America, major cultural sites are "discontinuous." Once "discontinuity"—as shift of initiative from a nearly stable culture to a new people and new area—is accepted as the norm in cultural evolution, a number of rationalizations and false clues can be quickly eliminated, not only in the attempts to discover and comprehend past cultures but also—and this is Service's evident earnest concern—in calculating probabilities on dominance and attempts to achieve dominance in contemporary technology and politics.

Such catalytic possibilities again appear to be functional in many more areas than Service himself adduces. Except for what may be implicit (but may also be simply a cultural accident) in Service's use of the phrase "the last shall be first," neither he nor his colleagues mention the history or currency of religions as integral to cultural phenomena. But some of the readers of *Evolution and Culture* may find, in Service's own climaxing statements, more extended historical and contemporary pertinence than Service himself specifies. He not only concludes that human beings still have, within the evolutionary potential, a margin of possibility for survival, a world "still . . . intact," but that the means to this end is specifically (p. 121) that "if we *share* [Service's italics] in the interests of the whole human race, we win."

JEREMY INGALLS

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God, Man, and Satan: Patterns of Christian Thought and Life in "Paradise Lost," "Pilgrim's Progress," and the Great Theologians. By ROLAND MUSHAT FRYE. Princeton University Press, 1960. x-184 pp. \$3.75.

If one were to correlate the novels of Henry James and the plays of Eugene O'Neill with men and movements in American philosophy, one might easily become either tediously verbose or dangerously selective. And when one seeks to correlate patterns of Christian Thought in Milton with patterns of Christian Life in Bunyan, and both with those of the Great Theologians, the problem is of much greater complexity and peril. I am happy therefore to report that Dr. Frye's study of Satan, Man, and God in *Paradise Lost*, *Pilgrim's Progress*, and Protestant orthodoxy from Polanus to Tillich, is both pertinent and enjoyable. Dr. Frye was fortunate in being

initiated into the field by Professor Maurice Kelley, whose comparison of Milton's *Paradise Lost* and *Christian Doctrine* made history some twenty years ago; he has also made good use of the Thomson-Heppe *Reformed Dogmatics Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources*, now in circulation for a decade—though one might wish that he had also considered the very relevant contributions of Miss Beryl Smalley and Mr. C. S. Lewis.

On the symbolic in Milton and in Christianity, especially in his treatment of Man and of Satan, Dr. Frye makes a real contribution to literary and theological criticism. He shows the nature of Adam as the federal symbol of the human race, and of Anti-Christ as the sphere of atrocity and horror. If, however, Satanic sin is to be understood as a "malignant force which destroys man's life," might it not follow that God is a beneficent power creating and preserving life rather than necessarily "the creator and preserver of all life"?

This may be an ambiguity in contemporary thought rather than in Milton, but there are difficulties in Milton which Dr. Frye has not as yet explored. "John Milton and John Bunyan fully understood the important place of accommodation in the Christian faith . . . 'Both in the literal and figurative descriptions,' divine truth is exhibited not as it really is, but as men can best comprehend it. . . . The key to this conception may be found in the words of the sixteenth-century reformer, Amandus Polanus. The true or genuine, he said, 'is not opposed to the figurative but to the false' " (pp. 14-15). Unfortunately the all-important phrase "both in the literal and figurative descriptions" exists not in Milton but in Sumner's inaccurate translation of Milton's Latin, where description and adumbration become literal and figurative description, and where the emphasis is unwarrantably shifted from the literal to the figurative. Milton goes on to be quite explicit. Adam begot a son in his own likeness, after his image; God created man in his own image, after his likeness; so God has in more eminent degree the outward form and members of man.

My point is not that Milton is necessarily a heterodox thinker; rather that, as a poet more than a thinker, he is concerned to preserve the paradox in orthodoxy. But we cannot easily equate his idea of accommodation with Bunyan's notion of metaphor, and still less integrate him with the smoothed-out systems of a Calvin or a Polanus.

If there are unresolved problems in Milton's thought, there is also an awkward situation in regard to Bunyan's art. "Leave the allegory alone, it won't bite you," Sir Herbert Grierson used to say of Spenser; but the maxim is difficult to apply to Bunyan. "I have a key in my bosom, called Promise, that will, I am persuaded, open any lock in Doubting-Castle," the abode of Giant Despair; but who can give us the key to this rather preposterous key? I imagine it must have seemed an oddly placed item even in its own day; and accustomed as we now are to general ideas (such as despair, doubt, and promise), the giants and castles and gate-keys rather get in the road. Dr. Frye's expertise in dogmatic themes does what can be done to rehabilitate Bunyan's allegory; but I still find *Grace Abounding* both more religiously moving and better writing.

To approach *Paradise Lost* and *Pilgrim's Progress* together in Dr. Frye's fashion does, however, enable us to see each of these works more clearly—the symbolism of Milton, the allegorism of Bunyan—and to understand the literary element in seventeenth-century Protestantism. And especially in the area of the demonic, the

primary purpose of the book is achieved: "to develop an understanding meaningful to twentieth-century man."

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Paul Elmer More. By ARTHUR HAZARD DAKIN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. xvii-416 pp. \$7.50.

We have here the long-awaited biography of the distinguished man of letters, Platonist, and Christian thinker who to so many of us was a master and teacher, whether at first or second hand, and whose influence was so great during the twenties and thirties in theological circles. For many years editor of the old *Nation* and author of the famous *Shelbourne Essays*; often called the American St. Beuve because of his long series of critical writings on things literary; lecturer in philosophy at Princeton University; author of *The Greek Tradition*, in which the claim was made, and proved, that Christian faith in Christ as incarnate Word crowned the whole development of Greek thought from Socrates to Chalcedon; victim of violent, and unfair, attack from H. L. Mencken and Edmund Wilson, neither of whom really understood him—yes, all these; and also *clarum et venerabile nomen* for those of us who were taught by him; a beloved friend and guide; a severe but always constructive critic of our thought and writing; and, above all, in his later days a man of deep faith and profound (if unusual) devotion: yet Paul Elmer More is now almost forgotten. Therefore it is good that Dr. Dakin, himself a student and friend of More's at Princeton, has written this complete and exciting biography which will do much to bring More once again before the literary and theological world.

The fine thing about this book is that it includes so much from the hitherto unpublished correspondence of its subject; indeed some readers may think that there is too much quotation of this kind. But it is precisely because we can enter into the real life and thought of More through his correspondence, even more than through his published works, that this book has its unique value. For nothing very much *happened* in More's life, externally speaking; it was on the whole uneventful. What was significant was his long development from a severe Calvinism, which he rejected, through a period of skepticism and then humanism, to a Christian faith which had a certain balance and proportion.

Of course there is much in this final position which can be called in question. More's "orthodoxy," at the end, was an odd combination: he took a very rigid view of the Incarnation (there is some account here of his violent disagreement with G. R. Elliott and others, of whom this reviewer was one, on how the person of Christ as incarnate Lord is to be related to other instances of divine self-revelation), but he regarded the "personality" of the Holy Spirit as an impossible belief; he accepted the Eucharist as the central act of Christian worship, but until his last illness he never received the Holy Communion, nor was he confirmed in the Episcopal Church which he attended and supported; he rejected much of the extreme biblical criticism of the time, yet would not accept as historical the narratives of our Lord's nativity nor of his resurrection—and so it goes. But the thing which stands out in this biography is the honesty of the man, the integrity of his thought, his deep humility before the facts as he understood them, and his conviction that only Christian faith could satisfactorily give a basis for the moral emphasis which all his life long he had felt central to the human enterprise.

One hopes that many will buy and read this fine book. It will introduce them to a great man; it will also force them to think through their own position, theologically, and it will show how a man of letters—perhaps one of the greatest this country has produced—was in the end led to the simplicity of Christian faith. And it will also do much to restore to his rightful place in the intellectual history of our times this distinguished, discerning, often wrong but always honest, critic and writer.

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The Lure for Feeling. By MARY A. WYMAN. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. 192 pp. \$4.75.

Recent publications by Leclerc and Christian suggest that philosophic interest in Whitehead's metaphysics is reviving. But if Whitehead is to gain the influence which he deserves, his philosophy must be placed into juxtaposition with the ongoing work of mathematicians, scientists, and humanists. The first extended effort to place Whitehead's thought in the humanistic tradition is *The Lure for Feeling*.

The Lure for Feeling is a collection of closely related essays designed to show how Whitehead takes themes found in Wordsworth, Goethe, Emerson, Whitman, Burroughs and many Chinese poets, and gives to these themes depth, coherence and comprehensive validity. Miss Wyman focuses on the poets' apprehension of the mode of presence of the divine in the world and on Whitehead's more systematic treatment. She finds that in both cases man is seen as interfused with nature, and God is understood as the "lure for feeling" which accounts for both the order and the freedom of the creative advance into novelty. She documents her general theses with a painstaking assemblage of particular poetic passages in which she points out the basic vision of God and the world which she shows to have been shared by Whitehead.

Miss Wyman establishes that Whitehead's vision of reality stands in a tradition which had previously received its clearest expression among poets. She sees this primarily as the result of an independent encounter with nature, but she notes also Whitehead's personal appreciation of Wordsworth and Whitman.

The Lure for Feeling is intended not only to heighten appreciation of Whitehead among humanists but also to increase understanding of his thought. To further this end of understanding, Miss Wyman includes both an expository chapter and a glossary of Whitehead's terms. Both are responsible statements reflecting careful study of the primary materials and deserve high commendation. However, it is doubtful that readers previously unfamiliar with Whitehead will gain the needed understanding through study of this book. Miss Wyman generally stays painfully close to the language of the original, which provides in abstraction from its context ever greater obstacles to ready understanding. Where she does employ her own examples and terminology she betrays some lack of precision. She seems, for example, not fully to appreciate the temporal atomicity of Whitehead's occasions and to regard objective immortality as a special achievement associated with peculiar perfection of feeling rather than as the universal condition of past occasions.

Nevertheless, both the project and its execution are to be warmly commended. Miss Wyman has shown a remarkable combination of erudition, philosophical clarity,

and imagination. Students of literature, of philosophy, and of religion will profit from reading her book.

JOHN B. COBB, JR.

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Dimensions of Faith. Edited by WILLIAM KIMMEL and GEOFFREY CLIVE, foreword by James Luther Adams. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960. 507 pp. \$6.95.

This is not just another symposium. It is a genuine study volume, and the reviewer makes bold to say that it should be read (and studied) in the light of that fact. This is not said with any thought of agreeing with points of view expressed in the book. It is still a study book, important for opponents as well as for others.

The general theme is stated on the wrapper: Contemporary Prophetic Protestant Theology. Contributions from eleven authors have been selected for the twelve entries, distributed through four grand divisions, three entries for each. There are two contributions from Tillich, hence only eleven authors.

Here is the reviewer's bold suggestion as to how to read the book. First, read the Preface (some readers skip prefaces to books; it would be a mistake to skip this one); then the general introduction (pages 19-32), which is unusually good; then the introductions to the four divisions (pages 34, 196, 304, 432), which are brief, but unusually good; then read the introductions to the authors from whose works selections are made (these, of course, immediately precede quotes from the authors); and finally, the selections themselves, it doesn't matter much in what order. This plan will give about as good a survey of the themes as one can find in brief compass anywhere.

Of course there is a certain inadequacy in any symposium, but in so far as such works are supposed to be guides as well as attempts to give comprehensive summaries, this one does its work unusually well. Even if one wants to "lambaste" some of the contributors to this symposium, he could do his work better if he acquired a clearer view of the whole field (of prophetic Protestant theology).

No doubt readers of this Journal are in many instances already pretty well acquainted with the writings of many of the contributors to this book. But even they can freshen up their view of the field by following the so-called reading plan suggested!

This volume represents the revival of interest in religion today, as contrasted with a century ago and more (as for example, those "cultured despisers" whom Schleiermacher addressed at the turn of the nineteenth century). It represents what the editors call a creative development in Protestant theological thinking, with special emphasis on the renewed appreciation of the sense of vocation in prophetic religion. It represents a differentiation of the religious dimensions of experience from others, which is a break with previous tendencies to regard the former as just one among all the others.

The first of the grand divisions deals with the function of the prophet, with an attempt at a clearer articulation of the nature and function of the prophetic vocation, and with an attempt to seek spiritual renewal beyond philosophical speculation and specious presuppositions and foundations. Authors quoted from are Kierkegaard, Barth, and Bultmann.

The second introduces the theme of the mystery of creativity, as illustrated by

the theme of the Trinity, and tries to overcome the "reductionism" that had reduced the doctrine of God the Father to a philosophical concept, God the Son to simply another ethical teacher, and God the Holy Spirit to a principle of evolutionary development in the natural moral growth of man. Authors are Otto, Dostoevsky, and Berdyaev.

The third centers attention on attitudes toward history and cultural life and forms, pointing out the argument that life is neither swallowed up in time nor wholly circumscribed by culture. It is argued that man can stand beyond time, history, and culture, and yet be subject to them within limits. Theological themes involved are the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection. Authors are Cullmann, H. R. Niebuhr, and Kroner.

The final division introduces the question of what it means to be a Christian in the modern world. Also attention is called to the modern awareness of and aliveness to such persistent human conditions and concerns as anxiety, guilt, courage, responsibility, justice, love. This section represents the attempt to articulate the moral situation of man in the light of the biblical proclamation. Authors are R. Niebuhr and Tillich.

There are biographical notes and a brief bibliography. No index.

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Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist. By MALCOLM L. DIAMOND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. ix-240 pp. \$4.50.

Malcolm Diamond's *Martin Buber*, written with enviable fervor and the passion of discipleship, is nevertheless a disappointing work. In his Preface, Dr. Diamond indicates his desire that this study "reflect something of the wonder I felt at the man." Indeed the wonder is transmitted, but transmitted in such a fashion as to obliterate the essential distinction which writing must preserve—even when it is an exercise in wonder; namely, the distinction between the wonderer, the wonder itself, and the object of wonder.

Obviously Dr. Diamond would object to such a distinction, demanding as it does a degree of objectivity which would of necessity transform the man from a living subject into an object of reflection. This is, however, one of the unavoidable limitations of all writing, that it can never wholly succeed in obliterating the difference between the subject and the object. Dr. Diamond has undertaken to achieve such an obliteration, making use of an antiphonic dialogue between excerpts from Buber's writings and comment and the exegesis of them. The result is a warm, perfervid, and often illuminating excursion into the underworld of modern feeling and despair, but it is not a presentation of Martin Buber as a "Jewish existentialist." This subtitle, a contrivance of the publisher's no doubt, was both unnecessary and not supported by the argument of the book.

What one misses in books like *Martin Buber* is an example of creative discipleship, rather than the passive response of the warm and admiring student to the beloved master. Discipleship perishes unflinchingly when the master succeeds in doing little more than generating passion in the disciple. Passion is, as the ancients tell us, a defect of the active intellect. One would wish, therefore, that in any future writing of Dr. Diamond on Martin Buber, he would move from the expositor to the illuminated creator. This is not to say that one asks him to turn against his master; it is rather to ask that he become more than an appropriator of the life and work of Buber, and

become rather a "new beginning." This is, after all, the work to which Martin Buber commends us—the task of a "new beginning" rather than the recitation of the virtues of what has been done.

ARTHUR A. COHEN

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Quakers and the Atlantic Culture. By FREDERICK B. TOLLES. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. xvi-160 pp. \$3.95.

The Restoration Principle. By ALFRED T. DEGROOT. St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1960. 191 pp. \$4.00.

An Errand of Mercy: The Evangelical United Front, 1790-1837. By CHARLES I. FOSTER. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960. xii-320 pp. \$6.50.

The impact of the ecumenical movement on the study of church history is clearly reflected in these three books. Two of these works deal with particular denominational heritages, both of them written with an awareness of the general theological and historical contexts in which the traditions stand and with some sensitivity to the contemporary ecumenical situation. The third book deals directly with the efforts of English and American evangelical Christians in the early nineteenth century to work together across denominational lines. So though these three books are concerned with differing strands of church history, they do bear a relationship with each other, for the strands are today converging in ecumenical encounter.

Quakers and the Atlantic Culture is a collection of seven of Frederick B. Tolles' insightful and well-written essays on the Society of Friends in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Tolles is one who believes that the Quakers stemmed largely from English Puritanism and not from continental mysticism, that they emphasized the corporate rather than the individualistic character of religious experience, and that their religion was rather more enthusiastic, or prophetic, than mystical. These theses are woven into the fabric of the essays with telling effect. One of the most timely of the essays—especially relevant to ecumenical discussion today—deals with "Quakers and Politics."

Alfred T. DeGroot's work is an appeal to the Christian Churches (Disciples of Christ) to understand and act upon "the restoration principle." The book sweeps over a wider time span than the others, beginning with a discussion of the restoration principle in the history of religions, and moving through a selective search for that principle in Christian history. Except perhaps for the chapter which deals with the Disciples (and finds that the Churches of Christ, which separated from them in the early twentieth century, no longer represent a genuine unity movement), the historical survey is so compact as to leave room for misunderstandings. For example, the treatment of Martin Luther deals with but one aspect of the reformer's many-sided life, and that a negative one. The final chapter gets to the major purpose of the volume, which is "to discover what should be restored from the treasures of the Founder and his original institution in religious living today" (p. 169). It would seem to the present reviewer that there is need for more serious dealing with contemporary ecclesiological and Christological issues than this book envisions.

An Errand of Mercy by Charles I. Foster deals in detail with the very important voluntary benevolence society movement of Anglo-American Protestantism from

1790 to 1837. Written largely from the primary sources, the book provides fascinating information on such things as the "model" British and Foreign Bible Society and the interrelated annual meetings (the "anniversaries") of the evangelical societies in their heyday. It does not sufficiently relate the American "united front" to the revivalism of the period, and its view that the front abruptly terminated in 1837 does not take proper account of the continuing life of most of the societies into the next period. It makes an important contribution to a fuller understanding of an important phase of ecumenical history.

The value of all three works has been increased by good indexes; Foster's has a fine bibliography. Tolles' book, in many ways the best written, suffers somewhat because the footnotes were placed in the back. Together, these works illustrate how ecumenical encounter is forcing all Christians to look at their own histories (and at each other's histories) in a fresh way. My own awareness of the value of understanding the particular successes and failures of other heritages and movements than our own was greatly heightened by reading these three books concurrently.

ROBERT T. HANDY

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A Century of Protestant Christianity in Japan. By CHARLES W. IGLEHART. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1959. 384 pp. \$3.00.

The summer's political developments in Japan are almost certain to affect the progress of Christianity there. The state of American-Japanese relations has conditioned the Japanese response to the gospel for a century. During the period 1880-90 and again while General MacArthur was *Shogun*, the churches were filled. The first wave of advance was related to the Japanese attempt to qualify as a full member of the family of nations, and thereby to obtain a revision of the unequal treaties. The failure of these efforts caused a Christian recession. The abortion of Eisenhower's visit may be the *coup de grace* of the postwar popularity of Christianity, which already had lost some of its impetus even before the Kishi government had decided to approve the new military agreement with the United States. The Japanese have been sensitive to Western political climate since the coming of Protestant missionaries in 1859.

Dr. Iglehart has treated these advances and recessions, as well as the complex of other events and developments during the first 100 years of Protestantism in the island nation. During the last half of this period Dr. Iglehart has been involved personally in the process as professor at Aoyama College in Tokyo, Education Secretary for the National Christian Council of Japan, Editor of the *Japan Christian Yearbook*, and advisor to the Allied Occupation on educational and religious matters in Japan. His *Cross and Crisis* was the mission study book in the U. S. A. for 1957-58. The Emperor of Japan awarded him an imperial Decoration in 1953. He currently is a guest professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo.

The current volume, prepared in connection with the 100th anniversary of Protestant beginnings in Japan, was long overdue. Fifty years earlier, Dr. Otis Cary had annotated the first half-century of Protestant missions, a companion volume to his history of the half-century of Roman Catholic missions that ended so disastrously in 1600 when the nation had closed its doors to the West. No comparable work of similar scholarship and comprehension has been written in English during the interval.

Dr. Iglehart's study treats the material both from the perspective of missionary

endeavor and also in terms of the church's establishment and development. He has delineated the political and social background which conditioned the Christian effort during each of the several periods. Especially valuable is his account of the church's condition at the time of the Japanese surrender, and the postwar reconstruction. He rightfully has devoted almost as many pages to this period as to the entire first half-century. The war years have not received comparable attention; we must await an annotation of this period after wartime records have been examined. Dr. Iglehart refers, but only incidentally, to the activities of the Japanese Christian churches in relation to Christianity in the areas of Asia occupied by their armies. This material, too, needs to be collected and interpreted as an aspect of the church histories of each of these lands. Dr. Iglehart's perspective is much more sympathetic toward the Japanese than Richard Baker's study of the church in wartime Japan, *Darkness of the Sun*.

While Protestant missions began relatively late in Japan, the early emergence of an autonomous church in the island empire demonstrates certain general principles concerning the way in which mission must be integrated with church. Because Dr. Iglehart has set these forth so clearly, the book should be studied not alone by Westerners interested in Japan, but by all churchmen who are concerned with the church taking root in any national culture.

WINBURN T. THOMAS

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A Seminary Survey. By YORKE ALLEN, JR. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. xxvi-640 pp. \$10.00.

It is impossible in a brief notice to appraise this book or even to list the important contributions it makes to a critical understanding of the present-day mission of the Christian Church. Primarily it is a study of theological education throughout the world. Though concerned mainly with the Protestant world mission, there are three chapters on Roman Catholic and one on Eastern Orthodox theological education. Though carried on with the warm support of the mission boards and the International Missionary Council, this represents an independent survey carried out by a member of the staff of Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. It is the only comprehensive study of the kind. Brief descriptions of schools for theological training in all parts of the world give primary facts. But there are analyses, interpretations, maps, and discussions of the significance and value of the schools themselves and of their place in the total missionary enterprise. This means that light is thrown upon many aspects of the work of Protestant missions in the present world. The book is a sort of compendium or ordered knowledge about the world mission with special attention, of course, to the agencies and methods of theological education.

It is no surprise to those acquainted with the world mission to learn that theological education in all countries is weak, inadequate, lacking in both personnel and in financial support. But it is shocking to learn that only two per cent of the budget of the mission boards is devoted to this purpose. The factual, statistical revelations of this survey may well be a major factor in the reorientation of missionary policy. Thirty years ago two points of view prevailed regarding what is central in missions; (1) the evangelical, which put first the preaching of the gospel as a direct appeal for conversions; (2) the "service" ideal, which held first the meeting of human needs as true Christian

witness and as the most effective method of extending the Christian faith. Now, it seems, a much neglected but most important means of creating and sustaining the indigenous Christian Church is due for recognition, namely, the preparing of a strong leadership through greatly increased emphasis on theological education. It is a good omen!

HUGH VERNON WHITE

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The Religion of the Bible. By S. VERNON McCASLAND. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1960. vi-346 pp. \$5.95.

Professor McCasland draws well on his acquaintance with the needs of the university student in his book-by-book treatment of the Old Testament, Apocrypha, and New Testament. He concentrates on the meaning of the Scriptures, and his book will be valuable either as a text or as a supplement for the texts which make a different contribution in college courses. The general reader and those enrolled in the increasingly popular Bible courses for the lay adult will find the book germane and enlightening. It accomplishes in one volume for American readers some of the purposes of Archibald M. Hunter's similar publications in Britain.

The young or older reader is gracefully shown that the traditional views of the authorship of the Pentateuch, the Psalms, and Proverbs are in nowise tenable but that they nonetheless have a connection with the facts and help communicate the genuine flavor of these writings. He makes clear that Saul is more than a villain, calls David's character paradoxical and understandable in the light of his time, insists that ruthlessness is at least as strong in Solomon as is any other trait. It might be questioned whether the Hebrew prophets and their teachings are here given sufficient space and emphasis in a work which treats, remarkably well on the whole, the Bible as a religious document. Every part is important in an introduction. But surely in a study with such a purpose, each part is not equally important nor meaningful.

Dr. McCasland skillfully explains that in both the Synoptic Gospels and the Fourth, Jesus is to be understood intuitively, that these very different sources are separated by method rather than by intention. In Paul's letters, he follows the order of Dr. Goodspeed but sometimes prefers different dates, as for the Corinthian correspondence. With little commotion about conflicting arguments, the author chooses—as perhaps the good interpreter must—the conclusion which seems to him most likely and makes his case accordingly. With C. H. Dodd he holds that the letter to the Ephesians is most probably from Paul's own hand; he does not doubt that it was intended for Ephesus. He believes that the Galatians were the citizens of Pisidian Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe. He declares that the prison letters were written from Rome rather than from Caesarea or Ephesus. "In fact there is no evidence anywhere," he writes, "of a lengthy imprisonment of Paul at Ephesus."

This reviewer could wish that Dr. McCasland did not dismiss summarily the letter to Philemon without even a sympathetic nod at the attractive theory of scholar John Knox that Onesimus had a unique place in Paul's last ministry and in the subsequent collection and publication of the letters. Dr. McCasland dates the writing of the Revelation during the reign of Trajan, spoiling a favorite gambit of this teacher that the conditions in Domitian's reign explain the bitter tone of the Apocalypse, contrasting with the more conciliatory I Peter brought forth by the more humane stance

of Trajan. If Trajan were the kind of enemy that Pliny's letters show him to be, why should a contemporary Christian leader give advice so extreme as that found in Revelation?

Readers who are also teachers will inevitably find that this excellent survey, like any other, parts ways here and there with their own insights and understanding. But all such readers have reason to be grateful that a colleague has treated thus authoritatively and readably the message of the Bible. The bibliography and questions with each chapter will assist the student who uses the work as a text or as collateral reading.

MAXINE GARNER

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Rebellious Prophet: A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev. By DONALD A. LOWRIE.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. x-310 pp. \$6.00.

Librarians in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev had indeed heard of Nicolai A. Berdyaev—but they were puzzled that anyone would want to write a book about him. Come to Russia for research on just such a project, Donald A. Lowrie made a disappointing discovery: Leningrad's library (twelve million volumes) had only three cards on Berdyaev. Moscow's Lenin Library had none of Berdyaev's later works written in France; his pre-revolution books were there but kept under police guard (p. 262). "Inside the Soviet Union," Lowrie concludes, "no one reads Berdyaev."

Berdyaev's thought as a religious philosopher remained "essentially Russian," Lowrie declares, despite exile to the West for criticisms of the revolution. Man, personality, freedom, creativeness, reality of spirit—these were his basic themes. Berdyaev thought of freedom not as some abstract idea or as a mere human right, but rather as something real and concrete which man could lay hold of by taking responsibility. (pp. 237, 247, 286.)

At heart, both in his early adoption of Marxist ideas and in his later adherence to the Orthodox Church, Berdyaev was seeking to express an old Russian religious motif, the theme that salvation is created in the midst of the earth. Both the Marxist approach to this goal (criticized by Berdyaev for lack of spirituality) and the Church's approach (criticized for its reliance on the hierarchical system) contained something of the truth. Berdyaev insisted, "The salvation of Russia will come through the Christianization of the new layers of society—by the spiritual rebirth of the workers and peasants."

Dreamy, pampered, self-willed as a boy, Nicolai Alexandrovitch was dismayed at the sight of any brother and sister who looked alike. Such resemblances "seemed to him a contradiction of the dignity of the individual." Fearful of drafts, he went through life with a woolen scarf on his neck, even in summer. His fear of illness was contradicted by surprising bravery before a mob. An argumentative nature and a distressing facial tic plagued him all his days—yet he could make a charming public appearance. (pp. 17-29.)

Exiled in 1898 by the Czarists to Northern Russia, Berdyaev had time to think and talk, and soon discovered he was "wasting time" with orthodox Marxism. (The Bolsheviks, he was later to declare, were crushing freedom, and "the idea of mankind crowded out the idea of man.") Gradually, he turned to the Orthodox faith. By 1907 he declared, "You cannot come to God, you can only proceed from Him." Still

rebellious against ecclesiastical bureaucracy, Berdyaev could now nevertheless call himself a believing Christian. (pp. 65, 115-17.)

He wrote some of his best books after his second exile—this time by the new masters of Russia. Living in France with his wife and her sister and on a small budget, Berdyaev went to the cinema once a week—where he was often “so occupied with his own thoughts that he would lose the thread of the story.” On one of these trips he conceived the idea for a book. *Freedom and the Spirit, The Destiny of Man, Slavery and Freedom*—these were some of the truly important philosophical, ethical, religious writings which were now to come from his pen.

The author misses the mark here and there—as when he finds within the Reformation, of all places, an “emphasis on reason” which Berdyaev would not have liked (p. 216). The book does not provide a systematic entry to Berdyaev’s thought. It is often halting in pace. But the failure of Soviet librarians to be helpful has not kept Mr. Lowrie from turning out a formidable account of Berdyaev and the headlong development of his philosophy.

JAMES E. SELLERS

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An Apostle of Freedom: Life and Teachings of Nicolas Berdyaev. By MICHEL ALEXANDER VALLON. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. 370 pp. \$6.00.

It is one thing to have a number of Berdyaev’s books to read and quite another thing to see his work as a whole in perspective. Ten years have passed since the appearance of O. Fielding Clarke’s *Introduction to Berdyaev* and Matthew Spinka’s *Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom*; and during these years a steadily increasing interest in “Christian existentialism” has made a clear understanding of such a representative existentialist as Berdyaev more urgently desirable than ever. Thus M. Vallon can count on an expectant audience for his new and more detailed presentation of Berdyaev’s life and teachings.

In a brief “Argument” he describes the purpose of his work as threefold: first, to supply an outline biography of Berdyaev; secondly, to present a systematic account of Berdyaev’s teaching; and thirdly, to compare his ideas with those of other modern thinkers on questions of common concern. Part I (pp. 41-146) contains the survey of Berdyaev’s life, interwoven with a discussion of his teaching in process of formation, while Part II (pp. 149-313) is devoted to a systematic and comparative study of his thought. Notes and a full bibliography (including a list of Berdyaev’s numerous articles in Russian) are appended.

The narrative of Berdyaev’s own life is introduced by an informative survey of “The Russian Background” (pp. 1-37), in which Vallon sketches the history of the Russian nation and comments on modern Russian thought, with particular emphasis on Berdyaev’s precursors, Khomyakov, Dostoevsky, and Solovyov. Serious students of Russian intellectual history will find this introduction too sketchy to be useful, but many readers will be helped to place Berdyaev more exactly in the development of Russian Christian thought—though some pages of observations on the Russian soil and soul could have been spared for the sake of more information about Western philosophical influences on the Russian mind. The biography itself is an adequate summary, well documented from Berdyaev’s posthumously published autobiography (*Dream*

and Reality, 1951). While there is nothing original in all this material—as Vallon's own careful notes indicate, what he has to tell us is told elsewhere in English—it adds up to a useful compendium which points out the main sources of Berdyaev's ideas and clarifies his position as a free-wheeling existentialist reinterpreter of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

The exposition of Berdyaev's teaching covers five chapters, dealing in order with God, man, the God-Man, the nature of ethics, and the meaning of history. Vallon's presentation is orderly, fair, and as clear as the subject permits. In particular, it effectively brings out the subjective and experiential bent of Berdyaev's mind, with its unyielding hostility to scientific and ontological objectifications of personality. The critical reader may still question Berdyaev's conception of spirit and reality, and reject as misleading his use of ontological categories (such as Plato's *to me on*) as symbols of a metaphysically inexpressible encounter, but he will be less likely to misconstrue Berdyaev's intention, and may even grow in sympathetic appreciation.

Because he compares isolated ideas rather than total outlooks, Vallon's comparisons of Berdyaev with Tillich, Niebuhr, Buber, and other contemporaries are less instructive, while his final critical chapter is disappointingly superficial. Relying as he does in his exposition on Berdyaev's own formulation of the basic issues, he never quite manages to see what Berdyaev's thought looks like from a radically different standpoint. His work is essentially what he says it is—a "dissertation"—and its thoroughness and technical tidiness are not matched by any penetrating insight or significant reappraisal. Once they get past certain difficulties presented by the author's English style, many readers will learn a good deal about Berdyaev, but they will have to look elsewhere for the makings of a critical assessment of his thought.

EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER

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The New Shape of American Religion. By MARTIN E. MARTY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. x-180 pp. \$3.50.

Safe in Bondage. By ROBERT W. SPIKE. New York: Friendship Press, 1960. viii-165 pp. \$2.75 cl., \$1.50 pa.

"As a nation, we are reaching the point of near saturation so far as religious interest goes. . . . In other words, the current revival, while extensive, in many of its aspects lacks depth." With these exciting introductory remarks, Mr. Marty leads the reader into interesting paths as he evaluates today's religious scene. The data presented are incidental to the larger theme of a critique of religion in America. This is one of those rare books which leave one inspired, happy and joyous, until its closing chapters. As the author transfers from critique to constructive suggestions, a great deal is missing. Mr. Marty writes as a reporter, producing the well-turned phrase, attractive sentence structure and thought content. Many of his phrases are new. Much of his discussion is stimulating. The "God of Religion in General" is beautifully illustrated by the satire on the Apostles Creed, dedicated to the Community Church. The kinds of religious symbols evidenced by much of today's popular religious music, excesses of revivalists, and the use of religion in political campaigns, are all grist for his mill.

Beginning with Chapter Five one hopes for specifics. But Mr. Marty's "panurbia," a kaleidoscopic view of changes in suburban communities and increasing

urbanization of America, contributes little that is new. "Signposts to Theological Resources" fall far short of the author's intention to lead the reader into an "enrichment of the sense of Christian participation which goes beyond the sense of togetherness or camaraderie." The theology and church administration procedures espoused in the section called "The Practice of the Parish" are disappointing to say the least. The sense of frustration encountered as one reads these closing chapters may be due to the necessity to bring the criticism of the church from the rarified atmosphere of the "prophetic" down to the "practical."

The book is a worthy one. But surely the future holds better answers in terms of theological perspective, church administration dimensions, and a concept of the parish. Perhaps these are to be added by another writer who is as brave in the implementation of criticism as this author is in the mounting of it.

Safe in Bondage is one of those rare books on a familiar theme which dares to be constructively shocking. The problems of the urban church, which are its major theme, are as well understood by Robert Spike as by any contemporary church executive. He came to his executive tasks with the United Church of Christ (Congregational) from a distinguished career of industrial and urban service. His experience in Greenwich Village fitted him to speak of the arts and communication, as his other urban parishes prepared him for other insights into the city. He speaks with authority.

Safe in Bondage has been discouraging to many who have used it in home mission study courses this year. Let not the gloomy Niebuhrian theology overshadow the solid worth of this book! In no other book are there as many insightful vignettes of the new workable urban approach.

It is quite apparent to all of us that traditional rural Protestantism has failed in the inner city. More churches are being closed than opened in this most densely populated area. Spike creatively describes many of the "reasons why." Family-centered programs do not appeal to couples and individuals who are family-less. The creative arts, a ministry to Beatniks, the mastery of television are attractive clues to a new way to program the inner city. Dr. Spike is well aware of our need to minister to non-members. He speaks here as a former director of evangelism:

"The sort of strategy that is necessary, however, is not the saturation of a city with institutional dispensers of religion regardless of quality. Rather it is a sensitizing of the leaders of Protestantism to the diverse nature of evangelism in the metropolitan scene, and the necessity of trying different kinds of approaches appropriate to the cultural subdivisions involved. . . . The ways of joining people to the gospel are varied and elusive. The art of lighting up those ways is the art of evangelism."

If those non-members were similar to us, they would already be members of our staid old churches. That they are not in our churches should force us to examine our tactics.

"One of the accepted clichés of Protestantism" is that we have lost the "working man." "Statistics do not bear this out . . . What is true is that the Protestant churches may not be in very dynamic contact with the life of the industrial worker." Hooray! We need to hear more of this. The place of the minister in community affairs, in union meetings, at the factory, is *more* important in "blue-collar" communities, not less.

This book, available in paperback form at \$1.50, should be read by every Protestant who is concerned about the city. It may depress, irritate, or excite the

reader, but it will not be forgotten! Nor will it be easy to think about the changing church in the same way again.

HERBERT E. STOTTS

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Between God and History: The Human Situation Exemplified in Quaker Thought and Practice. By RICHARD K. ULLMANN. New York: The Macmillan Company (George Allen & Unwin), 1959. 212 pp. \$4.75.

Richard K. Ullmann, of Woodbrooke College, Birmingham, planned this book to be a critique and apologetic of Quakerism; but as he admits, it has turned out to be, from the Quaker point of view, a study of the predicament of modern man. For this we are grateful because in this small volume we find both an arresting discussion of Quaker thought and practice and, in the light of Quaker insights, Christian directives as to how to be in the world while not of it, caught between God and history. But this dilemma is resolved in consequence of the assertion that man, being in the world, is in the world of God. Man is one being; he not only has a body, he is a body and a spirit. Not only is he a body but his body is the person. The spiritualist is no less one-sided than the materialist if he neglects the physical aspects of life.

Without faith in the experience of, and the encounter with, the Transcendent we have no possibility of discovering meaning in history; but our Judeo-Christian heritage teaches us not to look for revelation primarily in the mystical experience that leaves the world and time behind. The central revelation of God is an event in history, God's coming into the world in Jesus Christ. The integration of spiritual insight experienced as personal salvation and a Christian concern for mankind and the whole creation, the "intensive" and the "extensive" interpretations of Christ, overcame in early Quakerism the tension between the Inner and the Historic Christ.

The difficulty of a person wanting to do the will of God is to learn how the divine will can be distinguished from his own opinions and desires. Friends have developed a theology which avoids both legalistic implementation of objectively revealed divine law and "the license of sheer subjectivity." Basic in this theology is the unchangeability and consistency of the Spirit of Christ. Every new faithful encounter with the Spirit becomes a testimony to the same Spirit. The guidance of the Spirit has to do primarily not with right action but with true being, truth, love, purity and goodness. This revelation comes to us not through abstract commandments but in concrete situations. Quaker history provides evidence for both communal and individual guidance, each safeguarding and strengthening the other.

This in an extraordinary sense is a book for our times.

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The Recovery of Purpose. By EMILE CAILLIET. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 192 pp. \$3.50.

In this able and heartening book the Stuart Professor of Christian Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary examines the sickness of the modern mind, finds it in lack of finality and purpose, and prescribes the biblical faith in God as the exit from the tragic view of necessity, doom, and despair. The book is "dedicated to the

brotherhood of those who are heavy laden," and the success with which Dr. Cailliet writes makes plain the much-observed essential element of hope for this world in the authentic message of the Bible. He sees that there can be a complacency of despair as well as of hope. The cry, "No exit," is far removed from the faith of the Bible; for God is the great doer of the unexpected, as both Old Testament Exodus and New Testament Resurrection typify. It is against the tragic view with its "complex pattern of doom" that our writer persuasively argues, and for this he surely deserves the attention, the praise, and the gratitude of a generation whose constant twofold temptation is either to ignore or to luxuriate in the tragic sense of life.

One feature of the book puzzles the present reviewer. Dr. Cailliet identifies the source of the tragic view as an anthropocentric empiricism, which lies at the root of our trouble. "Anthropocentric," "empirical," and "subjective" criteria appear to be equated, and a recurrent motif of the book is an attack on "hopelessly anthropomorphic ways of reasoning," from which the concepts of probability and symbolic logic at least begin to deliver us. But surely the use of language, the concept of purpose, and the biblical doctrine of God all combine here to make anthropomorphism not a regrettable necessity but essential.

What H. Wheeler Robinson, many years ago, identified as the higher anthropomorphism of the Old Testament is negatively a guard against theriomorphism and positively the only adequate means at our disposal of speaking of God at all significantly. In our generation as varied writers as H. H. Rowley, N. Berdyaev, A. J. Heschel, P. Tillich, have spoken in the same sense. Tillich, e.g., tells us that "anthropomorphic symbols are adequate for speaking of God religiously. Only in this way can he be the living God for man." And Dr. Cailliet himself (on page 157) does see "a way from anthropology to theology the moment the alternative is seen to be, not between Hebrew and Greek, but rather between the prophetic and the tragic view." The elimination of anthropomorphism is the elimination of the God of the Bible.

ROBERT CRAIG

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Counselling the Catholic: Modern Techniques and Emotional Conflicts.

By GEORGE HAGMAIER, C.S.P., and ROBERT GLEASON, S.J. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. xiv-301 pp. \$4.50.

To the Protestant reader who has already studied pastoral counseling, the principal significance of the present work is its demonstration of the increasing extent to which counseling as an approach, and the findings of modern psychiatry and psychology as a background, are being advocated and used within Roman Catholic circles. Although it remains discriminating throughout, as any Catholic book must, the tone of this volume is constructively irenic toward the psychological disciplines and professions (including Freud's findings although not his philosophy). This makes the general thrust of the volume relatively similar to many of the important recent Protestant works on a similar theme.

By the acknowledged intention of the authors, the book does not attempt to teach a priest the basic principles of counseling through the use of case material analyzed practically and theoretically. Neither does it profess to draw systematically the implications of the counseling process from a theological point of view. It is precisely

those two tasks that have previously been carried out with great skill by Father Charles A. Curran in his *Counseling in Catholic Life and Education*, and which the present authors quote several times with appreciation.

The main body of the content of this book concerns masturbation, homosexuality, alcoholism, scrupulosity, mental illness, and similar matters. In each discussion general information is presented concerning the nature, development, and course of the subject, followed by hints and suggestions to the priest on his dealing with persons having such problems. As in recent Protestant writings, the writers stress that alcoholism, for example, once developed, is a disease and outside the realm of free moral choice, even though at some point fore or aft moral considerations may also be or become relevant. The clarity and good sense contained in all these discussions should be of real help to many priests, and of course to their parishioners.

Not only does it seem to this reader that no new theoretical ground is broken in this book. It is also, in certain respects, a retreat to a general "hints and helps and suggestions" approach, away from more precise analysis of concrete counseling material in relation to fundamental counseling principles. The possible dangers of this become most evident in such discussions as that on mental illness, which is once over too lightly. On the other hand, the tone of the book should not only help many priests to realize that in psychology and psychiatry they have resources, not enemies, but should also show the rest of us that there are large dimensions of "counseling" on which we can talk with mutual benefit with Roman Catholics without having to violate their conception of "faith and morals" or compromise our own.

SEWARD HILTNER

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Religion That Is Eternal. By G. RAY JORDAN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 134 pp. \$3.25.

In this book there is a balm in Gilead to make the wounded whole. Here is the healing prescription of a great soul physician for the spiritual maladies of our day which make a lusterless religion tame and timid and tepid. Dr. G. Ray Jordan of Emory University here blesses this jaded generation with strength-laden vitamins guaranteed to bring joy for sadness, zeal for inertia, and beauty for ashes. To follow the directions of these scintillating chapters means to toil in these fields of time in the sense of the Eternal. The religion that is eternal exalts a faith which comes not boasting that it is of the old-time variety, but which is as new as today's sunshine and shadows. For even the dark is full of nightingales.

The author of this radiant volume dodges no pressing problems, evades no puzzling dilemmas, detours no frowning experiences. Here life as it is, and must be lived, is faced—the best of it, and the worst; and lo, here is the miracle of the worst turning to best. Dr. Jordan reveals the wealth every Christian owns. He captures the thrill which tingles in Dorothy Thompson's recent question to an unbelieving world. After gratefully acknowledging the noble spiritual heritage which came to her in her early parsonage home, and remembering that some cynic had referred to it as a parsonage poorhouse, she asks, "Was I really the inmate of a parsonage poorhouse, or was I in very truth the child of a king?"

Dr. Jordan answers the query of this gifted modern by depicting religion, not in terms of opiates, but of opulence. For this age of doubt and despair in these ten

chapters there is heard the music sweet and low, and yet triumphant, of a faith that sings.

FREDERICK BROWN HARRIS

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The Concept of Grace. By PHILIP S. WATSON. Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1959. 116 pp. \$2.00.

The renaissance of biblical theology has once more focused attention on the central concepts of New Testament faith. Christian convictions are being redefined in loyalty to the great phrases which first captured their meaning. *Grace* is obviously a cardinal word in the New Testament vocabulary. We still use it constantly, but seldom with much precision. Most people would be noticeably embarrassed if asked at short notice to define the word.

In this excellent little book, Professor Watson has placed all who wish to understand New Testament Christianity deeply in his debt. In the first four chapters, he examines with great care the meaning of the word *grace* as we find it in the New Testament. He then considers the place of grace in dogmatic development, and gives us a glimpse of the vicissitudes to which the concept has been subject in the course of history. In a concluding chapter he turns to "the reality of grace in our human experience." In simple and nontechnical language, he relates New Testament religion to our contemporary life.

This is a book which can be heartily recommended. Ministers who are looking for homiletical material will find it here in great abundance. Their insight will be quickened, their spiritual and intellectual resources will be enormously enriched. Those with a less insistent professional urge will find this book no less rewarding. It will enlarge their understanding of the Bible, and consequently of the Christian faith. And in the process it will feed their spirits with the Bread of Life.

Before coming to the United States, Professor Watson was a distinguished servant of the British Methodist Church. As professor of theology at Garrett Biblical Institute he will contribute richly to the religious life of this country.

GERALD R. CRAGG

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Thomas S. Kepler has compiled a new anthology, *Leaves From a Spiritual Notebook* (Abingdon, \$5.50): "a treasury of inspirational reading for personal meditation and a wide range of devotional resources for group leaders and public speakers." Part I contains material from letters, memoirs, biographies, "which speak to life situations"; Part II consists of classic and modern prayers; Part III, of devotional writings. Dr. Kepler occasionally intersperses meditations of his own. Three indexes: by titles, by authors, by topics.

Faith and Learning (Association Press, \$3.50) is the last book of Alexander Miller, stimulating teacher on three continents, published five months after his untimely death. Subtitled "Christian Faith and Higher Education in America," it brings to expression the insights worked out by him as professor of religion in Special Programs in the Humanities at Stanford University in California. He wrote the book primarily to be of use to the "ongoing discussions" of the National Student Christian Federation

and affiliated movements, but also with an eye to teachers and ministers and "those inquiring intellectuals" who "will gladly pick up clues where they can, even from the Christians!" He calls for the "integral university," for new and imaginative ways of teaching religion on campus, for "drastic rethinking of the university's role in relation to both church and state."

In the same general field, George A. Buttrick's *Biblical Thought and the Secular University*, consisting of his Rockwell Lectures at Rice Institute in 1959, has been put out by Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge (\$2.50). "Secularism is not objective truth, but a faith"—a false faith. But some supposed secularists live by a better faith than they admit; the "allegedly secular university" and biblical faith have gifts to bring to each other.

J. B. Phillips, the well-known translator of the New Testament into contemporary idiom, has written another forthright book, *God Our Contemporary* (Macmillan, \$2.50 cl., \$1.50 pa.). In his ability to speak with "uncompromising brilliance," both to those within the church and outside, about the crucial contemporaneity of the faith, he reminds one of C. S. Lewis. Lewis himself has written a new book, *The Four Loves* (Harcourt, Brace, \$3.75), which discusses candidly four types of human love—affection, friendship, eros, and love of God. Distinguishing initially between "Gift-love" and "Need-love," he maintains realistically that the latter is an essential component of any human love; and indeed, while unlike the love of God, it has its function of bringing man nearer to God.

The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, has brought out the 29th of its Ancient Christian Writers series: a first volume of *St. Augustine on the Psalms*, \$4.50, translated and annotated by Dame Scholastica Hebgin and Dame Felicitas Corrigan (Benedictines of Stanbrook, England). Augustine's central theme is the Church as a Mystical Body of Christ. "Never has the setting forth of Augustine's doctrine been more opportune than in view of the forthcoming ecumenical council."

On the occasion of the retirement last June of Dean Alexander C. Purdy of The Hartford Theological Seminary (he was also Professor of New Testament), a book of essays in his honor was issued by the Hartford Seminary Foundation Press: *New Testament Sidelights*, edited by Harvey K. McArthur (\$4.25 including postage). Contributors include the editor (on the Gospel According to Thomas), Bultmann (on demythologizing), Bishop G. Kennedy, W. K. Grobel ("The Human Jesus Outside the Gospel and Acts"), G. Hedley, H. J. Cadbury ("Soluble Difficulties in the Parables"). The book closes with a *curriculum vitae* and a bibliography of Dean Purdy's many writings.

Association Press has published a useful book, *Facing Protestant-Roman Catholic Tensions*, edited by Wayne H. Cowan (\$2.50 cl., 50¢ pa.). It consists of pertinent dialogue between leading Protestants (e.g. J. C. Bennett, R. M. Brown, C. Stanley Lowell, F. E. Johnson) and leading Catholics (e.g. W. Clancy, T. F. O'Dea, G. Weigel)—thirteen in all. In this same field Westminster Press has sent us *A Protestant Speaks His Mind*, by Ilion T. Jones (\$3.95). He starts with appraisal of the Irenic Movement, the aim of which (a united ecumenical church) he finds impossible of realization since "Roman Officialdom is not changing." He proceeds to examine New Testament Christianity, "the ancient undivided church," "some essential Protestant doctrines," and "religion in our American society"; concludes with proposals for Protestant action.

E. H. L.





